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ABSTRACT

THE EROTIC CHARMS OF PLATONIC DISCOURSE:
MYTHMAKING, LOVE POTIONS, AND ROLE REVERSALS

By
Dana M. Trusso
May 2015

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Patrick Lee Miller
Socrates engages his audience in Phaedrus with speeches that include revised or
newly composed myths that express his theory of philosophical eros. The aim of the
speeches is to generate a love for truth that spills over into dialogue. Speeches are a
starting point for dialogue, just like physical attraction is the beginning of love. In the
case of Phaedrus, the beginning of philosophy is portrayed using playful and rhetorically
rich speeches that serve as “love potions” awakening the novice’s soul, and ultimately
leading Phaedrus to higher rungs on the ladder of love through the palinode, a medicinal
speech. It is thinking about speeches, not the speeches themselves, which moves Socrates’
student Phaedrus from the love of speeches to the love of Beauty itself. This is a stark
contrast to the purpose of speechmaking for the sophist. The sophist seeks to enchant the
soul, while the philosopher seeks to charm the soul into loving wisdom through
stimulating discussions. Socrates also uses role reversals in the lover-beloved relationship
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to model the soul’s ascent, contrasting the traditional roles with the way the lover and
beloved are presented in Socrates’ speeches. The novice must actively recollect Beauty
itself in order to ascend, rather than passively listening to speeches that provide an image
of beauty. Socrates’ interlocutors must move themselves up the ladder of love from their
own philosophical eros; wisdom is not attained by merely being pushed all the way up
the ladder of love.
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INTRODUCTION

ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τόκος ἐν καλῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν
ψυχήν.
― Plato Symposium 206b7–8

1

In Phaedrus, Socrates engages a newcomer to philosophy with speeches that include
revised or newly composed myths that express his theory of philosophical eros. Speeches
are a starting point for dialogue, just as physical attraction is the beginning of love.
Socrates becomes a mythmaker for the love of wisdom. In this dissertation, I will show
that the use of rhetoric in the form of speeches imbued with mythological narratives is the
strategy adopted by Socrates to cultivate philosophical eros.1 The Platonic dialogue
Phaedrus highlights the intersection of eros and myth for the purpose of philosophical
growth, and also contains a formidable critique of sophistry. This is significant because
this dialogue is constructed with a specific audience in mind: those who already love
speeches.2
Socrates’ aim in Phaedrus is to generate a love for truth in a young man who
already has a love for speeches. Socrates seduces Phaedrus through charming speeches
that spill over into dialogue. If philosophy is the preparation for death, Socrates’

I refer here to Socrates as a character in Plato’s dialogues that most likely refers to the historical Socrates,
but perhaps does not represent his words and actions in an accurate way. I am not interested in entering a
debate about the Socratic problem. My purpose is to examine the role of eros in Socrates’ speeches situated
in Plato’s dialogues. For more on how Plato uses the historical Socrates as a platform for the character in
his dialogues, see Peterson 2011; Irwin 2008; Kahn 2012; Prior 2006, Nails 1995.
2
Speeches were an important part of civic life in ancient Athens—even walking from one place to another
was an occasion for the recital of a speech (Press 2012, 27–28). Phaedrus was a special case in that he had
an infamous predilection for speeches, and in Symposium he even inaugurates the speechmaking for the
evening (178a6). The symposiasts are more than willing to comply, and Alcibiades, who is absent for the
speeches, disrupts the party and gives a speech of his own (212e2). Many other interlocutors in Plato’s
dialogues were not as in love with speeches as Phaedrus was. For example, Chaerephon from Charmides is
obviously enamored more with Charmides’s body than any speech he could give, or his soul for that
matter—a fact that bothers Socrates to no end (154d).
1

2

seductive speeches are preparation for dialectical discussions.3 I assert that Socrates’ use
of rhetoric in his charming and mythologically heavy speeches is demarcated from the
realm of sophistry. Unlike the use of rhetoric by the sophists for the crowd’s instant
gratification, like the ladder of love in Symposium, the preparation of the soul is a long
and gradual process. There are necessary steps that one must take in order to reach the
end goal: truth via Forms. The first step is desiring truth, the second step knowing the
difference between images of truth and truth itself, and the third is engaging in rigorous
dialectics to access the Forms.4 Dialectical discussions aid the soul’s ascent to Beauty
itself, and are fueled by philosophical eros that trains the soul to seek and recognize
truth—a truth that ultimately transcends discourse.5 In this dissertation I focus on the first
step, while mentioning the other two steps in reference to how effective philosophical
eros is in redirecting the receptive novice towards Beauty itself, the Form central in
Plato’s erotic philosophy.6

Plato Phaedo 64a. All subsequent references to Plato’s Phaedo are from Plato: Complete Works, J.
Cooper and D. Hutchinson (eds.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. When using the term “dialectic,” I refer to
the method of reasoning carefully and systematically using the opposition (whether hypothetically or the
partner’s position) as a platform for understanding the topic at hand and testing the position for weaknesses.
The goal is to access Forms. Nails writes that dialectic, “whether elenctic, psychagogic, or some other
form” is different than other methods of inquiry in that it “reincorporates responses to determine each
successive move in the process” (Nails 1995, 200). In Plato’s Phaedo 101d–102a, Socrates describes the
dialectic as examining the two sides of a hypothesis carefully and separately, without “jumbling” up the
positions (101d–102a).
4
Plato Sophist 230d. All subsequent references to Plato’s Sophist are from Plato: Complete Works, J.
Cooper and D. Hutchinson (eds.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. Nehamas adds, “Even in Plato's own eyes,
the elenctic method is not sufficient to distinguish clearly between Socratic and sophistic inquiry” (13).
Alexander Nehamas, ‘‘Eristic, Antilogic, Sophistic, Dialectic: Plato’s Demarcation of Philosophy from
Sophistry,’’ History of Philosophy Quarterly (Vol 7 No. 1 (1990), 3–16).
5
In Republic, Plato says that dialectical discussion aims to “arrive through reason at the being of each thing
itself, and does not give up until he grasps what Good itself is with understanding itself” which leads to
individual to “reach the end of the intelligible realm” (532a6–b1). The soul’s ascent is made possible by the
“practice of the crafts we mentioned that have the power to lead the best part of the soul upward until it
sees the best among the things that are” (532c4–d1). Texts for all subsequent references to Plato’s Republic
are from C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing), 2004.
6
Although Diotima substitutes the word “good” for “beautiful” in Symposium, when commonly referring to
what we feel an erotic attraction to, beauty is usually broached before goodness (Plato Symposium 204e1).
3
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The aim of the philosopher is in stark contrast to the purpose of speechmaking for
the sophist, who seeks to enchant the soul for his own personal gain, whether money,
honor, or other lower desires—victory trumps truth in this case.7 In contrast, the
philosopher seeks to charm the soul into loving wisdom through stimulating discussions
for the purpose of both self and others pursuing truth. Victory, in the philosophical sense,
is twofold: it is not winning a debate or prize, rather finding the truth and inspiring others
to know the difference between the appearance of truth and truth itself so they too can
find the truth.8 Dialectic is the method best suited to uncovering truth.9 Socrates is
competitive in the sense that he is competing to lead the souls of the youth through what
he understands is a superior method—philosophy. “Indeed, it is precisely by designating
certain modes of discourse and spheres of activity as ‘anti-philosophical,’” Andrea
Nightingale asserts, “that Plato was able to create a separate identity for ‘philosophy.’”10
It is important for Socrates, and Plato through the character of Socrates, to draw out the
differences between philosophy and sophistry.
Socrates also exploits the ancient Athenian practice of the lover-beloved

Gregory Vlastos explains that in contrast to the sophists, the aim of Socrates’ method of crossexamination (elenchus) is “in principle a method of searching for truth, which eristics is not, but only a
method (or set of methods—a whole bag of tricks) for winning arguments, regardless of whether or not you
take what you are arguing for to be true” (31). Gregory Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus," Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy (Vol. 1 1983, 27–58).
8
Plato Gorgias 458a. Texts for all subsequent references to Plato’s Gorgias are from Plato: Complete
Works, J. Cooper and D. Hutchinson (eds.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.
9
Plato defines dialectic as “a method of argument which aims at the discovery of the real nature of things
and is not guided by those merely verbal distinctions which at best indicate how the world appears to us (R.
454a–c, Tht. 164c–d).” Nehamas continues to explain that Plato” insists that the real nature of things is
constituted by the Forms in which these things participate.” The philosopher who “studies the Forms […]
and the sophist now do something fundamentally different and in different ways” (Nehamas 1990, 11–12).
10
Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 10–11.
7
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relationship as expressed in both dialogues.11 This relationship provided an educational
setting for the aristocratic Athenian youth. They would partner with an older, established
man who would teach the youth how to be a successful and virtuous citizen. The
relationship also involved the older male, the erastēs, using his beloved boy as a source
of sexual stimulation. The way Socrates uses the lover-beloved relationship in his
speeches provides an implicit critique of the practice, specifically the way in which the
boy experiences love passively instead of actively. In other words, Socrates is trying to
show that we are all lovers, with Beauty as our ultimate beloved.
I argue that Plato makes Socrates a mythmaker in order to charm his audience.
Plato constructs dialogues with vivid characters, enchanting myths, and provocative
concepts in order to seduce his audience—both the internal characters like Phaedrus and
the external readers of the dialogue. Taken literally myth provides superficial
explanations for various phenomena. Beyond the literal interpretation are the many
avenues towards ascent. For example, myth “brings us to a point where philosophical
recollection is possible” as Daniel Werner argues, but “it is through nonmythical means
that the process must find its ultimate fulfillment.”12 If philosophical thinking is going to

C.D.C. Reece explains: “As a man who loves boys in an idiosyncratic, because elenctic, way, Socrates is
placed in potential conflict with the norms of a particular Athenian institution, that of paiderastia—the
socially regulated intercourse between an older Athenian male (erastēs) and a teenage boy (erōmenos,
pais), through which the latter was supposed to learn virtue. And the potential, as we know, was realized
with tragic consequences—in 399, Socrates was found guilty of corrupting the young men of Athens and
condemned to death. (Plato on Love: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades with Selections from
Republic and Laws, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2006, xxi).
12
Daniel S. Werner, Myth and Philosophy in Plato’s Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 107.
11
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occur in this context, dialectical reasoning must follow Socrates’ mythical tales.13
Philosophical discussions initiate the examination of difficult questions while nurturing a
passion for discovering the answers. In other words, the love of wisdom expressed as
philosophical eros sustains rational thought directed at the Forms.
Speeches are a starting point for dialogue. If Socrates did not lure Phaedrus
through the enchantment of logos, which attracts the young man so strongly, Phaedrus
would most likely walk away from philosophical discussions about speeches. If physical
attraction is the beginning of love, for Phaedrus a beautiful speech opens up the
possibility for something far greater, by pursuing what speeches ultimately should aim
for—the truth available through the Forms. Socrates’ speeches are the intersection of eros
and wisdom: philosophical eros means that one love something enough to think deeply
about it.
Plato’s multilayered speeches allow the philosophical novice as well as the
professional philosopher, and everyone in between, to delight in both reading and
thinking about these charming discourses. This delight is ultimately caused not just by
seductive language or ideas, but an attraction to what transcends discourse itself—the
Form of Beauty. Philosophical eros ultimately is the passionate desire for Beauty itself.
The soul is attracted to Beauty, but cannot necessarily distinguish the appearance of
beauty from true Beauty. To do this requires dialectical ascent, i.e., to gradually learn to
recognize true knowledge requires a training of the mind (what Plato calls recollection) to
13

Utilizing myth in an educational setting without reflecting on its greater meaning would be like a
philosophy professor who asks his students to memorize the steps of Plato’s allegory of the cave, but does
not initiate a discussion about the meaning behind the literal interpretation. Some students get lost in the
details by asking questions like, “Who imprisoned them? Who made their chains? Who gave birth to the
prisoners? Is there an evil wizard? Does the liberated prisoner get a sunburn when he basks in the sun too
long?”
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examine the legitimacy of a variety of opinions. In order to start this process one must
first recognize an intellectual lack, and desire to fill it with wisdom. Ascent is the activity
of dialectical reasoning proceeding correctly toward the Forms. According to Plato’s
Phaedrus and Socrates’ speech in Symposium, the soul flourishes when dialectical
reasoning is paired with eros.
For my purposes, I focus on the Platonic dialogues that show the intersection
between philosophical eros, charming speeches employing myth, and a context involving
an audience of speech-lovers who have the potential to transform into wisdom-lovers.14
In both Phaedrus and Symposium, the character Phaedrus acts as the quintessential lover
of speech who is also a beloved, thus youthful and impressionable, whereas Alcibiades,
who bookends the speeches at Agathon’s symposium, represents unfulfilled potential.15
Alcibiades mistakenly believes he can satisfy his erotic longings inspired by Socrates by
loving Socrates instead of loving the pursuit of wisdom. Phaedrus remains focused on the
more abstract beauty of logos in speeches. Other relevant Platonic dialogues are
mentioned, such as Republic, Charmides, and Gorgias but only briefly and in reference to
ideas introduced in Phaedrus and Symposium.
In Phaedrus, Socrates’ shift from speechmaking to dialogue uncovers the nature of
Platonic love: an erotic attraction that gradually transforms from the love of images of

14

For a fascinating account of how allegorical interpretation of myth in philosophy evolved from
interpreting Homeric myths. Gerard Naddaf, “Allegory and the Origins of Philosophy” in Logos and
Muthos: Philosophical Essays in Greek Literature (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 99–132.
15
Phaedrus is also present in Plato’s Protagoras 315a–316a, along with many others such as Charmides
and Alcibiades, as well as fellow symposisasts Eryximachus, Agathon, and Pausanias. Also noteworthy is
that Alcibiades is present in the following Platonic dialogues: Protagoras, Symposium, Euthydemus,
Alcibiades I, and Alcibiades II, and mentioned in Gorgias (Socrates’ describes Alcibiades as his object of
love along with philosophy (481d), and Socrates refers to him as his friend (519b1). Lysias is present in
Phaedrus and Republic.
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beauty to the love of Beauty itself.16 The dialogue begins as Phaedrus and Socrates walk
outside the city walls, and find a shady place by a stream to converse about love.17
Phaedrus reads a speech he originally tucked away, hidden from Socrates. Lysias’s
speech sounds suspiciously tailored for Phaedrus—a potential beloved—or other
handsome, young, impressionable youth. The speech argues that it is better to choose to
associate with non-lovers over lovers.18 The speech is flimsy and unconvincing, both
rhetorically and philosophically, especially since the way Lysias defines love is on a
purely physical basis. At the close, Phaedrus is beaming with pride and asks what
Socrates thinks of the speech; Socratic irony follows.19 When Socrates explains the
redundancy and cursory nature of Lysias’s speech, Phaedrus responds, “You are
absolutely wrong, Socrates. That is in fact the best thing about the speech.”20 At this point
in their exchange, Phaedrus is too emotionally tied to the speech to doubt its perfection
and engage in a meaningful discussion, so Socrates agrees to Phaedrus’s (aggressive)
request for an improved speech.
Socrates purports to improve Lysias’s speech by avoiding redundancy, but his
speech fails to make a strong case because it examines the disadvantages associated with
having a lover while never mentioning the advantages of a non-lover.21 Socrates’ first
speech also rests on Lysias’s assumption that the “lover is less sane than the non-lover,” a

Plato Phaedrus 257c. After Socrates’ second speech—referred to as the palinode because it retracts the
treatment of love from his first speech—he transitions to a dialogue by asking Phaedrus what a
speechwriter aims to do. All subsequent references to Plato’s Phaedrus are from Phaedrus, translated with
notes by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1995).
17
Plato Phaedrus 227a–230e.
18
Plato Phaedrus 230e5–234c5.
19
Plato Phaedrus 234d. I imagine Socrates says this with all the enthusiasm of a “non-lover,” i.e., in a
completely monotone voice: “It's a miracle, my friend; I’m in ecstasy.”
20
Plato Phaedrus 235b1.
21
Plato Phaedrus 237a6–241d3.
16

8

claim that he will agree with in the second speech through a reversal of the negative
connotation into a positive one.22 Both Lysias’s written speech and Socrates’ impromptu
speech claim that the beloved should take a lover who does not love him because a nonlover is more sane, rational, and in control of his physical appetites than a lover.
However, as the palinode and Socrates’ speech in Symposium point out, it is only through
love (properly understood as philosophical eros) that the soul is able to ascend to the
form of Beauty and promote the individual’s own excellence through rational thought and
self-control. Unfortunately, Phaedrus is more than happy to play with these “dead
images” and stillborn speeches.23 Socrates’ goal is to make Phaedrus aware of his
misdirected love and give him the opportunity to direct his desire toward a more worthy
object so that play is turned into serious love. Phaedrus must take this step on his own as
a self-mover, with Socrates as the charming midwife coaching him through the
challenging process.
Socrates constructs the palinode as a speech imbued with myth to aid Phaedrus’s
transition from opinion to true knowledge.24 Mary Margaret McCabe remarks that the
way Plato writes is “indissoluble from what he is trying to say.”25 Plato appropriates
mythological tales and transforms them into a philosophically significant discussion on
the nature of love and learning. The memorable interweaving of myth into the palinode
provides answers to questions raised in both Lysias’s speech and Socrates’ first speech,
while generating many questions of its own for the attentive listener. This speech is
22

Plato Phaedrus 236b1.
Kathryn Morgan, Myth and Philosophy from the Pre-Socratics to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 228.
24
Plato Phaedrus 244a–257b.
25
Mary Margaret McCabe, “Plato’s Ways of Writing” in The Oxford Handbook of Plato, ed. By Gail Fine
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 88–113), 89.
23
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organized into four main topics: 1) the nature of eros as divine madness, 2) the nature of
the soul, 3) the movement of the soul explained as ascent and descent in response to
Beauty itself, and 4) the movement of humans as embodied souls in response to eros
within the lover-beloved relationship. Each of these four topics is crafted to lead
Phaedrus’s soul from the lower desire for beautiful speeches to the higher desire for
Beauty itself. Ascent is possible if, by Phaedrus falling in love with Socrates’ charming
speech he has a strong desire to examine it further, whereby Socrates initiates discussing
why speeches attract Phaedrus and what speeches do to his soul. Phaedrus must look
within and gauge his own soul over and against each of the above topics by asking selfreflective questions like: Have I experienced divine madness? (Phaedrus does seem
“mad” about speeches.) What is the nature of my soul? Is my soul ascending to the
source of my madness and thereby flying high, and how does this reflect my relationship
as a passive beloved? Based on my eros directed at beautiful speeches, is my soul
flourishing or floundering?
What follows from the series of three speeches is the most philosophically
significant part of the dialogue—the discussion about speeches, speechmaking, and more
specifically rhetoric.26 The last few pages of the dialogue are devoted to a discussion of
the nature of writing versus thinking about writings couched within the myth of Theuth
and Thamus.27 Plato cautions Phaedrus that writing and reading are not the same as
thinking—advice that the reader of Plato’s dialogues can take away as well. Phaedrus is
meant to serve as the platon tree next to the stream, i.e., as a beautiful environment that
lures one into intellectually stimulating discussions on the various topics broached in the
26
27

Plato Phaedrus 257c–274b5.
Plato Phaedrus 278b.
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dialogue, whether it is the soul, eros, education, language, or writing. Phaedrus, as a
work of art, is the image of wisdom but not wisdom itself. It is, however, an accurate
enough image of beauty to inspire a yearning for philosophical discussions that gets one
closer to Beauty itself. Platonic dialogues provide a beautiful environment, cultivating the
philosophical eros necessary to give birth to wisdom. The environment is not the end in
itself, it is the means to the end. Plato’s dialogues are like the body in that we are initiated
into the ways of eros when we first fall in love (with a romantic partner or with a
dialogue), but always for the love of what lies beyond the sensual and charming.
In this dissertation I use the analogy of the ladder of love in Symposium to explain
further how speeches are the starting point for dialogue. The speeches of Symposium
begin with Phaedrus enthusiastically turning the drinking party into a celebration of love
through speeches. Phaedrus is on his way to loving the Forms, but he must learn to love
the pursuit of wisdom through dialectical reasoning in the same passionate way that he
loves the rhetorical flourishes involved in the speeches that drift through Athens like the
song of summer cicadas.28 The speeches end with Alcibiades’ disruption and his speech
about Socrates. What is the connection between Phaedrus’s speeches in Phaedrus and
Alcibiades’ solicitation of Socrates at the end of Symposium? What is the cause of
Phaedrus’s attraction to speeches? Why does Alcibiades want to seduce Socrates? The
answer to these questions stems from that which truly attracts the soul: the Form of
Beauty. The love of wisdom expressed through dialogue is the next rung on the ladder
ascending closer to this goal. The sophist remains stuck on the lower rungs of the ladder
Cf. Plato Apology 23c. The youth of Athens are speech-lovers in that “they enjoy listening to people
being cross-examined” and begin imitating the Socratic method “of their won accord,” where they discover
that most people do not have the knowledge they claim they have. All subsequent references to Plato’s
Apology are from Plato: Complete Works, J. Cooper and D. Hutchinson (eds.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.
28
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of love because he never directs his desire away from the lower pleasures to the higher
pleasures found via philosophical eros.
Phaedrus, so full of potential, begins the speechmaking endeavor, and Alcibiades,
who once was also so full of potential, ends the speeches on a note of the failure of
philosophical eros to take hold of his soul. Alcibiades remains on the lower rungs of the
ladder of love, blaming Socrates for his frustration. Alcibiades represents the descent of
the soul. He was unable to train his horses to follow the rational rule of the charioteer,
and therefore is not able to climb the ladder of love toward Beauty Itself. Will Phaedrus
succumb to the same fate?29 Socrates’ pedagogical strategy takes into account the need to
persuade the novice that the “unexamined life is not worth living,” even when that
persuasion involves constructing speeches imbued with mythology.30
Persuasion does not mean that you convince someone that your interpretation is
correct, but that they care about the subject and desire to know the truth of the matter.
Plotinus criticizes Heraclitus for only speaking in metaphors that “have left us guessing,
since he has neglected to make clear to us what he is saying,” but realizes that was
“perhaps because we ought to seek by ourselves, as [Heraclitus] himself sought and
found.”31 Although Heraclitus could have written in a clearer format, he does not for
worthy pedagogical reasons. One gains knowledge of a subject by experiencing it rather
than listening to a description of it. Werner argues that neither “myth nor any other form
of discourse could serve as an adequate teaching instrument,” and insists that Plato would
29

Although Phaedrus is associated with the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries in 415, and fled into
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not believe the myths he writes are true accounts of such thing as the Forms.32 Werner
argues that Plato’s myth in Phaedrus points to the limits of language. On this point I
believe that Werner understands the nature of the dialogue format, especially when he
explains the limitations of language “do not mean that the philosopher ought to leave
behind or move beyond all discourse. Far from it, for in our incarnate state discourse is
both essential and unavoidable […] At its best, philosophical discourse—dialectic—can
serve as a kind of provocation.”33 I endeavor to illustrate that the goal of Socrates as a
mythmaker is not to provide the ultimate nature of reality, but to provoke his audience to
think about the possibilities in a philosophical sense while providing a mythological
narrative closer to reality than existing myths.
Kathryn Morgan states, “myth stands for and exaggerates the problematic aspects
of language.”34 In Phaedrus and Symposium, Socrates is engaging specifically speechlovers. Phaedrus and Alcibiades, as well as the other symposiasts, revel in logos. In this
sense, the myths Plato constructs or revises do not merely “refer to themselves and to the
limitations of mythical discourse,” but serve as “a tool for methodological awareness.”35
Werner understands what I believe is the greatest difference between a speech from a
sophist and from a philosopher: the sophist leaves no room for questioning and thus less
potential for self-knowledge.
For example, in Phaedrus Lysias’s speech provides a cursory list of reasons a boy
should devote himself to a nonlover rather than a lover by highlighting the disadvantages
of being with a lover who is driven by appetite, and the advantages of being with a non32
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lover who is driven by reason and self-control. Lysias’s speech, as told by Phaedrus, ends
thus, “Well, I think this speech is long enough. If you are still longing for more, if you
think I have passed over something, just ask.”36 Lysias does not articulate a definition of
love, nor can he therefore discuss whether this definition is accurate; consequently, he
seems unsure whether he has proved his point with strong support. Ironically, Lysias has
passed over an examination of the idea that is really interesting and has the most
importance: love. Lysias also passes over any counterclaims concerning the
disadvantages of a nonlover or the advantages of a lover. Phaedrus does not notice this
omission, but instead replies, “Don’t you think it’s simply superb, especially in its choice
of words.”37 The sophist’s speech does not provoke or invite critical reflection; it
demands assent. The sophist concerns himself with pure charm—does the speech sound
strong and conform to the standard format accepted by other speechmakers? In doing so,
the sophist instructs his pupils to imitate him on his unreflective path.
Socrates’ palinode, by contrast, invites the reader to reflect on a myriad of
philosophical questions. Socrates himself invites Phaedrus to examine the strengths and
weaknesses of rhetoric after the speech, although Phaedrus, disappointingly, seems to
have assented to Socrates’ claims for the sole reason that Socrates was able to give a
rousing speech and put Lysias’s speech to shame. Sophists follow the standard laws
governing a “good speech” without understanding why these standards are accepted as
producing good speeches. They are like someone who follows societal laws without
questioning whether the laws are right. Socrates’ palinode is different because, as Morgan
notes, Socrates uses myth as “philosophical rhetoric” that helps push “Phaedrus from a
36
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life of superficiality, based on thoughtless acceptance of rhetorical and social convention,
to a life of philosophy that analyses the relationship of these conventions with the truth.38
Socrates provides an avenue of beneficial change (ascent) for Phaedrus; it is Phaedrus’s
responsibility alone whether or not to choose to turn his life around. Socrates’ use of
myth invites Phaedrus and Alcibiades, along with other speech-lovers and the readers of
Plato’s dialogues, to begin to question the nature of speeches, language, and truth itself.
Mythmaking is not the only avenue to this goal, as dialectic serves the same purpose of
answering challenging questions and generating even more penetrating analysis.
However, for some speech-lovers like Phaedrus the first step towards philosophical
reflection involves charming tales that inspire reflection. Subsequently, dialectical
exchanges that delve deeper into the truth of the matter are made possible because of the
profound passion for understanding that thinking about those beautiful speeches
generated.
Plato’s use of myth directly appeals to philosophical novices because it does not
attempt to engage them using rational argumentation. The philosophical novice or “nonphilosopher,” as Werner says, will not “spontaneously move himself toward philosophy”
because he does not know that he grasps only images and not true knowledge.39 Given
that rational discussions do not interest the non-philosopher, Werner continues that “the
remaining option is to find a mode of discourse that is suited to an internally discordant
soul.”40 The mode of discourse that is best suited to engage the novice is myth because
the philosophical message hidden in mythological ascent narratives “targets especially
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those readers who have the potential to become philosophers, but who have not yet
actualized that potential.”41 Instead of enjoying the myth in the palinode for its charms
alone, the philosopher hopes to turn the philosophical novice towards understanding that
the subsequent discourses on myth are the most charming logos of all, as well as to fulfill
the higher purpose of turning the non-philosopher to the love of wisdom. Sometimes a
story is told to entertain, but it can also be a means to instruct and “lead the soul” as in
psychagōgia.42 Socrates leads the soul by understanding what interests the novice based
on what he currently loves, and using that to construct the most charming mode of
communication—in the case of Phaedrus and many other Athenians, their interest in
speeches surpasses their love of wisdom. Myth is specifically potent because it allows the
audience to reflect on how the myth applies to their own life, spurring self-knowledge.
Morgan points to the two major interpretations of myth in philosophy: 1) Myth
designed to add charm to otherwise difficult or overly technical ideas, or the “honeyed
cup” theory43 and 2) that myth points to a knowledge beyond discourse in mystical terms
by “hinting at the nature of the world inhabited by the Platonic forms and the
disembodied soul.”44 Although she is more in line with the second, she rallies against
interpreting myth categorically and instead wishes to understand the nature of myth
within the philosophical context in all of its complexities and nuances.
So which of these two theories does Socrates’ use of myth in his charming
speeches fall under? In Phaedrus and Symposium Plato does not need to use speeches
41
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imbued with myth to “brim around the cup with the sweet juice and yellow of the
honey.”45 The audience—Phaedrus and the symposiasts, respectively—broach the topic
of eros, not Socrates. His audience is already inclined to listen to speeches on love, so it
is not the topic that needs sweetening. A second interpretation could be that Socrates is
sweetening the revelation of the true nature of love, which surpasses the realm of the
senses for a more abstract understanding of the soul’s attraction and recollection of the
form of Beauty. This makes more sense. However, I do not believe that Socrates’
revelation is one that would make a person shudder in revulsion, but it is a radically
different understanding on a topic about which everyone seems to be an “expert.” This is
not similar to Lucretius, who believes that his philosophy needs sweetening because the
“doctrine seems in general somewhat woeful unto those who’ve had it not in hand, and
the crowd starts back from it in horror.”46 Is the knowledge that eros is ultimately the
erotic attraction to the form of Beauty itself like “wormwood's bitter draught” and such a
hard pill to swallow? It is puzzling and provocative, but I am not convinced that it is as
harsh or foul as this metaphor implies.
Instead, the challenge for Socrates is to sustain his audience’s interest long
enough to engage them in a discussion on the speeches. The speeches are honeyed with
myth not because the topic is too difficult to handle, but to inspire and sustain a curiosity
about the myth that reaches into the realm of dialectics. Myth is medicinal in that at best
it opens up the audience to the possibility of critical reflection on how they understand
and apply eros to their lives currently, which leads to self-knowledge. With this
awareness, they can better understand how their souls respond to eros and what the best
45
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object of eros is for the sake of their souls. By participating in philosophical discussion
on love, the audience is “not merely duped, but rather thus grow strong again with
recreated health.”47 In this sense Socrates’ vivid myths are delightful medicine that “if by
such method haply I might hold the mind of thee upon these lines of ours,” or is Socrates’
case, to hold them long enough after the speeches to engage in philosophical
discussions.48 The speeches are charming (honeyed), and the way Socrates hints at
something beyond the discourse (Beauty itself) is mysterious enough to inspire a desire to
understand the nature of eros in a more reflective way. Therefore, the way that Socrates
employs charming myths in his speeches corresponds to both interpretations of myth in
philosophy Morgan provided, with the addition of inspiring philosophical eros in the
souls of the audience members so that they may unlock the mysteries of eros for
themselves.
The significance of myth in Plato’s dialogues is how to use myth to illuminate the
complex nature of the soul’s ascent in response to eros. The myths serve as a way to
illustrate the lack of knowledge in the mind of the novice critical thinker, and the need to
investigate the issue further. As Anne-Marie Schultz points out, “Socrates’ narrative
voice functions as eros itself does, as a force that moves the soul toward communion with
the Good.”49 There are many levels of interpretation available to the reader of Plato’s
works, specifically made possible by the dialogue format as it highlights the role of eros
in the soul. For example, the Socratic method dazzles (and frustrates) the philosophical
novice reading a Platonic dialogue for the first time. Perhaps she desires to learn more
47
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about the topics introduced by the character Socrates, while also practicing his method in
other areas of interest.50 The professional philosopher interprets the text in a similar way,
but could look more closely at how Socrates charms the novice reader/interlocutor into
sustaining an interest in knowledge, specifically self-knowledge. One can read the
dialogues as a way to understand the self by learning to ask the right questions, or one
could read the dialogues to learn how to inspire her students to seek self-knowledge. Both
are different viewpoints by which one could interpret Socrates’ charming speeches.
An example of the many levels of interpretation within the dialogues themselves
is how Socrates uses himself as a model of erotic ascent in Diotima’s account of the
ladder of love in Symposium. Instead of giving a speech as himself, he characterizes
himself as the youth listening to a great prophetess teach him about the art of love. In this
sense, the reader is listening to the speech of Diotima from the perspective of Socrates.
Another perspective is that of the character who is presented as foolish or lacking
wisdom, like Phaedrus, or one who fails to transform into a wisdom-lover, like
Alcibiades. Instead of interpreting Socrates’ method as a failure based on these puzzling
characters, which would end the conversation, the captivated reader looks beyond the
outcomes of Phaedrus and Alcibiades and begins to ask questions regarding the
characters’ personal weaknesses, then developing answers that could perhaps bring more
self-mastery into the reader’s own life.51 Discussing the shortcomings of Phaedrus and
Alcibiades—colorful characters in Plato’s charming dialogues—brings us one step closer
to discussing the shortcomings within our own souls, which is a much more challenging
50
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task. To love Plato’s dialogues because of Socrates’ enchanting speeches is the starting
point for self-knowledge and philosophical reflection, whereas the uninterested reader
reaches the boundaries of the speech and does not discuss it further.52
This dissertation moves through Plato’s Phaedrus according to the ascent narrative
expressed in the ladder of love from Symposium. In Chapter 1, I show how myth and play
serve to open up the novice intellectually, and leads his soul to love wisdom. Every
ending needs a beginning. In the case of Plato’s erotic dialogues, the beginnings of
philosophy are portrayed as playful and rhetorically rich speeches that serve as a “love
potion” to awaken the novice’s soul. Philosophy is compared to an enchantment or potion
because Socrates brings the novice into a beautiful environment for the soul to
dialectically “play” as the starting point for philosophy. The next step of this
philosophical journey is the charmed soul choosing to embrace philosophical eros instead
of bodily eros. The expression of philosophical eros is rich philosophical discussions. The
end of the journey is falling in love with divine Forms reaching contemplation of Beauty
Itself. Many of Socrates’ myths reflect the gradual movement from the erotic beginning
imbued with seduction and persuasion to the end of philosophy that transcends all
discourse as the mind communes with Beauty itself. In Symposium, revealing the ladder
of love is how the prophetess Diotima initiates Socrates into the art of loving young boys.
In Phaedrus, the charioteer analogy, in its vivid portal of the ascent and descent of the
soul, sparks the discussion after the palinode. Socrates sweetens the prospect of
philosophical discussion by constructing the myth of the cicadas after Phaedrus agrees to
Thrasymachus is an example of a character, or “antiphilosopher” as Griswold calls him, who is unwilling
to truly think about justice once he voices his personal opinion (Griswold, 1988), 166). He is not attracted
by philosophical eros to the Forms, but is instead pulled by the weight of his own his love of honor and
money as much as he is attracted to his own opinions (Plato Republic 338d–341a, 343a–344c).
52
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talk about speeches. The cicada myth mirrors the charioteer analogy’s ascent narrative.53
What the myths in Phaedrus and Symposium have in common are the use of eros to
arouse philosophical eros. This dissertation seeks to follow Socrates’ ascent myths as he
leads the soul towards philosophy by inciting philosophical eros using rhetorically rich
speeches and vivid myths. It traces the goal of ascent as the self-controlled soul returning
to the divine in contemplation.
Chapter 2 examines how sophistry is also compared to a potion, but a potion that
awakens the soul without a method of ascent and the soul starts on an aimless, sometimes
dangerous journey. The structure of Phaedrus reflects how Socrates leads the soul from
speeches to dialogue, which expresses the turn from a lower understanding of love to a
higher one in pursuit of Beauty itself. Dialogue is the best vehicle to the Forms, while
rhetoric and written speeches do not properly lead the soul. In this chapter I will show
that a vital part of Plato’s philosophical eros is the use of charming speeches as a type of
love potion. The speeches are psychagōgic (soul-leading) and pharmakon (potions)
meant to transform the love of speeches to the love of wisdom. Socrates’ psychagōgic
pharmakon act especially as a response to sophistry. A sophist persuades the crowd with
charming speeches that do not necessarily provide truth, only the image of truth. The
sophist utilizes rhetoric to persuade, while not actually pursuing what is good, noble, or
true. The philosopher uses informed dialectic to pursue precisely those things for which
rhetoric can only provide appearances. The move from loving speeches to loving selfknowledge via discussion of speeches is Socrates’ pedagogical strategy to gradually lead
Phaedrus out of the lower rungs of reality and toward the highest rung of Beauty itself.
The allegory of the cave from Plato’s Republic is as well, but will not be dealt with in as much detail as
the ones mentioned above, which are the primary concern for my argument.
53
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Chapter 3 argues that the soul’s self-motion is the conceptual hinge that connects
Socrates’ charming speeches and the novice’s ascent. The motion is fueled by
philosophical eros, like the horses that power a chariot’s movement. If the soul were a
passive receptacle that ascended to Beauty itself when properly filled with virtue by a
teacher, then the lover-beloved model of education would function well. However, if the
soul must actively move itself towards wisdom and cannot be compelled by force, then
the lover-beloved relationship is not the best educational model. Socrates provides an
alternative model that takes into consideration the nature of the soul as essentially selfmoving in order to explain the subsequent role of philosopher-educators. The best
educator acts as a midwife by creating charming speeches that help the student give birth
to ideas; the educator acts as a daimōnic architect as he constructs a beautiful
environment in between wisdom and ignorance that opens up the novice to self-reflection
and dialectical exchanges. The mythological narratives I use to illuminate Plato’s use of
self-motion in the soul’s ascent are the charioteer analogy in Phaedrus and the
description of eros as a daimōn in Symposium. Eros as the intermediary messenger
between the immortal and mortal pursues Beauty itself, and the goal of the charioteer is
to rise to the rim of heaven to peep at the Forms, Beauty itself among them. The question
is: does Beauty move the soul towards itself, or does the soul move itself to the source of
its attraction?
In Chapter 4 I argue that the soul as self-mover is illuminated by the charioteer
myth in Phaedrus and Alcibiades’ disruption after Socrates’ speech in Symposium. These
passages invite the interlocutor to reflect on the relationship between lover and beloved
and their attraction to Beauty itself. In both dialogues, Socrates uses role reversals in the

22

lover-beloved relationship to model the soul’s ascent. In the ladder of love and charioteer
procession, the myth vividly portrays an erotic tale of self-ascent through actively
participating in dialectics that strengthen the soul’s capacity to move itself (with an erotic
push from Socrates) towards Beauty itself via dialectically inspired contemplation. For
example, Zeus represents the lover and Ganymede the beloved in Socrates’ retelling of
the myth. The daimōnic power of philosophy is personified as Eros, mythologized as Pan,
and embodied as Socrates. I apply Plato’s idea of self-motion to the vivid examples of the
soul overcoming the physical appetites of the dark horse in Phaedrus, as well as to the
example of someone who is not able to overcome his lower appetites—Alcibiades in
Symposium.
To conclude, I provide one final account of how Socrates’ speeches invite
Phaedrus to transform his life by recollecting Beauty itself. The prayers that are scattered
about Phaedrus serve as signposts for Phaedrus’s ascent, and reminders of the worthiness
of philosophy to care for his soul as philosophical eros awakens recollection of the
Forms. Socrates is providing Phaedrus with a gentle reminder of the lessons gathered
from their day spent together under the platon tree, which culminates in the last myth.
The final myth of Phaedrus is Socrates’ critique of writing, which should make the
reader of Plato’s dialogues uneasy. Plato is reminding us that we are reading about the
benefits of dialectical reasoning, and are not actually participating in it. It is as if he is
cautioning us not to fall prey to the comforting notion that all answers lie in books. The
speeches of Phaedrus and Symposium are the potion that induces the labor of dialogue,
with Socratic elenchus as the midwife of self-movers, coaching the birth of dialogue.54
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Reading is not enough; thinking and discussing ideas allows the soul to ascend.
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CHAPTER 1

CONJURING PHILOSOPHICAL ENCHANTMENTS:
MYTH AND PLAY

Could this be the very spot?
The stream is lovely, pure and clear:
just right for girls to be playing nearby.
— Plato Phaedrus 229b6–8
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To entice Phaedrus, Socrates must give him something to play with that will stimulate his
interest. As a speech-lover, Phaedrus is attracted to the logos version of eye-candy. It
becomes clear from the speech he rehearses and the speech he demands from Socrates
that he passionately enjoys speeches, but does not reflect on their content in a serious
way. Socrates’ aim is to construct a compelling speech that so enchants Phaedrus that he
wants to stay with it longer than the duration of the speech; that Phaedrus will be open to
playing with the ideas the speech generates long enough to spur serious philosophical
reflection. The setting of the dialogue promotes Socrates’ aim and functions as a third
character present in the dialogue alongside Phaedrus and Socrates.

1.1 Setting the Stage to Seduce a Lover of Speeches
Socrates and Phaedrus walk outside the walls of Athens and find a lovely place to “get
[their] feet wet” together.1 The playful and flirtatious tone of the dialogue is set when
Socrates asked what Phaedrus was holding underneath his cloak.2 Socrates’ playfulness
helps the reader understand his upcoming mythmaking in the greater context of playing
with ideas in order to discover the Forms.3 Flirtatious seduction is the first step to
engendering philosophical eros in Phaedrus, and myth is the vehicle for Phaedrus to
move himself from the lower “rung” of speech-loving to the higher rung of knowledge of
Beauty itself. When Phaedrus begins to love the discussion on speeches more than the
speeches themselves, hopefully he will reflect on why this change has occurred within
him, then understanding that the reason for his transformation of taste is because
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dialectics as pursuing wisdom is better (and more beautiful) than the speeches
themselves. The significant and weighty redirecting of desire from speeches to Beauty
itself begins in what seems like light-hearted play. Kathryn Morgan explains that
Socrates’ playful attitude reflects how myth points to truth as a “product of an intuition
which cannot be entirely serious (because it is as yet unexamined), but which has serious
implications.”4 In the same way that myth cannot be taken seriously—or at least as
seriously as the truth—Socrates will discuss at the end of Phaedrus how speeches, both
orated and written, should not be taken seriously, except as a playful foray of the soul’s
pursuit of wisdom.
Written works are constructed “‘for the sake of play’ (276d2)” according to
Morgan, “but a nobler and more serious engagement is to write in the soul of the listener
(276e5).”5 Although the tone of Phaedrus begins in play, the stakes are high. As a lover
of speeches, Phaedrus needs to direct his erotic attraction to the logos of speeches into
philosophical eros for knowledge beyond discourse. In other words, as Morgan explains,
“Phaedrus must learn to stop playing with dead images and become alive to the
possibilities of philosophical interaction.”6 Speeches are dead images when the reader or
listener does not use the logos of the speech as a platform for thinking about the issue at
hand. Phaedrus needs to play with the ideas conveyed by speeches. It is not the content of
the myth itself that holds vital knowledge; it is only through active engagement or
playfulness with the intent to truly understand reality that Phaedrus may awaken to the
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many avenues of logos toward the Forms.7
Phaedrus, in youthful vigor, wonders whether this stream could be a location
where, according to legend, the North Wind abducted a princess. Phaedrus notes, “Could
this be the very spot? The stream is lovely, pure and clear: just right for girls to be
playing nearby.”8 It is plain to see where his mind is at—like most boys his age he is
lasciviously preoccupied.9 His questions about the kidnapping (and presumably rape) of
Oreithuia mirrors the speech Phaedrus will recite to Socrates, which also has a dark,
sexual undertone as both concern an adult or authority figure (Zeus and Lysias) taking
advantage of a youth (Oreithuia and Phaedrus). Phaedrus sets a flirtatious tone by
mentioning the myth, which could have potentially set the scene for the traditional loverbeloved relationship. Socrates does not desire to partake of Phaedrus’s body; he is more
concerned with cultivating his young mind and, more specifically, with correcting his
false definition of love as expressed in Lysias’s speech.
Back at the stream, Phaedrus asks if Socrates believes the legend of the princess
and North Wind. Socrates is preemptively warning the reader not to explain his
subsequent account of the soul in an objective way, as many “intellectuals” of Athens are
prone to do in their “clever” stories.10 Socrates believes literal interpretation of myth is a
waste of time, such as when intellectuals explained the legend of the princess in objective
terms: a north wind blew her in the river and she drowned. “Anyone who does not
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believe in them, who wants to explain them away and make them plausible by means of
some sort of rough ingenuity,” Socrates says, “will need a great deal of time.”11 Why
would one translate stuff of legend and myth into objective accounts when a much bigger
task is at hand? Socrates says, “But I have no time for such things; and the reason, my
friend, is this. I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it
really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that [...] I
look not into them but into my own self.”12 Socrates’ disdain for objective accounts
explaining myths seems odd, especially since he will interweave many mythical elements
into his second speech. However, he must dismiss the rival way of interpreting myth as
true, i.e., rationalizing its historical background. Morgan responds to the first allusion to
myth by explaining that, “Plato seeks an internal and significant truth concerning the
human soul” and not historical facts. 13 “Traditional myths,” she continues “are not good
vehicles for philosophical truth, but are full of extraneous details which threaten the
consistency of the philosophical message.”14 The point of Socrates’ mythmaking is not
for scholars to reconstruct it into an objective account of the soul. The aim of interpreting
myths philosophically is to seduce speech-lovers (or myth-lovers) into looking within.
The method of playfulness lends itself to education, or as Christopher Long states, “the
teaching itself must [be] expressed in a playful manner.”15 Unfortunately, the standard
myths are not conducive to pursuing self-knowledge, so Socrates constructs ones that are.
Socrates’ gift at mythmaking does not go unnoticed by Phaedrus, who is known for his
11
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love of speeches, and is more than happy to play along.
On the basis of the speeches Phaedrus gives in both Phaedrus and Symposium, it
is clear that he has a special attraction to speeches specifically about love. In the
Symposium, Eryximachus relays a common complaint of dear his friend Phaedrus
concerning the dearth of speeches dedicated to love:
Our poets have composed hymns in honor of just about any god you can think of;
but has a single one of them given one moment’s thought to the god of love
(Erōs), ancient and powerful that he is? As for our fancy intellectuals (sophistas),
they have written volumes praising Heracles […] How could people pay attention
to such trifles and never, not even once, write a proper hymn to Love? How could
anyone ignore so great a god?16
Phaedrus loves hearing, practicing, and giving speeches, but he notices that there are not
speeches on love. What he is really pointing to is the lack of depth given to the topic of
love within existing speeches, but he does not know that yet. Socrates, in both
Symposium and Phaedrus, is responding to Phaedrus’s interest in love; it is Phaedrus who
is the “father of the subject” of love in both dialogues, not Socrates.17 Socrates, as
midwife, helps Phaedrus “push” Phaedrus on his ideas of love. Although this is true,
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Socrates indulges Phaedrus in order to fulfill Phaedrus’s true need—putting love of
wisdom into practice. This is highlighted when Socrates responds to Eryximachus, who
has directed Phaedrus to relay the first speech at the symposium, noting that Phaedrus is
already conveniently seated at the head of the table.
Socrates consents and remarks, “How could I vote ‘No,’ when the only thing I say
I understand is the art of love (ta erōtika)?”18 This statement, playfully flirtatious, is also
profoundly odd in that Socrates rarely admits to being an expert in any field. The
opposite is usually true.19 However, to say that one is fundamentally a lover of wisdom
points to the fact that Socrates does not possess wisdom. Socrates explains to Agathon
that “a thing that desires, desires something of which it is in need; otherwise, if it were
not in need, it would not desire it.”20 This highlights the contrasting meaning of
“philosopher,” as a lover of wisdom, with “sophist,” a possessor of wisdom. Socrates is
in the business of becoming—not being—wise. A truly wise person knows that he does
not know everything.21
Echoing Phaedrus’s naïve question about the North Wind and the princess at the
beginning of Phaedrus, the young Socrates in Diotima’s speech in Symposium in his
“amazement” asks, “‘Most wise Diotima, is this really the way it is?’ And in the manner
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of a perfect sophist she said, ‘Be sure of it, Socrates.’”22 Socrates does not want Phaedrus
to merely accept that his second speech is true, rather he hopes that Phaedrus will ask as
many questions as possible to inspire a dialectical exchange of ideas. Plato is slyly
pointing to the aim of mythmaking in Phaedrus and Symposium—it is to communicate
difficult topics of discussion to philosophical novices, not to create permanent myths that
are immune to scrutiny. If we take Diotima’s ladder of love at face value, we have missed
the point, in the same way that if Phaedrus asks at the end of the palinode if the soul
really is a chariot, and Socrates shoots back “You bet it is,” the conversation ends.
Phaedrus’s speech in Symposium shows he understands the lover, Eros, as a paternal
figure, an ancient god that brightens one’s life. The older male is the erastēs within the
lover-beloved relationship. Phaedrus’s concept of love is limited to his experience of love
within the Athenian context of the lover-beloved relationship.
In contrast to Phaedrus’s unsophisticated and endoxic notion of love, Socrates
understands erotics as a philosophical practice that leads to enlightenment. C.D.C. Reeve
explains that “ta erōtica refers to ‘the art or craft of love (hē erōtikē technē),” which
Socrates acknowledges as a gift from the god Erōs in the Phaedrus (257a3–9).”23 What is
the connection between love and the Socratic method? Reeve notes,
the noun erōs (“love”) and the verb erōtan (“to ask questions”) seem to be
etymologically connected—something explicitly mentioned in the Cratylus
(398c5–e5). Socrates knows about the art of love in that—but just insofar as—he
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knows how to ask questions, how to converse elenctically.24
Philosophical eros is practicing dialectics for the sake of wisdom, or, as Reeve says,
“lessons in how to ask and answer questions.”25 For Phaedrus the speech-lover, elenchus
is far from his primary interest. Socrates constructs a speech that is impossible for
Phaedrus to turn away from, and the same for the dialogue’s reader. “The dialogue is also
play,” Morgan notes, “meant to lead to serious thought. What the myth is to the dialogue,
the dialogue is to our lives.”26 The myth is a platform for Phaedrus to play with ideas in
the same way that the dialogue is a way for us, the readers, to play with the ideas
imbedded within it. The palinode (and Socrates) is so irresistible, that afterwards
Phaedrus is able to sustain a meaningful examination of speechmaking and rhetoric
through Socrates’ guidance.27 It is Socrates’ aim that this exercise tends to the
strengthening of Phaedrus’s soul.

1.2 Philosophical Potions: Charming Charmides
Socrates uses myth in the service of producing philosophical eros. The aim of Socrates’
mythmaking in Phaedrus and Symposium is similar to the purpose of the charm Socrates
recites in Charmides. Socrates is recently returned from the army at Potidaea, and wishes
to check out his old stomping grounds, one being the palaestra at Taureas. He inquires
into the state of philosophy and the youth in Athens, and more specifically if any are

24

Reeve 2006, xix–xx.
Reeve 2006, xx.
26
Morgan 2000, 227.
27
As an undergraduate I was attracted to the myths of Symposium and Phaedrus because there was so much
more room to play with the ideas than when studying other philosophers and philosophical systems for the
first time. I could also relate to the topic of love more easily than epistemology or metaphysics. The
dialogues served as a platform for philosophical thinking, and on that platform I stand today—after much
guidance—with much more scaffolding and serious intent.
25

33

“remarkable for wisdom or beauty, or both.”28 The answer is Charmides. Socrates crossexamines the handsome son of Glaucon and his older cousin Critias on the definition of
sōphrosynē, the Greek ideal of “know thyself” paired with “nothing in excess” that means
something like moderation or self-control in our parlance.29 Critias, Chaerephon, and all
the men and boys present gush over Charmides’s beauty. Chaerephon makes a crude
comment about how his body is even more visually stimulating than his face.30 Socrates
responds, “Before we see his body, should we not ask him to strip and show us his soul?
He is surely at the age at which he will like to talk.”31 The theme of the dialogue is selfcontrol.32 Socrates’ thinly veiled rebuke of their lusting after Charmides with little to no
thought about the state of his soul points to how little self-control they have.
Critias uses the excuse that Socrates knows a cure for the headaches that have
lately plagued Charmides to lure him to their company. 33 Socrates, uncomfortable in his
role of “physician” and stalling as usual, relays the story of a Thracian king who cautions
against using any cure of the body without first curing the soul, which is the most
essential part of the person. The cure is contained in a leaf, that when accompanied by a
charm (φάρμακον), would render the person whole.34 Socrates instructs Charmides that,
the cure of the soul, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain
charms, and these charms are fair words, and by them temperance is implanted in
the soul, and where temperance comes to stay, there health is speedily imparted,
Plato Charmides 153d. All subsequent references to Plato’s Charmides are from Plato: Complete Works,
J. Cooper and D. Hutchinson (eds.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.
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not only in the head, but the whole body.35
Socrates declares that it is necessary to heal whole and part together, so in order for
Charmides to heal his body he must heal his soul; the soul is whole when sōphrosynē is
implanted in it. Thus begins the search for sōphrosynē, so Socrates may teach Charmides
the charm to cure his headaches.
While medicine is a physical substance that induces health, Socrates’ “incantation
is a verbal practice intended to act on the disposition of the soul and, in particular, to
cause moderation to be born in it.”36 The charm Socrates uses to cure Charmides’s soul is
philosophical discourse. Michael Rinella explains the significance of Socrates’ use of the
word charm in its twofold meaning. He explains that on one hand “a pharmakon could be
a remedy used in medicine or an ointment applied as part of bodily training,” and on the
other hand it could be understood as “the basis of a spell, charm, or talisman used in
sorcery or divination.”37 Based on the second interpretation of the word pharmakon as
spell, it could also be understood as “an analogue to the power of spoken word and its
ability to place an audience under the influence of the speaker.”38 In the ancient world
medicine and magic were “deeply interwoven.”39 Socrates’ charm cures the soul through
the power of the spoken word; a kind of discursive charm serving philosophy that is
inscribed upon the soul. The answer is within the soul, known through its effects:
Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention more closely and look
within you. Consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the
35
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nature of that which should have this effect. Think over all this, and tell me truly
and courageously—what is temperance?40
The answer to the question, “What is temperance?” may be inscribed upon Charmides’s
soul, but he first needs philosophical eros in order to pursue the answer to this question in
an honest and rational way. Schultz confirms this reading and asks: “Will Charmides
recognize that he lacks genuine sophrosune and join Socrates in further discussion or will
he find his current mode of existence acceptable?”41 Charmides does answer that he does
not know if he has self-control, which shows some progress on the youth’s part. Socrates
aims to help his interlocutors reflect on what they know, and, whereby discovering that
they do not know what they thought they knew, reveal the gaps in their knowledge and
hopefully igniting a desire to transform their own ignorance into knowledge. Charmides
has at least admitted that he does not know. The following step is to inspire the youth to
passionately desire the pursuit of wisdom.
Charmides then promises to be charmed by Socrates until he reaches a state ready
to receive the knowledge of self-control. Critias observes that if Charmides devotes
himself to Socrates’ charms, this in itself is proof of self-control. Schultz says that
The fact that Charmides sees the charming as something Socrates will do to him
rather than something that he will do for himself or, together with Socrates,
illustrates Charmides’ desire to remain in his passive social role. He is unwilling
to assume responsibility for cultivating his own sophrosune.42
So Charmides does not control himself, but remains in the receiving role of beloved as he
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allows Socrates (and Critias) to care for him, instead of taking the “reins” and ruling over
his soul. The youth wants Socrates to look within him and change him according to what
Socrates knows is best. This is not how one becomes truly virtuous, but is a way one may
cultivate the appearance of virtue.
The dialogue ends on a flirtatious note: Charmides, commanded by his guardian
to follow Socrates, teases Socrates that he will do violence to uphold this command.
Charmides slyly remarks, “Do not resist me then” and Socrates replies that he will
certainly not. In the case of Charmides, Socrates’ discursive charms failed. The myth of
the headache charm Socrates constructed falls flat, as Charmides is unwilling to think for
himself; he refuses to actively engage in dialectical reasoning.43 When faced with
aporia—the state of knowing that one does not know something one previously believed
one did—Charmides has the potential for intellectual liberation through philosophical
eros. In other words, the path is twofold: either pursue wisdom with passionate abandon,
or walk away. Charmides walks away, and later walks into the tyrannical grip of Critias.44
As in the case of Phaedrus and Alcibiades, who claim they are devoted to love,
Charmides and Critias claim they are devoted to the virtue of self-control, when in reality
they are dedicated only to its appearance. Desjardins explains that the way Socrates’
Perhaps all of Socrates’ questions have brought on another “headache.” If the behavior towards
Charmides by the men of Athens in this dialogue is representative of his life, then one could speculate that
Charmides is “spoiled;” he never has to actually think about anything or meet his own needs, but always
has willing admirers to do his bidding. Some scholars also speculate that the morning headaches are
actually hangovers from heavy drinking the night before. Cf. Hyland 1981, Schultz 2013, 52.
44
Schultz explains the three ways that the dialogue’s conclusion foreshadows how Critias and Charmides
end in tyranny: “First, Critias orders Charmides to be charmed. In doing so, Critias yields to the temptation
of overt social control through the command of others. Critias’ desire to exert overt social control
culminates in his involvement with the Thirty Tyrants. As leader of this regime, he rules over all other
Athenian citizens. Second, Charmides willingly obeys Critias just as he will later do as one of the Ten
chosen by the Thirty to govern Piraeus. Third, Socrates asks what they are plotting (176c). Charmides
emphatically says, ‘Nothing.’ Then, he immediately admits that they have been plotting all along by saying,
‘Our plotting is all done’ (176c)” (Schultz 2013, 57).
43

37

interlocutors call on “traditional formulas” pushes the reader “to think about the
difference between interpretations reflected in the behavior of Critias and Charmides, on
the one hand (interpretations rejected as inadequate), and in that of Socrates, on the other
(an interpretation Plato finds both true and worthy of enthusiastic emulation).”45 Again,
Plato’s flawed characters compel the reader to reflect on his or her own inadequacies.
How do I behave? Do I emulate true virtue or the appearance of virtue? Do I pursue
knowledge or the opinions that correspond to my lower desires? Asking these questions
and desiring to answer them with honesty is a step necessary to transform common eros
into philosophical eros—desiring to “know thyself” for the sake of an improved pursuit
of wisdom. Although philosophy can be quite enchanting, especially Socrates’ speeches,
it does not advocate intellectual laziness. It is not a one-stop cure all. One cannot take a
sip, and with immediately alert eyes perceive the reality underlying appearances. Like
love, philosophy is a process that grows with practice, time, and intellectual maturity.
Indeed, philosophy is love—of wisdom.

1.3 Philosopher’s Muse: The Plane Tree, Cicadas, and the Ladder of Love
Outside the city walls, the young man and older philosopher look within themselves.
Phaedrus notices how out of place Socrates looks in the natural setting, and boldly says
that he will act as Socrates’ guide.46 Socrates twice entreats Phaedrus to “lead the way” to
the spot designated the best for speechmaking, although initially when he meets the youth
Rosemary Desjardins, “Why Dialogues? Plato’s Serious Play” in Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings
(New York: Routledge, 1988), 120.
46
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on the path outside the city Phaedrus asks this of Socrates.47 It is as if Socrates is truly
leading, although doing so by following Phaedrus. Phaedrus leads Socrates out of Athens,
the only Socratic dialogue that occurs outside the city.48 Socrates is shocked with his own
behavior and adds that Phaedrus must “have found a potion to charm me into leaving,”49
alluding to what seems like a magical spell that is often cast upon an impressionable
mind in the midst of alluring rhetoric. It is not that Phaedrus cast Socrates under a spell,
but that Socrates is casting his own type of “spell” on Phaedrus, one that ends with
Phaedrus knowing why he is susceptible to charming speeches. The superficial beauty of
empty words carries one away. However, those words put to good use in the service of
wisdom, transform into powerful educational tools. Socrates desires Phaedrus to
understand what truly attracts him—it is not just speeches, but something far greater.
Instead of the setting remaining in the background, it “will not stay where it
belongs,” Ferrari observes, as it “becomes a prominent topic of discussion and a direct
cause of the conversational action.”50 By describing the natural beauty of their place of
repose, it seems as if Socrates is honing his own skill at poetic oration while setting the
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stage for his examination of eros.51 Rhetoric and philosophy are not by nature mutually
exclusive; it depends on how that language is used. Take for instance Socrates’ use of
rhetoric in Phaedrus. He alludes to the lover-beloved relationship when describing the
trees:
The plane tree is tall and very broad; the chaste tree, high as it is, is wonderfully
shady, and since it is in full bloom, the whole place is filled with its fragrance.
From under the plane tree the loveliest spring runs with very cool water—our feet
can attest to that.52
Could the description of the tree mirror that of Plato himself, a handsome educator
dedicated to the soul and not the body, hence chaste?53 Plato is older, so he has so much
to offer the youth—a beautiful environment in which to open up the soul. The shade adds
a sense of protection, the fragrance hints at the richness of dialogue possible as their
words waft through the air.54 Alex Hardie explains that “plane trees are well attested for
in the Athenian agora,” and there is evidence that there were two plane trees in the
51
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gymnasia of Athens, specifically the Academy and Lyceum.55 Interestingly enough, “in
both places, philosophical schools were organised as religious societies based in the cult
of the Muses and Mouseia.”56 The plane tree is also associated with Hippocrates of Kos,
and the only association with the divine is that of the Muses.57 Like a true physician,
Socrates understands how the soul works and how to apply the correct rhetoric—inspired
by the Muses—to allow the soul the possibility of recollection.
The mention of a potion at the beginning of Phaedrus is mirrored at the end of the
dialogue when Socrates critiques writing through the myth of Thamus and Theuth.58 In
this myth, Theuth describes writing as a type of potion [pharmakon] for remembering and
hence wisdom (274e5), whereas Thamus decries it as a potion for forgetfulness and the
mere appearance of wisdom (275a). Here we see two opposing meanings of potion—one
that promotes the soul’s health and ascent, the other promotes the soul’s harm and
descent through the guise of a healing potion. The dual nature of potion mirrors the
nature of rhetoric and myth—in the hands of the ignorant, it will most likely harm the
soul; in the hands of the wise it can promote recollection and self-knowledge. Phaedrus’s
ascent is ultimately in his hands, so Socrates’ spell can only take Phaedrus to the point of
recollecting the Forms, but cannot actually remember them for him. In this case, Socrates’
psychagōgia is like the setting or background that aids in the pursuit of self-knowledge
and the Forms. He is the soul’s doctor, correctly using the remedies available to him to
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induce the soul’s recollection of the Forms.
Another interpretation of the platon tree, which only thrives in moist places, is
that it serves as a symbol of Plato’s erotic philosophy. The cool water that runs from the
tree foreshadows a later reference to what happens when the “sluice-gates” of the soul are
opened by love.59 Plato’s dialogue and Socrates’ palinode, like the spring, bring pleasure
while exciting and nourishing the mind. “Landscapes and trees,” Socrates says, “have
nothing to teach me; only people in the city.”60 Plato is gently reminding the reader that
he is ultimately the mythmaker, the poet, the dialogue generator, and Socrates is the
figure he chose as the voice of his erotic philosophy. Plato, as the writer of the dialogue,
sits silently in the background—a setting that serves as a third character in the dialogue.
The setting is imbued with mythological references—from the traditional Athenian myth
of the North Wind to Socrates’ newly minted myth of the cicadas. The myths are not the
teachings themselves, but the beginning of learning towards wisdom. The third character
is the learning environment conducive to self-transformation. The setting of the dialogue
itself is charming, seductive, and filled with magic.
Like the Theuth and Thamus myth, the myth of the cicadas illuminates why
Socrates constructs charming speeches to seduce youth like Phaedrus. Socrates relays
both of these re-constructed myths to Phaedrus after the speeches have concluded. The
character Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium, as well as Aristophanes as the author of

59
60

Plato Phaedrus 251e.
Plato Phaedrus 230d4–5.

42

Birds, mentions cicadas.61 The Greek word for cicada is tettix, which mimics the sound of
the cicada song. Homer’s Illiad describes the “lily voice of the cicada” (3.152) as
compared with the voices of elders.62 The nymphs live underground for up to seventeen
years, ascending from the ground to shed their brown exoskeleton and reveal the bright
coloration and beautiful wings.63 The exoskeleton remains intact and attached to the tree
the insect molted from, which Aristotle observes:
The cicada the moment after issuing from the husk goes and sits upon an olive
tree or a reed; after the breaking up of the husk the creature issues out, leaving a
little moisture behind, and after a short interval flies up into the air and sets a
chirping.64
The chirping of the cicada often lulls one to sleep at the height of summer heat around
noontime. Socrates warns Phaedrus not to be lulled into sleep as they discuss speeches
under the platon tree because, “the cicadas, who are singing and carrying on
conversations with one another in the heat of the day above our heads, are also watching
us.”65 If the cicadas observe them sleeping at noon “like most people,” they will assume
they are “sluggish in mind” and then laugh at the pair as if they are “slaves who have
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come to their resting place to sleep like sheep gathering around the spring in afternoon.”66
However, if the cicadas observe Socrates and Phaedrus discussing the speeches,
“steadfastly navigating around them as if they were the Sirens, they will be very pleased
and immediately give us the gift from the gods they are able to give to mortals.”67
Phaedrus’ curiosity is piqued. He asks what gift would the cicadas bestow upon them
from the gods. Socrates acts as though he is surprised and says, “Everyone who loves the
Muses should have heard of this.”68 He creates a myth about the humans that existed
before the Muses, upon hearing the song of the Muses for the first time, continued to
listen until they died of starvation. Cicadas originated from these humans, and are blessed
with “no need for nourishment once they are born. Instead, they immediately burst into
song, without food or drink, until it is time for them to die.”69 When the cicadas die, they
tell the Muses which people honored which Muse. For example, “To Erato, they report
those who honored her by dedicating themselves to the affairs of love” and “to Calliope,
the oldest among them, and Urania, the next after her, who presides over the heavens and
all discourse, human and divine, and sing with sweetest voice, they report those who
honor their special kind of music by leading a philosophical life.”70 This is the gift that
the cicadas can give to Phaedrus and Socrates if they choose to fight through the
noontime heat and discuss the speeches. Phaedrus of course desires to be in the favor of
the Muses, so exclaims, “By all means, let’s talk.” The cicadas are the messengers
between humans and gods, much as Socrates characterizes eros as the daimōn between
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ignorance and wisdom. The myth of the cicadas is another example of Socrates
constructing a charming speech in order to provoke the philosophical novice to more and
more sophisticated recollections of the Forms. Socrates reflects the dual nature of the
cicada—his body reflects the exoskeleton of a nymph in its grubby, homely appearance.
The nymph does not have wings and crawls along slowly, trapped in this grounded husk.
Socrates’ mind soars upwards towards the sun with strong wings and a clear voice of an
adult cicada, inspiring others with his philosophical song along the way. Socrates’
daimōnic cicada song soars into the air while the city slumbers in the noontime heat.
Phaedrus is enthralled by the song enough to stay awake and participate in the spell of
philosophy, dedicated to the Muses who inspire him.
Socrates invokes the Muses in the first prayer of Phaedrus, inaugurating his first
speech. Socrates prays, “Come to me, O you clear-voiced Muses, whether you are called
so because of the quality of your song or from the musical people of Liguria, ‘come, take
up my burden’ in telling the tale that this fine fellow forces upon me so that his
companion may now seem to him even more clever than he did before.”71 Socrates’ first
speech introduced the idea of madness or mania that is central in the palinode. It is
appropriate, therefore, that the first speech began with an invocation to the divine:
madness is a “gift from god.”72 The third type of madness discussed in the palinode is
when the Muses possess a poet, which “takes the tender virgin soul and awakens it to a
Bacchic frenzy of songs and poetry.”73 Thinking back to Socrates’ first speech, it is clear
that the Muses do not promote self-control as the non-lover does. Invoking the Muses is
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yet another way Socrates identifies the deceptive quality of his speech. In fact, in the
palinode Socrates exclaims that the potential poet who does not invoke the Muses “will
fail, and his self-controlled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been
driven out of their minds.”74 Philosophy is a pharmakon because it is like music.
Alcibiades purports that Socrates produces enchanting “music” like Silenus through
words instead of musical instruments.75 In the cicada myth, one of the highest Muses is
Urania, who “presides over the heavens and all of discourse, human and divine,” and
reports to the gods “with the sweetest voice” those people who have honored her “special
kind of music” by living philosophical lives.76 Urania is also mentioned in Pausanias’s
speech in Symposium, where he distinguished Common Aphrodite from Heavenly
Aphrodite.77 There are numerous mythological references within the description of the
setting, many like these that point to the importance of philosophical eros.
G. R. F. Ferrari’s interpretation of the myth of the cicadas was originally very
different from my own. The often-cited interpretation from Listening to the Cicadas is
that the cicadas represent how the love of beautiful words is a “Siren song” that leads one
astray. Phaedrus is distracted by his love of speeches, which leads one far away from
philosophy. Many years later, Ferrari redacted his original position by saying, “I begin
with a palinode. It is not true, that tale I told about the myth of the cicadas in Plato’s
Phaedrus.”78 Ferrari’s amended claim is that the divine inspiration of the cicada call
inspires those who are sensitive to the beauty of language, like Phaedrus. It can “open up
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the way to philosophy” for the intellectually stimulated, or as I argue, the novice filled
with philosophical eros.79 However, for the “intellectually lazy,” the cicada song induces
sleep.80 What happens to the soul of those who are sensitive to beautiful words in the
presence of divinely inspired speeches is similar to what happens to the lover in the
presence of the beautiful boy—he is driven mad with erotic longing. Ferrari notes that “a
divine madness can awaken us to the true Beauty we have lost” but it is imperative that
reason remain in charge of the soul, otherwise the power of the dark horse will overtake
the soul as it charges forth toward the erotic object.81 Ferrari likens this process to
Odysseus’s encounter with the Sirens. Instead of plugging his ears like the rest of his
crew, he tied himself to the mast. Reason remains in charge, even when the dark horse
wants nothing more than to pursue the Siren song. The soul is driven mad with earthly
beauty, and because reason is in charge we can use that madness to cultivate
philosophical eros in pursuit of Beauty itself. In the presence of beautiful speeches, we
must “remain lashed to the mast” of reason and not get carried away by Plato’s charming
myths.82 The danger of the Siren song is that the soul not ruled by reason will actually
believe the myths; he will not let the beauty of the speeches work on cultivating
philosophical eros directed at Beauty itself, rather than at the images of beauty that are
encountered in the sensible realm.83 Attraction to beautiful speeches is not an affliction, it
is the starting point for properly directed eros ruled by reason.
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Along with the cicadas, nymphs, and the river god Achelous, Pan has a place by
the Ilisis as well.84 The mythological goat-god is strongly identified with the landscape,
but a setting that is more meaningful than “spatial location.”85 The importance of setting
for Pan is mirrored in Phaedrus, a dialogue that significantly takes place outside Athens.
In the same way that for Pan, landscape is not meant to be “picturesque” but a sign of the
“supernatural,” the dialogue’s setting readies the audience for something verging on the
supernatural to occur. Pan’s landscape is “a space where strange phenomena take place,”
which has a connection to the divine madness or “delirium” that Socrates will experience
as he gives his speeches.86 Borgeaud continues that the dialogue unfolds in the banks of
Ilissos” and that Socrates, Phaedrus, and the reader are “at the very gates of Athens, but
the landscape, characterized by water and shade, is sacred to Pan and the nymphs, and it
is the hour of Pan (noon).”87 Something strange is about to happen. The dialogue’s setting
sets aside the content as a little different than what one normally expects in a Platonic
dialogue, which takes place in the city.88 Part of the strangeness is the focus on what
happens to incite philosophical reasoning in a novice, which occurs through carefully
executed logos. Socrates courts Phaedrus to the side of philosophy through playing with
logos.
In Symposium, Diotima acts as the mouthpiece of Socrates, and compares
philosophical discourse to a magical enchantment. She describes Eros, the son of Penia
and Poros, as the quintessential philosopher who is “resourceful in his pursuit of
Chapter 4 of this dissertation elaborates on the importance of Pan in Plato’s erotic philosophy.
Philippe Borgeaud, The Cult of Pan in Ancient Greece, trans. by Kathleen Atlass and James Redfield
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 59.
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intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all his life; a genius with enchantments, potions,
and clever pleadings.”89 A philosopher is the master of resource, and will use whatever he
has at his disposal to brew the most magnificent potions. Ostensibly, these potions aim to
cure the soul of ignorance, as is the case for Socrates’ charm in Charmides. Socrates’ use
of charming speeches in Phaedrus and Symposium resourcefully use myth to promote
ascent of the soul. In other words, Socrates conjures up a potion inducing self-knowledge
out of his own love for wisdom.90
In one colorful example, Plato silences the music for a different, “special kind of
music” to please the Muses.91 The setting of Symposium is a festive drinking party for the
intellectuals, artists, and leaders of Athens. On this evening the partygoers decide to put
down the wine and give the flute girls the night off in order to give speeches in praise of
Love, or Eros. One by one they give their speeches, and each praises the qualities of love
that attract them personally. Socrates hears several speeches by individuals who are
attracted to very different things and each one creates a speech that validates his own life.
So is beauty in the eye of the beholder? With so many types of beauty that attract
different people in different ways, how could there possibly be one universal beauty or
one correct way to love? Agathon’s poetic but rather vague speech initiates a fascinating
discussion between him and Socrates. This is where Socrates, an expert on the “art of
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love,” comes in. Socrates engages Agathon in a dialogue concerning Agathon’s claim
that love possesses beauty. According to Socrates, Agathon’s characterization of eros as
beautiful does not correspond with the essential lack or yearning that defines eros.
Socrates gives his speech through a “remembered” dialogue between a younger version
of himself and the priestess Diotima, the only female voice at the all-male symposium. It
is this speech that serves as the climax of the symposium.
In Symposium, Socrates says that he only knows the “art of love” in lieu of,
ostensibly, the art of rhetoric. And yet Socrates’ speech, through the mouthpiece of the
prophetess Diotima, expresses delightful discursive charms. The ladder of love is a
compelling and memorable tale of erotic ascent from the body to the soul and ultimately
to Beauty itself. In the Symposium, the reader finds a twist to the Republic’s allegory of
the cave. Where the cave analogy uses vision and light to characterize how we learn, the
ladder of love plays on our notions of attraction and beauty—also visual—to examine
why we desire to learn. What does love have to do with philosophy? According to
Plato—everything! Philosophy is the love of wisdom. Socrates expresses a love for
wisdom that transforms philia—love as fondness and appreciation for friends, family,
and community—into eros. The common understanding of erotic love is the passionate,
burning yearning to possess the object of desire. Socrates says that eros is the intense
desire for something one lacks. The greatest lack in life is wisdom, and the greatest
fulfillment in life is bridging the gap between ignorance and wisdom. For Socrates, the
ultimate object of desire is the Forms—providing access to true knowledge and wisdom.
Philosophical eros means that one loves something enough to think deeply about it,
especially in dialectical exchange with other passionate lovers of wisdom.
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Socrates portrays himself as the daimōn between humans and gods, and opinion
and knowledge. He also uses Diotima as a mouthpiece for his speech. Diotima’s speech
begins with a portrait of eros as the progeny of Poros (resource) and Penia (lack), which
is always pursuing what it knows it lacks—immortality. After discussing the nature and
aim of love, Diotima initiates the young Socrates into the art of loving young boys
correctly. The message of the ladder of love serves to inspire the youth to advance from
ignorance towards wisdom starting with one thing that most people experience—sexual
desire. The art of correctly loving starts on the first rung of the ladder: attraction to one
beautiful body. Think of this step as a first crush and imagine all the feelings associated
with the experience. How does one move to the next rung of loving all beautiful bodies?
Diotima explains, “he should realize that the beauty of any one body is brother to the
beauty of any other and that if he is to pursue beauty of form he would be very foolish
not to think that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same.” From loving all beautiful
bodies, then we move to loving beautiful souls, and on to beautiful laws and customs and
all types of knowledge. Beauty is ultimately the same in each, and each new type of
beauty teaches us to understand beauty in a better way. The beauty of an individual
reflects a type of goodness, whether a healthy physique or a good character, but Diotima
thinks beautiful ideas will thrill the soul even more. Ascent up the ladder of love entails
moving away from particular bodies (shadows) and towards the universal idea of Beauty
(the Sun) that is the true source of our attraction. Once eros has awoken, the soul can
begin the gradual work of recognizing its true source of attraction: to Beauty itself.
The erotic attraction towards the Form of Beauty rests latently in the soul, ready
to be woken up and recollected by a bit of prodding, poking, or stinging by Athens’s
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infamous gadfly. Knowing the self prompts us to open our droopy eyes and notice the
higher rungs above, and then hopefully to desire to climb to the very top of the ladder.
This awakening of the hazy mind by attraction to beauty is the gradual process of
recollection. Eros motivates the soul to reach toward the heights of human existence.
Instead of remaining satisfied with the body, the love of Beauty inspires us to care for the
soul. The lower rungs represent lower desires such as beautiful bodies, money, and fame,
while the higher ones represent higher desires like loving Beauty itself and fervently
pursuing wisdom. Phaedrus, as a lover of speeches, is situated on the third rung of the
ladder as he is attracted to the beauty within logos as expressed in the Athenian tradition
of speechmaking. The constant chirping of the cicadas in Phaedrus could represent the
buzz of speeches in Athens. Will Phaedrus be lulled to sleep by Athens’s speeches,
remaining on the middle rung of the ladder of love? Or will his love of logos be
transformed into a love for knowledge (about rhetoric and writing), propelling him to the
next rung and closer to the source of his attraction, Beauty itself?
When the individual recognizes that the object of eros is not just bodily flux, then
it becomes clear that ascending is possible through uncovering that object we should be
pursuing with all of our passion. Diotima reminds Socrates that, “reproduction always
leaves behind a new one in place of the old.”92 Reproduction is the synthesis of new ideas
in the dialectic. Sheffield explains,
The answer to why we desire to be creative in the presence of beauty is that this
activity allows us to be productive of a perceived good, and, given that we are the
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kind of living beings that we are, production is the mortal form of possession.93
Humans are by nature always in a state of flux, and reproduction is the only way to
immortality, to what is beyond the constraints of the body. However, even our souls are
in a state of flux caused by the process of forgetting and remembering:
For what we call studying exists because knowledge is leaving us, because
forgetting is the departure of knowledge, while studying puts back a fresh
memory in place of what went away, thereby preserving a piece of knowledge, so
that it seems to be the same. And in this way everything mortal is preserved, not,
like the divine, by always being the same in every way, but because what is
departing and aging leaves behind something new, something such as it had
been.94
The dialectic process turns an old idea into a new idea, which in turn becomes “old” and
flawed and resurfaces through Socratic cross-examination as a new idea, etc. This
uncovering is the process of learning; it is being able to perceive the few and the rare that
wash ashore from the many. Sheffield states, “The Symposium is itself presented as an act
of erōs.”95 Philosophical eros gives rise to and sustains the ascent of the soul.
Philosophical eros is the soul’s attraction to true knowledge that requires dialectical
ascent. Ascent is the activity of dialectic reasoning proceeding correctly; the soul
flourishes when dialectical reasoning is paired with eros.
Unlike a traditional potion, the philosophical brew cannot guarantee
transformation. Philosophical eros opens up the possibility for the individual to ascend
Frisbee C.C. Sheffield, Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire (Cambridge: Oxford University Press,
2009), 110.
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through rich dialogue and careful thinking. The potion makes the soul receptive to
dialogue; the individual as a self-mover decides to go within or remain on the level of
opinion. In the words of Socrates in Theaetetus, where he feels like he is being used like
a bag of tricks, he exclaims:
You have an absolute passion for discussion, Theodorus. I like the way you take
me for a sort of bag full of arguments, and imagine I can easily pull out a proof to
show that our conclusion is wrong. You don’t see what is happening. The
arguments never come out of me; they always come from the person I am talking
with. I am only at a slight advantage in having the skill to get some account of the
matter from another’s wisdom and entertain it with fair treatment. So now, I shall
not give any explanation myself, but try to get it out of our friend.96
Socrates’ exclamation that Phaedrus is an extraordinary lover of speeches parallels his
claim that Theodoros is passionate about arguments. In both cases, the young men are
asking Socrates to entertain them with logos, as if he were a paid magician pulling truth
from a hat. The difference between Socrates likened to a midwife aiding in the birth of
dialectical reasoning and Phaedrus as inducer of speeches, is that Phaedrus does not seem
to care about the truthfulness of the words produced—as a typical sophist—just that the
language sates his love of rhetoric.
Like the cicadas buried underground for years, Socrates practices psychagōgia by
calling dead images out of the grave so they may crawl out and leave behind rough
exoskeletons. According to the myth of reincarnation in the palinode, the soul falls from
the heavenly procession when it forgets the Forms, and becomes trapped in a body. The
Plato Theaetetus 161a–b. All subsequent references to Plato’s Theaetetus are from Plato: Complete
Works, J. Cooper and D. Hutchinson (eds.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.
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cicadas begin to transform as newly formed wings unfold, strengthen, and lead the cicada
on an ascent to the branches of the platon tree. The gradual transformation from a lower
reality to a higher one parallels the ladder of love in Symposium and the charioteer
analogy in Phaedrus. The cicada transformed from underground nymph in its lower stage,
to a flying singing cicada in its higher stage. The ascent was made possible by being
placed in the correct setting, a beautiful environment conducive to ascent. Listening to
conversations strengthens their wings so they may fly above and hear the song of Urania,
the heavenly realm. Similarly, participating in dialectics strengthens intellectual vision
via recollection. The constant hum of cicadas reminds one that philosophical speeches
imbued with myth contain a powerful pharmakon that aids the soul’s ascent up the ladder
of love toward Beauty itself. As Socrates and Phaedrus rest under Plato, the cry of
cicadas fills the warm summer breeze as it lightly brushes over their skin; a beautiful
environment to discuss how eros opens the soul.97
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CHAPTER 2

PSYCHAGŌGIA AS PHARMAKON:
THE HEALING POWER OF GUIDED RECOLLECTION

Socrates says, “Well, isn’t the method of medicine
in a way the same as
the method of rhetoric?”
— Plato Phaedrus 270b1–2
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In this chapter I will show that a vital part of Plato’s philosophical eros is the use of
charming speeches as psychagōgic pharmakon, especially as a response to sophistry. A
sophist persuades the crowd with charming speeches that do not necessarily provide
truth, only the image of truth. The sophist utilizes rhetoric to persuade, while not actually
pursuing what is good, noble, or true. The philosopher uses informed dialectic to pursue
precisely those things for which rhetoric can only provide appearances.1 In Phaedrus,
Socrates explains that rhetoric is the art of soul-leading through words.2 By defining
rhetoric as “directing the soul by means of speech” Socrates is holding a mirror to
Phaedrus in order to prompt this speech-lover to look within and reflect on the
consequences of his soul being led by unrestrained logos.3 Socrates is trying to make
Phaedrus ask meaningful self-referential questions: Phaedrus loves speeches, but to what
end? Where does rhetoric lead his soul? Examining rhetoric after the speechmaking helps
Phaedrus examine for himself why he loves speeches and how the object of his love
trains his soul to reach its aim.4 The move from loving speeches to loving selfknowledge via discussion of speeches is Socrates’ pedagogical strategy to gradually lead
Phaedrus out of the lower rungs of reality and toward the highest rung of Beauty itself.

“Now, do you mean, to make him carry conviction to the crowd on all subjects, not by teaching them, but
by persuading? […] And “to the crowd” means “to the ignorant?” [...] So he who does not know will be
more convincing to those who do not know than he who knows, supposing the orator to be more
convincing than the doctor […] Then the case is the same in all the other arts for the orator and his rhetoric:
there is no need to know the truth of the actual matters, but one merely needs to have discovered some
device of persuasion which will make one appear to those who do not know to know better than those who
know” (Plato Gorgias 458b–459c).
2
Plato Phaedrus 261a7–8. “τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων.”
3
Psychagōgia is used in Phaedrus at 261a8 and 271c10.
4
Griswold 1986, 29. Griswold argues that Socrates promotes self-knowledge in Phaedrus by Socrates’
speeches holding a mirror up to Phaedrus’s soul. Griswold says, “This drama functions as a mirror in which
Phaedrus is made to detach himself from himself and so observe himself. He can become self-conscious
only when his love of speech becomes reflective, that is, itself an object of speech. Socrates enters a
comedy of imitation and deception with Phaedrus in order to lead Phaedrus to self-knowledge.”
1
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In Phaedrus, psychagōgia (ψυχαγωγία) translates as “soul-leading” or “the
winning of men’s souls, persuasion.” 5 Historically, psychagōgia refers to an “evocation
of souls from the nether world,” usually within the context of a ritual.6 In the sense of the
rhetorician, spoken words raise the “dead” or attract an otherwise uninterested person,
and the conjurer transforms the souls as he wishes with his magical power.7 Elizabeth
Asmis traces the use of psychagōgia in Aristophanes’ Birds when,
the chorus of birds sees a strange sight: Socrates “is conjuring souls”
(psychagōgei, 1555) by a lake among the ‘Shadow-feet.’ […] In casting Socrates
as a conjurer of souls, Aristophanes is parodying Socrates’ well-known ethical
concern, his care for the soul.8
Aristophanes’ parody of Socrates is correct in that it applies to Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus,
where Socrates constructs speeches with rhetorically powerful myths that appeal to the
youth, viz., Phaedrus. Unlike this selection from Birds, he does not need to shed any
blood in a Homeric fashion to attract a soul; he simply constructs magical myths.
As I will explore in this chapter, Socrates gradually leads this youthful soul to
appreciate truer speeches than the inferior sophistic speech of Lysias. Plato uses
psychagōgia to refer to sophistic rhetoric in his description of Protagoras, who “draws
them from each of the cities through which he passes, enchanting them with his voice just
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like Orpheus, and they follow after his voice spellbound.”9 Jessica Moss notes that
Phaedrus is the only dialogue that uses the word psychagōgia as a noun, using it
otherwise only twice outside this dialogue.10 Asmis explains that, “in the Laws (909b),
he plays on the basic sense of ‘conjuring’ souls of the dead to add to it the notion of
‘beguiling’ the living; and in the Timaeus (71a) he uses the verb to refer to the
beguilement of the desiring part of the soul by means of images.”11 Because Plato uses
the same word to describe the sophists’ use of rhetoric, we understand that Plato has
Socrates deliberately using rhetoric to lead Phaedrus’s soul in the sense of the verb, and
rhetoric as the noun form of the verb.12 The way Socrates uses rhetorically charged myths
is not limited to Phaedrus, which also provides a critique of rhetoric. Socrates often
explains ideas using myths, and in Phaedrus and Symposium, those myths are unique
because they are explicitly erotically charged.13
Isocrates also uses the word “to describe the effect of poetic devices on the
listener.”14 For example, in Evagoras (10) Isocrates explains that although the speech
may be inferior, if it sounds good it will garner the audience’s approval. The strategy is to
“‘charm’ their listeners with beautiful rhythms and harmonies even though their diction
9
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explains, “those who are already wise no longer love wisdom, whether they are gods or men. Neither do
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the same goal: to think for himself and in doing so inflame his philosophical eros.
14
Asmis 1986, 156. Keep in mind that Isocrates is Plato’s rival. Isocrates argues that his own work is
philosophy while Plato’s work is sophistry, although he defines philosophy as “the ability to speak well
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(Nehamas 1990, 4).
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and thoughts may be poor.”15 Similarly, in To Nicocles (49) Isocrates says the
“rhetoricians who wish to ‘allure’ their listeners must use the crowd-pleasing device of
myth, just like the poets.”16 Mythmaking is another tool for the rhetorician to persuade
his audience. For the sophistic rhetorician, it does not matter whether or not the words
point to Forms, so long as they persuade the soul. The pharmakon of the sophist’s
psychagōgic potion is a distraction at best, and at worst poisonous for the soul. It may
lead to what Alcibiades describes as Socrates putting him in a trance where he loses any
ability for free choice. Whereas Socrates is concerned with caring for the souls of his
“victims,” the sophists are usually concerned about their own material gain.17
For Socrates, speeches lead the soul to philosophical discussions that enable it to
heal by recollection of the divine Forms. One could call these “philosophical speeches”
because they aid the soul’s ascent in the same way a pharmakon aids physical healing.
Pharmakon, as we saw in the preceding chapter, is understood as both a doctor’s healing
salve and a magician’s potion that, depending on the expertise and intent of the
practitioner, can harm or heal. If rhetoric is administered properly, it becomes a powerful
tool to construct speeches and myths that appeal to the interests (superficially) and needs
(primarily) of the audience; reaching Beauty itself in the ascent via dialectic is the
ultimate goal. At worst, speeches lead the soul to lower goods and vice. Plato offers many
examples of the poisonous power of rhetoric in his dialogues, often using an analogy to
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medicine.18 For example, Asmis observes that the power logos has on the soul is similar
to the power pharmaka have on the body. This explains why “Gorgias held that a speaker
can shape a soul in whatever way he wishes and in particular ‘drug’ and ‘bewitch’ a soul
‘by an evil persuasion.’”19 In Phaedrus, Socrates likens rhetoric to medicine because they
both use particular methods to care for their respective subjects—medicine heals the body
and rhetoric the soul.20
The pharmakon of philosophical speeches is that it leads the soul to see the higher
reality “above” appearances; it is as if the potion lifts a blindfold from the eyes so they
can see the “higher rungs” of the ladder of love that were once concealed. Diotima’s
ladder of love confirms this reading of pharmakon in that she says the mysteries are not
for the uninitiated.21 Not everyone will choose to climb the ladder of love. Like the ladder
of love, leading the soul of Phaedrus involves erotic intrigue, the context of the loverbeloved relationship, a gradual redirection of the object of eros that takes place through
dialectical attainment of knowledge, and the ultimate goal of knowledge of divine Forms.
The steps find a parallel in Diotima’s genealogy of the daimōn Eros in her speech in
Symposium. Love, as the son of Poros (resource) and Penia (lack), is described as
inheriting the following qualities from his father:
he is a schemer after the beautiful and the good; he is brave, impetuous, and
intense, an awesome hunter, always weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of
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intelligence, a lover of wisdom (philosophōn) through all his life; a genius with
enchantments, potions (pharmakeus), and clever pleadings (sophistēs).22
Eros inherits his great “Need” from his mother Penia, and that he is “always poor…tough
and shriveled and shoeless and homeless.”23 Eros sounds like Socrates, which highlights
his erotic pursuit of wisdom. He loves and needs wisdom because he does not possess it.
Resource represents the innate knowledge in the soul that is recollected in the proper
environment.
Phaedrus or any philosophical novice represents the resource with which Socrates
as “lack” comes in contact, creating beautiful speeches that “hunt” after wisdom. Socrates
has practice in this hunt as the daimōn of philosophy, so he has more philosophical
resources than many, but his erotic attraction to Beauty itself is strong—even more so
because he has recollected Beauty itself as the source of his attraction to beautiful bodies.
Socrates’ intellectual vision is much clearer than Phaedrus’s, but that does not inhibit
Socrates from continuing to practice his erotic art with this or any interested novice.
Alternatively, resource and lack give birth to philosophical eros that fuels the
dialectic in constant and relentless pursuit of Beauty itself. In this sense, the parents of
love can also represent the two interlocutors involved in dialectic. Phaedrus is resource
because Socrates is playing off of the available eros—in this case a love of speeches—to
induce the birth of philosophical eros leading to Beauty itself. Seeing Phaedrus’s
passionate love of speeches fuels Socrates’ philosophical eros as well. Seeing this young
man in love with logos inspires Socrates to meet him at his “rung” on the ladder of love
in order to give birth to a speech so beautiful that it will pique Phaedrus’ interest in what
22
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is beyond speeches. In this sense, Phaedrus inspires Socrates and provides the resource
needed to deliver logos inspired by love and inspiring love. You see, Diotima so filled the
young Socrates with philosophical eros that he continues to praise love and practice its
arts whenever possible. After Socrates’ speech, he says,
This, Phaedrus, and the rest of you, was what Diotima told me. I was persuaded.
That’s why I say that every man must honor Love, why I honor the rites of Love
myself and practice them with special diligence, and why I commend them to
others. Now and always I praise the power and courage of Love so far as I am
able. Consider this speech, then, Phaedrus, if you wish a speech in praise of Love.
Or if not, call it whatever and however you please to call it.24
Socrates directly addresses Phaedrus the speech-lover after his encomium on eros.
Socrates explains that the goal of his speeches as psychagōgic pharmakon: to persuade
others to ascend the ladder of love. When Socrates says, “once persuaded, I try to
persuade others” he is saying that pursuing Beauty itself is an act of love because “human
nature can find no better workmate for acquiring this [philosophical] eros.”25 The role of
philosopher is to guide the soul in the right direction by practicing the “art of love.”26
Philosophy is the art of passionately panting after Beauty itself, committing
wholeheartedly to attaining knowledge of the Forms. If you pursue wisdom with others,
you are less likely to be seen as a madman because others will recognize your madness as
divine. Unfortunately for Socrates, during his trial the philosophical eros he inspired in
the youth was deemed more detrimental to the their souls than the physical eros of the
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sophists. Athens found practicing the art of bodily-sophistic love more acceptable than
intellectual-philosophic love, and prosecuted Socrates accordingly.

2.1 Sophistry as Poison not Potion: Phaedrus’s Speech and Socratic Mimesis
The dialogue Phaedrus has three main parts: the opening scene, the three speeches, and
the philosophical discussion about speeches. In the third part, Socrates shifts from giving
speeches on eros to an analysis of speeches and rhetoric in general, and again shifts his
focus from speeches to writing.27 When Socrates criticizes writing he is referring back to
the “scroll” hidden under Phaedrus’s cloak at the beginning of the dialogue.28 Discussing
an idea honestly and carefully is far superior to memorizing a speech, whether written or
recited orally. Socrates is gently reminding Phaedrus that his love of speeches will only
get him so far, while understanding speeches and discussing the merit of each is truly
valuable.
The discursive layers in Plato’s Phaedrus begin with an explanation of the setting,
Phaedrus’s recitation of Lysias’s speech, Socrates first imitative and false speech,
Socrates’ second mythological speech, and the subsequent meta-discussion about the
previous speeches. Socrates’ first speech reveals the use of language for persuasion and
mimicry, with little else but a flimsy argument to draw us in. Socrates’ second speech
uses rhetoric in the poetic description of the soul as a winged creature. He creatively
employs language to crack open the oyster of the realm of appearances to reveal the pearl
of truth within. Language can be misused and abused, but that should not turn us off from
its charming possibilities. What better place to test the limits of language with speeches
27
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than among the speechless trees? In fact, this was Phaedrus’s reason for going outside the
city walls in the first place. If Socrates had not passed by, then Phaedrus would have
practiced reciting his speech like “the self-forgetful chatter of a sleepwalker.”29 Griswold
claims that “Lysias’ speech is ‘not healthy’ (242e5) for Phaedrus,” rather more akin to “a
pharmakon in the sense of ‘poison,’ not ‘remedy.’”30 Not all speeches lead to the health
of the soul.
Socrates remarks that Phaedrus must have put a spell on him to get him to venture
into the country, where the “landscape and trees have nothing to teach.”31 As someone
“dedicated to learning” Socrates recognizes that only people can help him learn, not the
voiceless trees, although Socrates teases Phaedrus that he would follow him anywhere
with the prospect of hearing the likes of his speech.32 Socrates is like an animal following
a treat; in this case the treat is “the leaves of a book containing a speech.”33 Socrates is
mirroring Phaedrus’s lust for speeches. Phaedrus repeats the speech of his sophist mentor,
Lysias, who, as Gellrich notes, provides a “novel, paradoxical thesis that one ought to
choose the non-lover over the lover” 34 because “it is better to give your favors to
someone who does not love you than someone who does.”35 Lysias’s justification is that
a lover is controlled by eros not reason, so he cannot pursue what is best for his beloved.
The conventional understanding of erotic love is employed in Lysias’s speech. Martha
Nussbaum explains that the common notion of eros was a subjective “unreasoning ‘mad’
passion, strongly sexual in nature, which takes the person over, acquires the force of
29
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necessity (231a, 233c), and deprives the person of self-control and deliberation.”36 The
speech provides many reasons why a non-lover is superior to a lover, but they all revolve
around the idea of a lover as “sick” and a non-lover as “sound” in the mind.37
In Phaedrus and Symposium, Socrates provides a philosophy of eros—one that
hopes to inspire divine madness as a way to recollecting the Forms. The distinction
between a lover and a non-lover is crucial. If Lysias is correct and a non-lover is more
beneficial for the youth’s pursuit of virtue and wisdom, then the idea of philosophy as
passionately yearning for the Forms is diminished. Lysias provides reasons why a nonlover is more beneficial to a youth in pursuit of the best life. For example, a non-lover
provides voluntary and consistent favors to the beloved because his “desire never dies
down” like it does for the lover.38 A non-lover feels responsible for his actions and does
not keep a record of all the favors he bestowed and what he received in return for those
favors, as a lover does. The non-lover will always bestow favors to new and old beloveds
alike. There is a larger pool of friends to choose from if you do not discriminate between
lovers and non-lovers. The beloved’s reputation will not be stained when he spends time
with a non-lover, because everyone understands the intention of the friendship to be pure.
Another reason a non-lover is more advantageous for the beloved is that there is no
messy break-up involving jealousy or other pettiness to worry about. 39 Lysias concludes
with an entreaty for the beloved, Phaedrus, to accept him as his non-lover.40 Not anyone
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will help Phaedrus to “become a better person.”41 Lysias promises a lasting friendship
along with his time, patience, forgiveness, and effort to lead his soul to virtue.42
Examining why Phaedrus’s ascent is inhibited by this unconventional speech that
switches the lover’s role into the role of a non-lover, Gellrich explains that it “has taken
the conventional social expectation of rational control in male sexual activity and played
it out along the lines of a self-serving hedonism aimed at decorous self-gratification
without concern for the good.”43 The sophistical speechmaker had charmed Phaedrus
with a speech that ultimately aims to promote the goals of the speechmaker and not the
audience.
The explanation of the cultural nuances embedded within the lover-beloved
relationship “persuasively drive[s] a wedge between love’s madness and its alleged
educational benefits.”44 The danger of Lysias’s speech is how it positions Phaedrus in the
passive role of beloved or “non-loved.” Instead of Phaedrus portrayed as an equal to
Lysias, having as much rational capacity for thought, there is instead “a form of
charismatic bondage at the rhetorical level, with Phaedrus in the feminized, ravished
position of receiving without resistance.”45 Socrates needs to help turn Phaedrus into a
ravisher of ideas. This can only be accomplished if Phaedrus surpasses his role as a
passive listener to speeches and becomes someone who thinks about speeches actively
and constructs new ones that help resolve puzzles for others.
The role reversals also hold up a mirror to Phaedrus so that he may see himself
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objectively as cast under Lysias’s spell.46 Socrates’ hope is that Phaedrus will reflect on
his eros with his newfound self-awareness in order to understand why he was lured by
rhetorical enchantments, and why philosophical discussions are ultimately more alluring.
“Socrates’ attempts to seduce Phaedrus away from his infatuation with Lysianic rhetoric
and towards devotion to philosophy,” Moss explains, and by doing so “we see Socrates
engaged in an attempt at soul-leading, using as his tool Phaedrus’s love, not of another
person, but of rhetoric.”47 This explains why Phaedrus has so much potential: he already
loves logos, but he loves an image of the truth which logos signifies instead of the truth
itself. Socrates is aware of what leads Phaedrus’s soul, thereby playing on that love by
constructing a speech that Phaedrus cannot easily forget.
At the close of the recitation, Socrates, as tongue in cheek as he gets and
reflecting Phaedrus’s enthusiasm for the speech, exclaims, “It’s a miracle, my friend; I’m
in ecstasy.”48 Even the young Phaedrus picks up on the sarcasm. Nevertheless, he enjoins
Socrates to praise the speech on its “impressive” and “complete” examination of the
nature of love.49 Socrates refuses these terms, so Phaedrus asks him to give a speech in
response. When Socrates again refuses Phaedrus’s request, saying that he is not versed in
the art of rhetoric as Lysias is, Phaedrus gives him an offer that he cannot refuse: “Stop
playing so hard to get! I know what I can say to make you give a speech [...] I shall never,
never again recite another speech for you.”50 Phaedrus’s aggression, albeit playful, is not
acceptable behavior for a beloved.
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Kenneth Dover provides background information to elucidate the relationship
between lover and beloved. He explains,
society sympathized with the persistent ἐραστής and encouraged him, but did not
tolerate forwardness or deliberate seductiveness on the part of the ἐρώμενος; we
may compare heterosexual societies in which women are expected to say ‘no’ but
men are expected to go on trying to make them say ‘yes’.51
Phaedrus reverses the power dynamic of the lover-beloved relationship by placing
Socrates in the role of the younger and passive beloved, who is expected to mimic the
erastēs, the well-established aristocrat. Where the beloved is usually passive, Phaedrus is
actively demanding speeches from Socrates. Where the lover is usually in charge,
Socrates seems under the tutelage of Phaedrus and obliged to meet his demands,
notwithstanding his resistance to fulfill his duty. This is ironic because Phaedrus is
known as the ultimate beloved as he remains in the passive position, loved and cared for
by older established men, especially doctors.52 Phaedrus’s company speaks to his desires:
loving speeches he consorts with sophists, and desiring good health he partners himself
with doctors. His inversion of the roles of lover and beloved early in Phaedrus
foreshadows how Socrates will invert the roles in his second speech, confirming
Phaedrus’s identity as (potential) lover of Beauty itself and speaker of truth rather than a
passive beloved of doctors and sophists.
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Phaedrus wants to bask in Socrates’ logoi, but he does not want to think about
them. He is mirroring Lysias—role-playing just as Polus assumes the role of Gorgias in
Plato’s dialogue of that name. Socrates must bend to Phaedrus’s demand or risk losing
his relationship with him.53 Socrates exclaims, “How could I possibly give up such
treats!”54 Not that Socrates would be at a loss intellectually, but the dialectic between
Socrates and his young friend would surely end, and along with it, most importantly, their
budding friendship. To reaffirm his friendship with Phaedrus, Socrates gives his first
speech, covering his head while doing so. He brings Lysias’s speech to its logical
conclusions, and by doing so provides a twisted account of eros. The action of covering
his head is playful in tone, but it suggests the deeper message of this role-playing game:
Socrates is willing to “stoop” to Phaedrus’s level in order to keep his interest, but he has
his limits. The first speech is as low as he is willing to go, and even that makes him
uncomfortable. Socrates subtly shows Phaedrus that he is returning to the shadows of the
“cave” for his sake.55 Covering the head is a sign of regression, of lowering oneself on
the lower rungs of the ladder of love or burying one’s head in the dirt. He seems
embarrassed to lower himself to the ranks of Lysias. Socrates is like the cicada reverting
to its nymph form—descending from the treetops to re-bury itself in the ground for
another life cycle.
Another clue that the speech is disingenuous is its dramatic introduction. Socrates
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starts by saying that “there once was a boy, a youth rather, and he was very beautiful, and
had very many lovers” and one of these lovers decided to trick the boy to gain his favor.56
The “wily” lover convinced the beautiful boy that he was not in love with him, using a
persuasive speech of which Socrates pretends to give an account here. Socrates roused
Phaedrus’s erotic interest via a flirtatious mimicking of courtship in the beginning of the
dialogue.57 Nevertheless, he is not doing so to initiate Phaedrus as his beloved, but is
mimicking Lysias’s relationship with Phaedrus for the purpose of invoking self-reflection
in the “lad.”58
Moss argues that “love only works for lovers, and the mock courtship emphasizes
that Socrates and Phaedrus are not in fact in love; hence Socrates cannot use interpersonal
love to lead Phaedrus’ soul.”59 However, in this remark she misses the point of the
playful tone between Socrates and Phaedrus. The playfulness points to three things: (1)
the relationship that does not exist between the two currently, but that could (in the sense
of the lover-beloved relationship that exists as an overarching convention in Athens); (2)
how the power dynamic between Socrates and Phaedrus shifts during the dialogue, each
becoming lover, beloved, and non-lover in turn; and finally, (3) that the flirtation between
them points to the flirtation with logos to come in the many myths in the dialogue (as if

56

Plato Phaedrus 237b.
A similar courtship is seen in Charmides: “Socrates follows Critias’ advice ‘to pretend’ (155b) that he
has a remedy, and as the handsome young man approaches there is a scurrying about by those who wish to
sit next to him, during which time Socrates catches fire from seeing the inside of Charmides’s garment and
loses his gift of gab. All this is in the ironic spirit of erotic play for which Socrates is famous. But the
doubleness does not discredit the notion that the ‘beautiful speech’ can order the soul so much as lead the
way to the insight at the end of the dialogue—that the “beautiful speech” capable of charming is Socratic
dialogue” (Gellrich 1994, 282).
58
Socrates is not satisfied with referring to Phaedrus as a boy (παῖς) here, so he uses the diminutive
meirakiskos (μειρακίσκος is the diminutive of μειράκιον) to highlight his intellectual immaturity (Plato
Phaedrus 237b2).
59
Moss 2012, 20.
57

71

they are climbing the ladder of love throughout their afternoon together). So in these
ways Socrates is using interpersonal eros between him and Phaedrus that mirrors a
philosophical eros for Beauty itself that is the goal of speechmaking in the Platonic
dialogues.
Interpersonal love has certain limitations that could hinder the cultivation of
philosophical eros, as we saw with Alcibiades’ speech in Symposium. Alcibiades could
not ascend out of the lower rungs of the ladder of love away from his personal connection
to Socrates and his body. Moss argues that rhetoric can serve as substitute for
interpersonal love because rhetoric “exploits people’s passion for the beautiful—here the
beauty of logoi rather than of human bodies or souls—to lead them towards the Forms.”60
Philosophers and sophists use love and rhetoric as powerful tools to lead the soul, but
they use them in very different ways. On one hand, Socrates offers enchanting speeches
that play with ideas for the sake of sparking a love of ideas that, if properly channeled by
the interlocutor, transform into a love of discussing (all) ideas, and ultimately the love of
wisdom. On the other hand, sophists conjure rhetorical enchantments that do not seek
anything beyond a love of an idea or speeches as presented by the sophist. “Only sham
rhetoric,” Asmis says, “beguiles others; real rhetoric guides souls to self-knowledge
through a knowledge of soul.”61 The word-potion served by sophists does not aid in the
ascent of the soul as modeled in the ladder of love; the eros cultivated remains on the
lower rungs of material reality. In terms of the soul’s ability to attain wisdom, sophistic
strategies are distracting at best and poisonous at worst.
Descent into vice occurs if the goals for the lover and beloved are in conflict with
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one another. Socrates’ first speech centers around the consequences of defining love in
the manner of Lysias—one’s life is filled with a constant struggle between love and
reason in the same way that the lover and beloved are in a dramatic conflict with one
another. Reflecting Lysias’s speech, Socrates then defines love as a desire for what is
beautiful, although “men who are not in love have a desire for what is beautiful.”62 The
latter idea is in conflict with Plato’s erotic philosophy, where love is an expression of the
innate attraction to Beauty Itself that is present, whether latently or not, in all souls.
Socrates explains that one can distinguish a man in love by his “outrageousness”
(hubris), as his behavior is filled with vice analogous to the tyrant in Plato’s Republic.63
A lover is ruled by his “inborn desire for pleasure” and goes out of his mind when “desire
takes command and drags [him] without reasoning toward pleasure” as it wreaks havoc
and “plays tyrant” in the soul.64 The lover is
deceitful, irritable, jealous, disgusting, harmful to [the beloved’s] property, harmful
to his physical fitness, and absolutely devastating to the cultivation of the soul,
which truly is, and will always be, the most valuable thing to gods and men.”65
Socrates’ definition of the lover reflects his estimation of Lysias and the sophists who
harm the youth of Athens. The definition of love as hubris reflects the sophistic
conception of love as a desire for pleasure that is exploited for selfish purposes. On the
contrary, a non-lover is ruled by the “acquired judgment that pursues what is best” and is
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characterized by self-control (sōphrosynē), thus “being in his right mind.”66 To
summarize, Socrates’ first speech characterizes the lover as a potential rapist and the nonlover as a potential teacher; the beloved’s best choice is obvious.
The second half of Socrates’ first speech is a list of all the ways a lover harms the
beloved by shaping him into an inferior and easily controlled pawn. For example, a lover
wants someone who is easily overpowered physically; he encourages the boy to be “soft,”
sit in “dappled shade,” and use cosmetics to compensate for his lack of color.67 The lover
also cultivates intellectual inferiority and poverty of the soul, as well as rejoicing in the
loss of the boy’s wealth, parents, and all possessions. Another great injustice for the
beloved is that when he is older and finally wants to reap the benefits of the loverbeloved relationship, the lover’s lust has faded and he regrets the way he treated his
beloved. The lover refuses to fulfill the promises he made when he was ruled by hubris,
now that “right-minded reason is in place of the madness of love (erotōs kai manias).”68
Griswold notes that this is the first use of “mania” in Phaedrus, acting here as a transition
to Socrates’ second speech where he discusses divine madness in detail.69 The lover and
beloved have switched roles. Now the lover “is a refugee, fleeing from those old
promises on which he must default by necessity; he, the former lover, has to switch roles
and flee” as the beloved pursues the lover in hubris, “chasing after him, angry and
cursing.”70
Socrates’ first speech is an improvement over Lysias’s in that he provides a method
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to uncover the nature of love in order to understand whether a beloved should give his
favors to a lover or non-lover. That understood, the speech is itself unsuccessful in
providing a convincing argument; the definitions of love and the soul rest on commonly
accepted opinions. These are not carefully examined ideas that can serve as a platform for
analysis. The failure of this “technical and sober” speech is precisely why Socrates
praises dialectical reasoning.71 Lysias’s speech and Socrates’ first speech serve as
evidence that dialectical reasoning is superior to sophistic speechmaking. Even when
Phaedrus interjects during Socrates’ first speech, he responds by saying something out of
character: “be quiet and listen,” perhaps like an egotistical sophist, but very unlike the
Socrates of most other Platonic dialogues.72 The irony is that Phaedrus was responding to
a question Socrates had asked him. Socrates makes it clear that his speech is antithetical
to cultivating dialogue. His second speech, by contrast, serves as an example of
philosophical speechmaking that embodies the art of dialectical reasoning. It is not
rhetoric that makes speeches artful, it is dialectical reasoning that embodies an “art and
not an artless practice.”73 Gellrich remarks, “The cross-currents of meaning bring eros,
sophistry, and enchantment into a complicated eddying, as desire becomes both the
subject matter of discourse and its dramatized effect.”74 Socrates employs the
“dramatizing effect” producing eros when he ends his speech abruptly, leaving Phaedrus
wanting more.75 Socrates announces, “You won’t hear another word from me, and you
will have to accept this as the end of the speech” to which Phaedrus responds, “but I
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thought you were right in the middle.” 76 One can hear the frustration in his voice.
Phaedrus whines, “So why are you stopping now, Socrates?” Phaedrus is obviously
frustrated, which parallels Alcibiades’ sexual frustration with Socrates in Symposium.
Phaedrus wants Socrates’ marvelous speeches, while Alcibiades wants Socrates’ golden
god within via physical intimacy.77 Both young men miss the aim of philosophical eros.
Socrates stimulates eros by withholding logos just as Phaedrus threatened he would do if
Socrates did not show off his speechmaking skills. Socrates wants more than speeches—
he wants dialogue, and to this end he is successful.
Phaedrus insist that Socrates not “cross the river” back to Athens, but wait out the
heat of the afternoon together by “discussing the speeches,” to which Socrates replies,
You’re really superhuman when it comes to speeches, Phaedrus; you’re truly
amazing. I’m sure you’ve brought into being more speeches that have been given in
your lifetime than anyone else, whether you composed them yourself or in one way
or another forced other to make them […] even as we speak, I think, you’re
managing to cause me to produce yet another one.78
It is ironic that Socrates the midwife seems to be on the brink of “giving birth” with
Phaedrus acting as the doctor promoting a healthy birth. Where the Socratic method gives
birth to the inspiration needed for understanding the true nature of reality, Phaedrus’s
whiney goading gives rise to contrived and uninspired speeches. Socrates highlights how
uninspired his first speech is by ironically stating that the sacredness of the spot they
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reside in is lifting his state to that of a seer or prophet.79 He covered his head as if to
motion that he is blind to earthly matters, like a seer, and is filled with divine madness.
But as Phaedrus forced him into this role it doubly points to his blindness to Beauty itself
as he separates himself from the ability to generate discussions with Phaedrus. Asmis
notes that, “Socrates delivers his speech, covered up ‘in shame,’” which makes sense
because he is mimicking “Isocrates, whose message is shameful” as the speech is an
“exercise in the professional rhetorician's pseudo-art of deception” and not a dialectical
exercise in uncovering the true nature of eros or a lover.80 However, as Derrida notes, he
participated in speechmaking to “imitate the imitators in order to restore the truth of what
they imitate: namely truth itself.”81 Socrates attempted to show Phaedrus (rather than
explain) why the sophistic speeches are an image of truth, but Phaedrus was not able to
follow. If Phaedrus had seen the flaws of the first speech, the second speech would have
been unnecessary and the two could have jumped into a discussion of the nature of
rhetoric and speeches straight away.
At the end of Socrates’ first speech, he uncovers his head and is prepared to truly
inspire Phaedrus with, as Griswold says, the second speech that acts as a “palinode that is
both a remedy and an inoculation—the perfect pharmakon.” 82 In other words, Socrates
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will model for Phaedrus what it means “to recollect what is truly beautiful” by opening
up his soul to divine madness. 83 The ensuing recollection steadily restores Socrates’
intellectual vision. In Socrates’ second speech—a palinode in the sense that it serves as
an act of contrition for the first inferior speech by recanting the original definition of a
lover—it becomes quite clear that vision, whether physical or intellectual, is the main
analogy for knowing in Phaedrus. Vision is understood as recollection, and Socrates’
second speech is the love potion that he serves to Phaedrus. How Phaedrus takes up the
love potion will decide whether it is a poison that makes him love speeches themselves
all the more, or a remedy to speech-loving by prompting recollection. Socrates hopes that
his speech as a pharmakon will open up Phaedrus’ soul to the intellectual vision that
serves as recollection.

2.2 The Soul Grows Wings and Begins to Fly: Recollection in the Palinode
Divine madness is viewed as a “going out of one’s mind” or losing control of the self as
argued in Lysias’s speech.84 To begin his second speech, Socrates explains why madness
(manian) is not bad (kakon) in itself as Lysias argued; on the contrary, madness is
beneficial “when it is given as a gift from god.”85 Socrates reverses the connotation of
divine madness from losing control to gaining ultimate control of the soul, in the same
way that psychagōgia could be seen as a wizard’s clever trick to enchant for his own
benefit.86 Socrates makes rhetorical persuasion a stage to gaining control over the soul,
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which can then ascend to the divine Forms. The “greatest of blessings [agathos]” come
from divine madness.87 The term kakos means the opposite of kalos and agathos. Based
on Liddell and Scott, the definition of “kakos” can refer to bad, mean, ugly, ill-born,
cowardly, worthless, sorry, wicked, evil, and poor.88 Whereas “agathos” can refer to
good, gentle, noble, and brave, and kalos beautiful, fair, and good. 89
This term is used again by Socrates when describing the importance of dialectic
as a method of division, and not using “bad” rhetoric, which is likened to an unskilled
carver. Socrates loves the dialectical process, which he describes as having two
components:
The first consists in seeing together things that are scattered about everywhere and
collecting them into one kind, so that by defining each thing we can make clear
the subject of any instruction we wish to give. Just so with our discussions of
love: Whether its definition was or was not correct, at least it allowed the speech
to proceed clearly and consistently with itself.90
The dialectical opposition of Socrates’ two speeches allowed Phaedrus to collect a wide
array of information on the topic of love. This is the first step. The second step is to carve
that information: “This, in turn, is able to cut up each according to its species along its
natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.”91 The metadiscussion Socrates and Phaedrus engage in after the speeches reveals the educational
model inherent to the Socratic method. “Well, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of these
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divisions and collections, so that I may be able to think and speak.”92
Socrates’ palinode presents a more cohesive whole that is more easily dissected,
each part undergoing a rich analysis that leads to further access (recollection) to the
Forms. The palinode relays a myth of how the soul recollects Beauty itself. The soul
originally is like an incorporeal chariot that consists of a noble horse, a wild horse, and
the charioteer. The function of the charioteer is to train his horses to obey his command
so that he may reach his goal—a divine banquet at the end of the crowded and noisy
procession. Each soul belongs to a particular procession that is led by a god. Those who
are led by Zeus are the first to begin and have the easiest road to the Forms. For most,
however, the procession to the pinnacle is difficult because the charioteer struggles to
control his own horses, and must also compete with all the other chariots as they stumble
along the procession that becomes increasingly chaotic. Socrates is using this idea as a
form of psychagōgia, i.e., to lead Phaedrus to understand that the person who leads him
plays a significant role in the care of his soul. If he follows a lesser god or lesser person,
such as a sophist, then his path to the Forms will be more difficult. However, if Phaedrus
chooses to be led by the Zeus of Athens, a philosopher, then his ascent will be less
chaotic.
The well-trained soul that also happened to fall into good company on earth is
much more likely to begin the process of recollection, although even then in confusion
with “eyes” dimmed. Compared to the power of the soul, the senses, such as eyesight,
“are so murky that only a few people are able to make out, with difficulty, the original of
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the likenesses that they encounter here.”93 Sensory perception is the means to recollect
the universal or “original” ideas in which particulars participate. The power of the senses
is weak because they cannot easily [or at all] connect particulars to the universal. Where
the charioteer at the rim of heaven had a limited banquet on which to feast his eyes, the
man relying on his senses has an almost infinite variety of ever-changing material. The
seemingly infinite stream of sensory data confuses the mind unless it organizes the
perceptions into broader categories or ideas.
Within this world of material flux, where does one even start to filter truth from
opinion? This is where the soul comes in. The above description of sensory capacity
contrasts starkly with the power of the soul as it participates in the divine banquet:
And we who celebrated it were wholly perfect and free from all troubles that
awaited us in times to come, and we gazed in rapture at sacred revealed objects that
were perfect, and simple, and unshakeable and blissful. That was the ultimate vision
(eudaimona phasmata), and we saw it in pure light because we were pure (kathara)
ourselves, not buried in this thing we are carrying around now, which we call a
body, locked in it like an oyster in its shell.94
Because the memory of Beauty, Justice, and Self-Control are present in the well-trained
soul, the soul is what can link the likeness to the original. The vision of the soul is
perfect, and what the soul is able to behold is perfect. Notice the positive words used to
describe this divine vision: “rapture” (μακαριωτάτην), “celebrate” (ὠργιάζομεν),
“perfect” (ὁλόκληροι), “free of all troubles” (ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν) “simple” (ὁλόκληρα),
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“unshakeable” (ἀτρεμῆ), “blissful” (ἐποπτεύοντες), “pure” (καθαρᾷ), “beauty”
(κάλλους), and “radiant” (ἔλαμπεν).95 These contrast the negative description of the
senses attempting to perceive the divine Forms: “murky” (ἀμυδρῶν), “image”
(ὁμοιώμασιν), and with “difficulty” (μόγις).96 These negative words mirror the state of
the embodied soul, which is “buried” (ἀσήμαντοι), and “locked” (δεδεσμευμένοι)
like an “oyster in its shell.”97 The positive connotation in these words conjures the specter
of a life well-lived (eudaimonia phasmata) and the ultimate goal of ascent—to access the
divine Forms with intellectual vision.98
The rhetorical form directs our attention to the deeper message: ascent is possible
only by an inward turn. To “know thyself” is to look within the soul and recollect the
knowledge that has always been there. To love a good life necessitates the inward turn.
The pleasure of using the inward vision of the soul vastly outweighs the pleasure of
sensory vision. Compare it with the pleasure you experience, for example, when gazing at
a field of wildflowers on a warm summer day. The sensory world is full of intertwining
fleshly delights. That pleasure is mere muck, in Plato’s estimation, compared with the
bliss of gazing at Beauty itself. It is like focusing on the oyster’s shell instead of the pearl
within, or on the finger pointing to the moon instead of the illuminated moon in all its
heavenly glory.
How does the soul’s vision aid living the best and most pleasurable life possible?
The goal of ascent in the charioteer analogy is ultimately for the soul to return to the
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heavenly procession in order to feast on the Forms. In order to prepare the soul for the
chariot procession, one must train it properly by honing soul-vision by recollecting the
divine Forms. Soul-vision is rational capacity, and is strengthened by formulating rational
accounts. Strengthening the vision of the soul “redirects it appropriately” away from the
objects of beauty one perceives through the senses and towards the Forms.99 The myth
alludes to the goal of ascent in lived experience—to improve the soul’s capacity to
discern truth from opinion through dialectical reasoning. Ascent necessitates reaching
within the soul to grasp what is truly real. The inward turn is made possible by
philosophical discussions, which provide the intellectual stimulation needed to
understand (and passionately desire to understand) reality all the more.
Ascent is gradual and starts from the bottom up; it begins when the soul perceives
physical beauty with the senses. Divine madness in the form of erotic attraction enables
the soul to begin the hard work of uncovering its true aim—knowing Beauty itself. Yet,
even the philosopher who has the soul with the most potential to rise must struggle to
recollect the heavenly feast. What must come first is the proper environment in which the
soul is capable of transforming love from sensory objects to a love for intelligible objects.
The proper environment for ascent is a beautiful one. On the one hand, eros flourishes in
the presence of kalon. In Republic Plato sates that “both knowledge and truth are
beautiful things,” but each act as means to the ultimate goal of knowing the Good. In the
same way that light and vision are “rightly thought to be sunlike,” but are not the sun, so
knowledge and truth are beautiful but not the form of Beauty; truth is not the goal of
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ascent because it is not the Forms.100 As an expression of the more focused philosophical
eros, reason flourishing in the presence of logos. The beautiful environment filled with
visually and intellectually stimulating people, speeches, and ideas aids the soul in
recognizing the beauty that her soul is attracted to, but is not the end in itself. The
ultimate goal is to recollect Beauty itself (which leads to recollection of the Good). “That,
then, is what every soul pursues, and for its sake does everything.”101
On the other hand, eros diminishes in the presence of ugliness or kakon, which is
why Socrates believes that no one knowingly desires what is bad.102 Why then does
Alcibiades turn away from ascending via philosophical eros? It is because his power of
reason is dim:
You know when our eyes no longer turn to things whose colors are illuminated by
the light of day, but by the lights of night, they are dimmed and seem nearly blind,
as if clear sight were no longer with them.103
It is not that Alcibiades desires any less, it is that he is not able to distinguish what is a
shadow of beauty and what is true Beauty. His reason is dimmed by forgetfulness and
distraction. Dialectical reasoning would sharpen his reason, but he does not have a
passion for dialectics, but the image of Beauty. Alcibiades is distracted by the means to
Beauty (beautiful things on the lower rungs of the ladder of love) and cannot see the end
of eros (the Forms accessed through ascending the ladder of love).
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Socrates lingers on beauty in the palinode: “Well, all that was for love of a memory
that made me stretch out my speech on longing for the past.”104 Socrates palpably feels a
yearning for the divine banquet; he yearns to remember Beauty itself. Why is Beauty
itself the form that Plato invests with the most attention? First, Plato pays special
attention to beauty because it captures our senses most vividly, as it is “radiant among the
other objects” that we “grasp sparkling through the clearest of our senses.”105 Vision is
the “sharpest of our bodily senses” and “beauty alone has the privilege, to be the most
clearly visible and the most loved” of all the objects available to our sensory
perception.106 Sight is the most powerful of the five senses and has a strong connection to
recollection, especially of the Form of Beauty itself “because beauty enjoys a special
status in the sensible world: we can perceive it with our eyes.” 107 Morgan continues to
remark that “only beauty has this allotment and it is therefore most clear and most
loveable to us (250d7–e1).”108 Eros is a powerful force of recollection because we love
our beautiful memories and long to return to the time when we experienced those
beauties with intensity. Socrates says it is that longing which made him stretch out his
speech.
Second, beauty invites the most visceral response. The response our body has to
beauty mirrors the response our soul has to it. Attraction to beautiful bodies is a universal
human experience. The sight of a beautiful object will excite anyone with a “soul.” Dover
explains that Plato “considered that our response to visual beauty is the clearest glimpse
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of eternity that our senses can afford us.”109 Not only is vision our most powerful
physical sense, but it also has the ability to stir the soul, specifically when exposed to
beauty. Beauty is most immediately felt as a bodily reaction to a beautiful body. In fact,
the ancient Athenians believed that the source of eros for the erastēs was in the eyes of
the erōmenos; eye contact is considered an intense form of erotic initiation.110 An
example of how Plato expresses the power of eye contact is in Phaedrus when “the
charioteer looks love in the eye, his entire soul is suffused with a sense of warmth and
starts to fill with tingles and the goading of desire.”111 Socrates continues to say that the
erastēs is “struck by the boy’s face as if by a bolt of lightning.”112 Plato clearly believes
that vision has a persuasive influence on eros.
Third, beauty is the most immediate cause of the soul’s erotic attraction to an object
that participates in it. Our senses cannot perceive in the sensory world “wisdom” or “selfcontrol” in the same way they can an object of beauty. Plato notes, “it would awaken a
terribly powerful love if an image of wisdom came through our sight as clearly as beauty
does, and the same goes for other objects of inspired love.”113 Beautiful bodies awaken
the visceral response of physical attraction. Dover notes, “There can be little doubt that
the homosexual response was the most powerful emotional experience known to most
people for whom he was writing.”114 Plato is not talking about the beauty of any object,
but specifically the body of a beloved. This is the concept of stimulating beauty Phaedrus
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understands, as the lover-beloved relationship was the Athenian cultural norm that shaped
his view of love.
Ultimately, Plato thinks, a beautiful mind will thrill the soul and provide the same
amount of attraction to beauty that a body once did. 115 One cannot see a beautiful or wise
soul, so the soul of the lover relies first on sight of the beloved to awaken eros. “We have
no sense organs to perceive wisdom,” Morgan states, “otherwise our passion for it would
be equally intense (250d3-6).”116 If the soul contains an adequate memory of Beauty
itself philosophical eros will arise in favor of physical eros for the object of beauty at
hand. “When the charioteer sees that face” after he has reigned in the dark horse, “his
memory is carried back to the real nature of Beauty, and he sees it again where it stands
on the sacred pedestal next to Self-Control.”117 Once eros has awoken it has the
possibility of beginning the gradual transformative work towards recognizing its true
source of attraction: Beauty itself.
The goal of embodied life is to drown out the distractions of the body and return
to the latent memory of the within the soul; the nature of the soul’s ascent is “recollection
[anamnēsis] of the things our souls saw when it was traveling with god, when it has
disregarded the things we now call real and lifted its head to what is truly real instead.”118
The person who is able to recollect the Forms with the most accuracy will live the best
life possible, and upon death will return to the heavenly realm to begin the chariot
It is worth noting that Nussbaum notes that the “godlike face that represents beauty well and the form of
the body (251a) can itself contain traces or signs of character, or the god within (252dff),” and continues
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procession again. The person who recollects the most about their time in the heavens will
also seem like a madman to the uninitiated because he or she will not care for mundane
activities. Kathryn Morgan clarifies the connection between recollection and divine
madness through memory, which allows “the lover to grasp his god, get a share of him or
her, and becomes, again, inspired.” 119 Recollection is defined as “the human ability to
bring together many sensations into a whole gathered together by reason” based on the
experience of the soul in heaven, while memory “is the engine of becoming inspired.”120
Socrates says that because ascent is based on recollection, “only a philosopher’s mind
grows wings, since its memory always keeps it as close as possible to those realities by
being close to which the gods are divine.”121 The philosopher stands between worlds; he
is not enamored of the accumulation of wealth or honor.122 Rather, “he stands outside
human concerns and draws close to the divine; ordinary people think he is disturbed and
rebuke him for this, unaware that he is possessed by god.”123
Other people wonder why the philosopher spends so much time contemplating the
nature of reality and pursuing the truth about each topic with such zeal. Why not amuse
yourself with some gossip and chit-chat like the rest of us? The rabble says, “Be a body!
Seek pleasures! Enjoy the senses!” The philosopher is, in fact, in hot pursuit of
pleasure—the highest high, the most intense and enduring satisfaction of eudaimonia that
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is brought about by intellectual stimulation.124 Non-philosophers do not get it. Instead,
they say the philosopher is out of his mind. Socrates agrees! The philosopher enjoys the
gift of divine madness, which allows his soul to soar once again, liberated from the
mundane.
The outward sign of ascent is divine madness, which is incited “when he sees the
beauty we have down here and [the soul] is reminded of true Beauty; then he takes his
wing and flutters in eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so; and he gazes aloft, like a
bird, paying no attention to what is down below—and that is what brings on him the
charge that he has gone mad.”125 The person in love thinks of nothing but love and in
doing so begins to remember true reality—the soul feast at the rim of heaven. The wings
of the soul begin to grow and take flight, and he seems more bird than man. Those around
him that have not been so aroused think he has lost his mind, when in reality he has just
turned it on for the first time. The cause of the soul’s ascent is twofold: first, the exposure
and attraction to beauty in the visible world and second, the subsequent recollection of
the true Beauty to which the soul-chariot was once exposed in the intelligible realm.
Seeing a beautiful body unconsciously activates the soul’s memory of Beauty itself.
The soul does not recognize that it is remembering its “past life” in the heavenly
realm; it is attracted to the beautiful body in such a strong way that those around him
believe he has gone mad. “This is the best and noblest of all the forms that possession by
god can take for anyone who has it or is connected to it, and when someone who loves
124
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beautiful boys is touched by this madness he is called a lover (ἐραστής).”126 Sexual
awakening is ultimately a spiritual awakening, but the soul must go through the gradual
process of understanding why he is attracted to beauty before he can grasp Beauty itself.
Once the soul is “turned on” by beauty, it has the ability to grow and flourish in order to
perform its function: ascend to the source of all reality. The soul chooses to direct itself
toward bodily or intellectual delights. A sexual awakening may therefore remain just that.
What is the relationship between recollection and philosophical eros? Is the soul
able to recollect the transmigration of the soul, peeping at the rim of heaven, or the nature
of attraction to Beauty itself? Mythological tales provide a narrative that channels eros
toward its philosophical variety. Philosophical myth helps the novice to ask the right sort
of questions about reality, himself, and the true meaning of his life. The overarching
images of a myth refer to possible experiences in a person’s life. Like Werner, who
explains, “Platonic myth itself can serve as a trigger for intuitive recollection,” I believe
that Socrates’ pharmaka work to open up the soul and awaken new possibilities.127
Intuitive recollection, a term coined by Kathryn Morgan, is an unconscious recollection
that occurs in anyone who interacts with a particular that participates in a Form.128 The
individual is not aware of the Forms, at least not as such, nor is she recollecting that
specific Form from a particular. Morgan proposes that a second type of recollection,
philosophical reflection, is the “conscious and deliberate cognitive process” of
recollecting a Form where “philosophical dialectic is the tool with which we provoke this
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second type of recollection.”129 Morgan’s distinction between intuitive and philosophical
recollection clarifies how all people experience a sexual awakening of the body, but only
some people experience the spiritual awakening and subsequent “divine madness” as the
soul recollects Beauty itself.
Morgan and Werner distinguish memories from the process of recollection.
Intuitive recollection provides access to the latent memory of the soul’s experience
traveling toward the Forms under the tutelage of one of the gods. In the presence of the
beloved, one’s soul experiences a strong feeling of connection, nostalgia, or physical
eros; it is a visceral experience of the memory of the heavenly procession, which is not
rationally informed. Recollection takes place when the lover recognizes that his response
to the beloved is more than physical; that it is spiritual as well. If there is a difference
between a memory and recollecting Forms, then what turns the soul from intuitively
experiencing memory to philosophically recollecting the source of the memory? Werner
provides a novel connection between the power of myth and the power of beauty to
inspire recollection, understanding both as intuitive recollection.130 Intuitive recollection
is inspired by beauty because “the lover does not consciously deliberate about the beauty
of the beloved; he simply feels it,” and the beloved’s beauty “directly moves the lover to a
recollection of Beauty.131 Myth awakens the latent memories of the soul’s procession in
the same way that physical beauty sparks an erotic awakening because “like physical
beauty, Platonic myth itself can serve as a trigger for intuitive recollection.132 Werner’s
theory corroborates my own thesis that speeches containing myth are a starting point for
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dialogue in the same way that physical eros is the beginning of philosophical eros.
Kathryn Morgan’s distinction between intuitive and philosophical recollection also helps
to explain why some people fall madly in love with another person, but never experience
the divine madness entailed by passionately desiring Beauty itself.
Just like sex, myth alone will not lead the soul to recollection of Forms, i.e., the
soul’s ascent. The sophist mistakes the shadowy images of truth for the truth, while the
philosopher is able to unify the memories into a narrative pointing to something far
greater—Beauty itself. “The philosophical life,” Morgan explains, “assimilates both lover
and beloved into representations of their god.” 133 Through inspiring philosophical eros
that leads to recollection, the philosopher acts as the Zeus of the procession as he leads
the mortal charioteers on their way to the divine banquet. The mortal charioteers who
follow Zeus are the most ordered as they emulate their leader, therefore have the most
time gazing at the Forms.134 The best of the mortal charioteers emulate their processional
leader by exhibiting godlike qualities as they control their horses. The most godlike
charioteers love Beauty itself rather than beautiful busts, poems, or speeches. Each of us
has the capacity to lead our own soul towards Beauty with the help of good leader, that is,
teacher.
Socrates’ speeches are pharmaka, but the opposite of Circe’s potent brew in
Homer’s Odyssey. His provides a truly healing incantations that promote (not force)
recollection. He wants people to recollect, whereas Circe serves Odysseus and his men
“malignant drugs” (φάρμακα λύγρ᾽) in order to make them forget their homeland and
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turn them into pigs.135 Forgetting the Forms sinks one into a lower realm, where life is
more animal than divine. Circe leads the soul to forgetfulness while Zeus, representing a
philosopher, leads the soul to the divine banquet as pharmakon. To be swayed by the
wrong psychagōgue has dire consequences for the soul.
There is a connection to Socrates’ use of pharmakon to mean enchantment, and
the similar word pharmakos that means scapegoat. Historically, Pan (not the god himself,
but a representation or stand in) is the scapegoat. After a natural disaster, Pan was
“ritually burdened with the impurities of the entire community and then driven across the
frontier—if he was not actually killed and his ashes thrown into the sea.”136 It is no
wonder Pan hated city life. The pharmakos is double natured in that it “is thought of as
both the source of the trouble and (as the name itself makes clear) the pharmakos, i.e., the
medicine, the curative charm.”137 Because Plato believes that Pan and speech are
etymologically related, perhaps he understood speeches as that which had the potential to
cure Athenians of their intellectual malaise.138 If only Socrates could act as a scapegoat to
take on the intellectual sins of Athens, and sacrifice himself for the sake of Athens.
Socrates’ trial and death seem to point to him as a Pan-like pharmakos, but instead of
being the source of the Athenians intellectual stagnation, he was the one who so vocally
pointed out the lack of wisdom in the wisest of all Greek city-states.
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2.3 Beyond the Palinode: Carving Up the Dialogue
Why does Plato’s Phaedrus not end with the palinode? If the dialogue ended on
Socrates’ second speech, then the love Phaedrus feels for Socrates’ myth would end
there, and fade the next time Phaedrus heard another rousing speech. At best the myth of
the palinode would spur self-knowledge. At worst it would serve as another distraction
from the pursuit of wisdom. Instead of ending on Socrates’ spectacularly charming
speech, the dialogue continues with an investigation of speeches, rhetoric, and writing. It
is thinking about speeches, not the speeches themselves, that moves Phaedrus from the
love of speeches to the love of wisdom. The speech arouses eros in Phaedrus, and the
discussion about speeches redirects this eros towards a higher object—the source of all
erotic attraction, Beauty itself. By applying dialectical reasoning to the truth about
speeches and the soul, Socrates is leading Phaedrus’s soul up the ladder of love to better
and better objects of desire, the goal and ultimate rung leading to the Forms.
Griswold states that the philosophical import of Plato’s Phaedrus and the reason
why he writes in the dialogue format is that the dialogue itself “shows that our talk about
ourselves must extend to talk about our talk about ourselves.”139 Plato’s dialogue format
opens up the possibility for more and more philosophical discussions, writes Griswold,
because “each discourse seems to undermine itself in a way that generates yet another
discourse.”140 Plato’s body of work is a ladder of love in itself! Morgan’s theory aligns
with mine as she believes “both myth and dialogue are not the most serious form of
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philosophy.” 141 When Morgan says “dialogue” she is referring to Plato’s written work,
not the dialectical method. She claims that Plato’s dialogues do not contain knowledge,
but are an “aspiration towards it that will be realised, if at all, in real-life philosophical
discussion.”142 The dialogues and Socrates’ speeches contained within are training the
reader and audience to think differently.
Morgan and Griswold agree that the discussion following the reading of Platonic
dialogues is the ultimate purpose. The speechmaking, mythmaking, and dialoguegeneration all inspire a desire to learn more about the provocative topics that arise. The
best way to learn, according to Plato, is to participate in elenchus and rigorous dialectical
reasoning. The purpose of learning is to gain wisdom concerning the all reality. In other
words, it is to recollect the Forms through dialectical ascent fueled by philosophical eros.
If Phaedrus was excited about Lysias’s speech, and then overwhelmed by Socrates’
palinode, how much more passionate will he be when he gains understanding about why
he is attracted to speeches, how his soul is shaped by logos, and the source of all
knowledge that far surpasses the images of truth he has encountered thus far. How
Lysias’s “feast of eloquence” pales in comparison to the feast of the Forms!143
Socrates criticizes both the method of the sophists and the practice of the loverbeloved relationship. Both sophistry and sex may passively awaken a part of the soul
through an attraction to the sophist’s speeches or the beloved’s body, but on their own,
these methods do not lead to active self-awareness. The next step is thinking about why
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speeches and bodies promote eros in the soul, using dialectical reasoning to reach
informed conclusions. Instead, the sophist and the erastēs cultivate eros that is directed at
images of beauty and not Beauty itself. For example, in the charioteer analogy the poet
shapes his beloved like a statue—to imitate himself and the god he followed in the
heavenly procession. “We have seen how the lover chooses a beloved who imitates
beauty well,” Morgan writes, “and then works to make him into the best possible
representation of their god. He treats the beloved as a cult statue and strives to perfect
it.”144 The sophist, like the poet, creates his beloved pupil in his own image through
logos—an image of himself that is the image of his patron god. The beloved is then the
image of an image—far removed from the source. By contrast, the philosopher is able to
correctly direct the soul to the ultimate object of erotic longing through engaging the
novice in dialectical discussions. To be passively shaped is inferior to “actively creating
not out of a memory, but through challenging the underlying truth the memory points
to—the Forms.”145 The philosopher’s “beloved” is not created as an image of the Forms,
but is instead trained to create ideas that reflect the Forms as accurately as possible.146
Jessica Moss argues that soul-leading is the theme that unites the two disparate
parts of Phaedrus—the speeches and the discussion about the speeches.147 Both the
speeches with their rhetorical flourishes and mythical stories, as well as the dialogue
dissecting the nature of rhetoric, fulfill the unifying function of psychagōgia. A
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psychagōgue leads the soul by persuasion. One cannot lead someone who does not want
to be led, so Socrates creates charming speeches that attract speech-lovers. But is
Phaedrus as a dialogue really persuasive? The dialogue contains stimulating speeches on
the topic of love, a stimulating topic in itself, but does it really persuade Phaedrus that
philosophical discussions are superior to rhetorical speeches? Socrates says that good
speeches, “must be put together like a living creature,” but does he meet his own criteria
in his two speeches and does Plato meet this requirement in the dialogue as a whole?148
Moss claims that “the dialogue itself famously seems to be a misshapen jumble,” which
she justifies by explaining that it begins with a rich series of speeches on love and ends in
a more serious and “dry” discussion on the nature of rhetoric.149 The three main parts of
Phaedrus—the opening scene, the three speeches, and the dialogue about rhetoric and
writing—each act as psychagōgic pharmakon in the gradual progression to truth by
means of ascent; when taken together the three parts initiate one into the mysteries of
philosophy.
The prerequisite for ascent in this dialogue is that the interlocutor already love
speeches. If the audience has Phaedrus’s logomania, the speeches act as the love potion
that draws out the eros of the speech-lover like an aphrodisiac draws out latent erotic
feelings. I claim that the three parts of the dialogue work together as a harmonious whole
in the same way the three parts of the soul need to work together in a singularity of
purpose in order to perform its function well.150 Asmis observes that the dialogue “moves
from a display of pseudo-rhetoric to a revelation of genuine rhetoric,” which reflects
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Socrates’ “transition from psychagōgia as beguilement” common in sophistry “to
psychagōgia as guidance of the soul” that defines philosophy.151 Philosophical myths aid
the soul’s ascent, while common myths distract from the pursuit of self-knowledge and
the Forms. Philosophical rhetoric inspires eros directed to the Forms, whereas the rhetoric
used by sophists directs the audience to his or her own glory. In the same way,
pharmakon is both poison and cure, depending on who administers it. The medicinal
analogy works if you understand that a knowledgeable doctor who administers a
medicine correctly will help cure a person’s ailment, while a doctor who does not
understand the nature of the ailment or the nature of the curative could help the patient
accidentally, but will most likely cause damage.
Even in Symposium each speech signifies a similar progression. Instead of two
people competing for the most convincing speech, as in Phaedrus, the Symposium
contains a variety of speechmakers from various backgrounds competing for Agathon’s
attention. The friendly competition creates a potential for a rich dialectic. Although there
is little memorable dialogue about love—excepting Agathon and Socrates’ short
debate—the speeches each improve upon one another, culminating in Socrates’ speech
that attempts to resolve many of the puzzles raised by the previous speeches, as Sheffield
argues.152 The way the speeches respond to one another mimics the dialectical method.
Socrates is modeling how one should pursue wisdom. “Throughout this progression,”
Asmis writes,
Socrates serves as an example of a true rhetorician and true ‘psychagogue.’
Against Aristophanes’ portrait of Socrates as conjuror of souls [in Birds], Plato
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sets a portrait of Socrates as a ‘psychagogue’ who guides souls to the truth by
seeking it himself.153
Unlike Alcibiades’ portrayal of Socrates in Symposium as a magical satyr who forces him
to follow his commands with no free choice, Socrates is leading the way for us to take
control of our own souls out of the Bacchic frenzy of philosophical eros. The magician is
really midwife.
Nevertheless, to lump Socrates in with sophists, rhetoricians, and poets seems to
cast a shadow on his intentions and character. If Socrates is supposed to present a healthy
alternative to the sophists, then why is he using the same distracting tactics? If “dialectic
is frequently presented as a use of language opposed in every way to sophistic
enchantment,” then why does Socrates participate in psychagōgic enterprises, presenting
his pharmakon to those in need?154 Gellrich states there are “historical continuities
between the magician, the sophist, and the dialectician” and that those connections point
to Plato’s greater goal—cultivating the novice’s passion for philosophy.155 Socrates uses
charming speeches as a means to an end, just as the sophists do, but they have different
ends. For Socrates, it is to care for the soul of another by inspiring ascent, while for the
sophist it is to care for the self in terms of lower goods like wealth, honor, and even
physical pleasure.
It is as crucial for Socrates to hook the audience’s interest as it is for sophists;
both are vying for the souls of Athens. Rhetoric and philosophy both “lead souls by
persuasion,” but philosophy does not stop there. After Socrates has persuaded someone
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that he is worth listening to or has something of value to say, he continues to lead the soul
to truth by dialogue.156 A dialogue insists on mutual participation. One difference
between listening to (or repeating) speeches is that the act is ultimately passive, whereas
engaging in dialogue is active. Ascending from speech to dialogue is like transitioning
from love of a person’s body to love of his soul. The body’s beauty charms the lover to
desire more of the person, leading to the lover asking questions (erōtan) in order to know
the soul within the beautiful body. Dialogue is superior to speeches because it helps train
the soul to think for itself, but dialogue is not the end either; it is only a means to that
end: wisdom through the soul’s access to the divine Forms via dialectical ascent. It is the
Forms that make true knowledge possible, and it is the soul that has access to the Forms
as it ascends. The connection between the source of wisdom and the soul is the desire for
true knowledge. This desire makes persuasion necessary. Without desire, there is no
pursuit of wisdom; philosophical eros is necessary for the soul to ascend. Some people
need guidance in the form of dialogue that aids recollection of eros, as through the ladder
of love. Recollection about the true nature of Beauty itself cannot be forced upon
someone, just as true love cannot be forced upon the passive object of desire.
Socrates’ critique of Lysias’s definition of love is an implicit critique of the loverbeloved tradition and sophistic education. He explains that sophists are inferior leaders of
the soul because “they are ignorant of dialectic.”157 The sophists lack the skills and tools
needed to master rhetoric, and thus cannot properly educate others in the art of it:
It is their ignorance that makes them think they have discovered what rhetoric is
when they have mastered only what is necessary to learn as preliminaries. So they
156
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teach the preliminaries and imagine their pupils have received a full course in
rhetoric, thinking the task of using each of them persuasively and putting them
together into a whole speech is a minor matter, to be worked out by the pupils from
their own resources?158
Phaedrus is participating in the shared activity of learning by engaging Socrates after the
alluring palinode. He agrees with Socrates’ critique of sophistry, and asks how anyone
could become a successful rhetorician; by natural talent, knowledge, and practice, he
replies, “to the extent that you lack any one of them, to that extent you will be less than
perfect.”159 Socrates adds that dialectical questioning and speculation on nature is a
prerequisite for a successful rhetorician in the same way that a doctor needs to master
medicinal arts.
In both cases we need to determine the nature of something—of the body in
medicine, of the soul in rhetoric. Otherwise, all we’ll have will be an empirical and
artless practice. We won’t be able to supply, on the basis of art, a body with the
medicines and diet that will make it healthy and strong, or a soul with the reasons
and customary rules for conduct that will impart to it the convictions and virtues we
want.160
If sophists cannot define what rhetoric is, how can they teach others the art of it? If
rhetoric is essentially leading the soul, then what use is a rhetorician who knows nothing
of the soul? Socrates likens the sophist to a doctor who knows nothing of the body—in
both cases the person imparting their “artless practice” has the potential to do more harm
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than good. Any good accomplished would be accidental. No one would entrust his body
to a quack; why allow one to care for your soul?161
The way to practice an art is to start with knowledge. Socrates provides an
example of this type of thinking:
Isn’t this the way to think systematically about a thing? First, we consider whether
the object regarding which we intend to become experts and capable of transmitting
our expertise is simple or complex. Then, if it is simple, we must investigate its
power: What things does it have what natural power of acting upon? By what things
does it have what natural disposition to be acted upon? If, on the other hand, it takes
many forms, we must enumerate all of them and, as we did in the simple case,
investigate how each is naturally able to act upon what and how it has a natural
disposition to be acted upon by what.162
Socrates goes on to list all the types of questions the rhetorician must consider in order to
practice his art. “Since the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul,” he explains,
“whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know how many kinds of souls there are.”163
Of course, this is a daunting task, as Phaedrus points out. Yet Phaedrus does not have a
better method to present, so Socrates throws out what he believes a sophist would say—
namely, that these speeches should touch on the “likely,” not necessarily the true.164
Phaedrus agrees without hesitation, and so Socrates moves the conversation to the art of
161
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writing.
Some scholars call true rhetoric, or at least Plato’s idea of it, “philosophical
rhetoric.”165 This distinction confirms my reading of Plato’s critique of sophistic rhetoric
as a failure to persuade the audience to discover the truth of the topic and not merely
various opinions on the subject that seem likely. Persuasion is the focus of Plato’s
critique of sophistic rhetoric in the sense that it refers to “arousing desire in the auditor’s
soul.”166 Persuasion does not mean that you convince someone that your interpretation is
correct, but that they care about the subject and desire to know the truth of the matter.
The true rhetorician must know the truth of the topic in order to persuade an audience,
and the method of attaining this truth is collection and division through dialectical means.
Yunis observes that “in the Gorgias Plato demonstrated that if the rhetor does not have
clear, firm knowledge of the subject of his discourse, it will lead to harm for all parties,”
so “Phaedrus takes up where the Gorgias left off.”167 Using the definition of rhetoric as
psychagōgia in Phaedrus, one can see that if the person who is leading the soul does not
know the goal of his “procession,” then both parties will remain lost. It is possible that
they may stumble upon the truth, but it is more likely that they will start down a
dangerous path.
Dialectics is needed to clarify the truth for the rhetorician as it enhances his ability
to persuade. “By thrusting philosophy into the very heart of rhetoric and remaking it in
philosophy's image,” Yunis adds, “the Phaedrus completes the job begun in the
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Gorgias.”168 The problem with understanding rhetoric as using dialectics to discover the
truth of the matter is that it does not guarantee that the rhetorician will use dialectical
reasoning to persuade his audience of the truth instead of using dialectics to fortify a selfaggrandizing argument. An example of this is in the first speech of Socrates, where “he
follows Lysias by arguing in favor of the non-lover.”169 This reveals how a sophist can
manipulate knowledge gained from dialectical reasoning and use it “rhetorically for a
corrupt end.”170 What is the incentive to use rhetoric philosophically? Plato answers this
question by constructing the rhetorically superior palinode.
One reason Yunis provides for the superiority of the “Great Speech” is its power
to “arouse eros” by depicting it so vividly in the charioteer myth.171 Plato understands
that “mimetic art, both visual and poetic, has the ability to arouse the desires and
appetites of those who are spectators of that art.”172 The palinode itself incites eros, but
eros that is directed toward a specific goal—not just rhetorically superior speeches, but
the truth the speeches are meant to reveal. Yunis argues that Socrates’ palinode uses
rhetoric to “argue for the priority of philosophy.” 173 The aim of the palinode is
“rhetorical persuasion, not philosophical dialectic” and for it to succeed the “speech must
actually be compelling.”174 The speech does not speak the truth; it points to the truth and
invites the audience to seek it. The previous examination of recollection in the palinode
shows how Plato creates a myth that reinforces the need to lead the soul via philosophical
rhetoric (seeking truth that provokes ascent to divine Forms) rather than sophistic rhetoric
168
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(seeking convenient images of truth that hampers that ascent).
If the palinode does produce a rhetorically superior speech by creating a myth that
leads the souls of its audience to love seeking truth, then why does Phaedrus never
become a philosopher? If the palinode is, as Yunis describes, “a formal, rhetorical
expression of Socrates’ erotic force,” then why didn’t it lead Phaedrus to a life of
dialectical questioning and contemplation?175 A pharmakon either promotes health or
harm. Who are the doctors of the soul that have the expertise to apply the potion
correctly? What happens if the logos-potion is administered improperly? Does it poison
the soul instead of curing the soul? It seems that Socrates is unable to cure Phaedrus and
Alcibiades, among others, so does this mean that Socrates as a philosopher is not properly
equipped to heal the soul?176 If Socrates likens a doctor curing disease to a philosopher
dispelling ignorance, then why can’t Socrates properly cure souls of the disease of
ignorance?
Alcibiades’ fall from philosophical eros is memorable. When he drunkenly
interrupts the symposium after the conclusion of Socrates’ speech, he is asked to
participate in the night’s activities by constructing a speech praising love.177 Alcibiades
agrees, with a caveat—he will praise Socrates instead. This does not seem like a stretch
since Socrates was likened to the daimōn eros in his own speech. Diotima’s speech
likened Socrates to the eros of the philosophical myth. The presence of Socrates is the
deep well of truth from which Alcibiades’ soul wishes to draw. Socrates’ life is dedicated
to pursuing wisdom with the strongest erotic urgency. Alcibiades absorbs this magnetic
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energy, but is unable to use it to care for his own soul. Alcibiades even exclaims that
Socrates, “makes it seem like my life isn’t worth living,” but when he leaves the presence
of his lover, he “goes back to his old ways: he caves into his desire to please the
crowd.”178 Socrates, he adds, “makes me admit that my political career is a waste of time,
while all that matters is what I neglect: my personal shortcomings, which cry out for
closest attention.”179 Nevertheless, Alcibiades stubbornly refuses to listen to Socrates: “I
stop my ears and tear myself away from him, for, like the Sirens, he could make me stay
by his side till I die.”180 Alcibiades is ultimately unwilling to turn his soul away from
lower goods to higher ones.
The description of how Alcibiades’ soul responds to Socrates mirrors the
description of the “bad” horse in Socrates’ palinode. Alcibiades desire for honor from the
crowd, and even the pleasure of Socrates’ body and mind, are out of control. In this sense
does Alcibiades mirror the dark horse of the soul that is unwilling, at first, to obey the
charioteer’s command. Alcibiades quakes and shudders, sweats and frets whenever he is
in the presence of his “lover” Socrates. The dark horse “is suffused with a sense of
warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the goading of desire” before it begins to pull
the charioteer wildly towards the boy.181 The soul is driven wild in the presence of
beauty. The myth in Phaedrus explains why some lovers are able to control their dark
horse and begin a lifelong friendship with the beloved, viz., that they train the appetitive
dark horse to obey the command of reason. When the dark horse is out of control and
178

Plato Symposium 216a1.
Plato Symposium 216a5–b1.
180
Plato Symposium 216a5–b1.
181
Plato Symposium 215e–216a, 218a–b5. Compare this to the description of the struggle to rein in the bad
horse in the company of the beloved in Phaedrus 253e–255a1 as well as the soul’s first erotic experience at
251a1–252b1.
179

106

“leaps violently forward and does everything to aggravate its yokemate and its charioteer,
trying to make them go up to the boy and suggest to him the pleasure of sex” the “other
two resist, angry in their belief that they are being made to do things that are dreadfully
wrong.”182 After the charioteer has begun the process of training his horses—one that
Alcibiades ostensibly never started—he is again overcome by the beauty of the beloved,
but this time “his memory is carried back to the real nature of Beauty, and he sees it again
where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to Self-control.”183 Sexual attraction brought
back the memory of Beauty itself like a “bolt of lightning” and the charioteer now has a
clear idea of what he is attracted to when he sees the beauty of his beloved, and is able to
instruct him on the Forms while simultaneously harnessing the erotic passion for Beauty
to philosophical discussions.184
Not every beloved will have the advantage of a virtuous lover. Socrates offers a
cautionary tale to those who cannot tame the dark horse:
If, on the other hand, they adopt a lower way of living, with ambition in place of
philosophy, then pretty soon when they are careless because they have been
drinking or for some other reason, the pair's undisciplined horses will catch their
souls off guard and together bring them to commit that act which ordinary people
would take to be the happiest choice of all; and when they have consummated it
once, they go on doing so for the rest of their lives, but sparingly, since they have
not approved of what they are doing with their whole minds. So these two also
live in mutual friendship (though weaker than the philosophical pair), both while
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they are in love and after they have passed beyond it.185
Plato’s palinode does not typecast a lover as one thing and a non-lover as its opposite in
the manner of Lysias’s simplistic speech. In the more complex charioteer analogy, the
variation among souls is explained. If one has trained the dark horse of appetite well, then
the soul is free to begin ascent. If not, the appetites will rule over the soul like an allconsuming tyrant.186 Socrates’ myth explains why some people exposed to the
pharmakon of philosophical speeches and dialectical charms are unable to direct their
eros into philosophical eros. Philosophy is not a cure-all. Like any medicine, it must be
administered properly, i.e., practiced with a passionate eros within an informed dialectic
aiming at Beauty itself. Not everyone will grow wings and fly toward the feast of the
Forms. It is a challenging, risky, and gradual process. Highlighting the failure of a few
interlocutors places a mirror in front of many potential readers. When they see their
reflection in the mirror, which character do they see—Phaedrus, Alcibiades, or Socrates?
Plato’s dialogues are as beguiling as they are illuminating. Although the palinode
presents a more unified argument than did either Lysias’s speech or Socrates’ first speech,
it is not perfect or complete. The purpose of the second speech is not to provide all the
answers, but to inspire a desire to ask questions about the speech itself in pursuit of
wisdom. For this reason, Griswold writes, “Socrates has cast himself in the role of
Phaedrus’ lover, but only with the purpose of yoking Phaedrus into a joint pursuit of
philosophy.”187 If Phaedrus joins Socrates in his love of wisdom, they both benefit; if he
fails, he will continue to recite speeches that lead the soul to more desire for speeches and
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nothing more, and perhaps lead others to worldly desires.
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CHAPTER 3

WHO IS IN CONTROL?
SELF-MOVERS OR BEAUTY IN THE SKY WITH DAIMŌNS

Phaedrus responds, “By all means, let’s talk.”
— Plato Phaedrus 259e1
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The soul’s self-motion is the conceptual hinge that connects Socrates’ charming speeches
and the novice’s ascent. The motion is fueled by philosophical eros, as a chariot’s
movement is powered by horses. If the soul were a passive receptacle that ascended to
Beauty itself when properly filled with virtue by a teacher, then the lover-beloved model
of education would function well. However, if the soul must actively move itself towards
wisdom and cannot be compelled by force, then the lover-beloved relationship is not the
best educational model. Socrates provides an alternative model that takes into
consideration the nature of the soul as essentially self-moving in order to explain the
subsequent role of philosopher-educators. The best educator acts as a midwife by creating
charming speeches that help the student give birth to ideas; the educator acts as a
daimōnic architect as he constructs a beautiful environment in between wisdom and
ignorance that opens up the novice to self-reflection and dialectical exchanges.
Using compelling analogies and mythological characters in his captivating
palinode from Phaedrus, Socrates likens eros to a nourishing stream, the soul’s ascent to
flying, the soul to a chariot, recollection to wings, and true knowledge to a divine
banquet. In Symposium, Socrates speaks through the mouthpiece of Diotima in a pointed
role reversal that engages his audience and provides the ladder of love as an ascent
narrative. In this chapter and the subsequent one, I will discuss each of these analogies,
specifically how they are tailored to charm Phaedrus and young students generally by
aiding self-motion towards Beauty itself. It is thinking about speeches, not the speeches
themselves, whereby Phaedrus moves his soul from the love of speeches to the love of
wisdom.
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3.1 The Soul as the “Spring of Motion”: Self-Movers and Philosophical Eros
Socrates exposes Phaedrus to a life that is not limited to loving speeches. Phaedrus, like
many people, needs someone to turn him towards a life of wisdom. “Phaedrus is living
proof,” Werner notes, “of the fact that most nonphilosophers are perfectly satisfied with
their current way of life, and see no need to change.”1 Without Socrates’ enchanting
speeches and discussions about those speeches, Phaedrus would in all likelihood have
continued to live his life as a lover of speeches and beloved of speechmakers. This
introduces a question of freedom: Who is really in control of Phaedrus’s life and future?
Is Socrates the master of Phaedrus’s future?2 Does Socrates force Phaedrus to change for
the better, or does he open up possibilities for Phaedrus’s future? Is Phaedrus’s soul in his
own hands? Answering these questions, for Phaedrus and for the reader of Plato’s
dialogues, aids the process of gaining self-knowledge and thus nourishes the soul.
The myth of the palinode magnifies life’s possibilities. Phaedrus is a young man,
probably in the throes of his sexual awakening: the perfect time for Socrates to teach him
about the true nature of erotic love—the goal being spiritual awakening. However,
Phaedrus will not have to relinquish his love of speeches in order to love wisdom. He
could instead see the limitations of speechmaking and not let his love of speeches
dominate his soul. Socrates’ charioteer analogy in the Phaedrus does not entail a
rejection of erotic (physical) attraction and love, rather ascent as the awakening of the
soul to philosophical eros.3 Philosophers desire to “lead the soul” out of the oyster shell,
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so to speak, in order for their interlocutors to strengthen their wings. According to the
charioteer myth, the soul must first begin to recollect the divine banquet of Forms before
the wings sprout. Attraction to the beloved is the soul recollecting Beauty itself. Does the
object of one’s desire “move” the soul, allowing it to ascend through recollection?
Socrates begins the palinode with an explanation of the soul’s nature by stating,
“Every soul [ψυχή] is immortal.”4 Every soul is a self-mover for the reason that it is the
source of motion and not what is moved.5 What is the mover and what is the moved? For
Socrates, the moved is the body and the mover is the soul. This also reflects the
traditional nature of eros in the lover-beloved relationship: the lover loves and the
beloved is the object of love.6 Socrates wants to refashion the idea of eros and education
by stating that the soul moves itself as it loves towards the true object of love as wisdom.
The object of love does not move the soul, it is the soul wishing to possess the object that
causes the soul to move. Griswold clarifies by explaining that, “if the soul desires what
appears to it to be good and beautiful, the appearance may be said to move the soul, but
only because the soul values the appearance.”7 In this sense, the soul moves itself from
the process of judging an object as beautiful and thus desiring it, rather than the beautiful
object forcing the soul towards it. Although the examination of this passage can be
technical and complex, for my purposes what matters is that each soul will move itself
according to the way it understands (and consequently desires) beauty. In other words,
self-motion explains why “people choose in accordance with their nature, character, and
4
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Cf. Griswold: 1986, 78–87 for an in-depth analysis of Socrates’ argument that the soul is immortal. For
my purposes, I examine why Socrates begins his speech with the idea of the immortal self-moving soul; my
argument is not concerned with whether Socrates proves that this idea is true or not.
7
Griswold 1986, 87.
5

113

recollection the images they desire.”8
The philosopher who pursues self-knowledge and Beauty itself will move himself
in a different way than the sophist who pursues self-honor and the beauty of speeches; the
philosopher ascends towards wisdom and the nonphilosopher remains stagnant or
descends into ignorance. Wisdom and ignorance do not “move,” rather it is the soul in
response to wisdom and ignorance that changes. The soul that has recollected the Forms
of the divine banquet understands that Beauty and the Good nourish the soul, not images
of beautiful and good things. The forgetful soul will not move itself toward Beauty itself
because it does not know that it is the ultimate object of desire. Similarly, the youth who
is deceived by a sophist about the best life—in Phaedrus’s case it is listening to speeches
and composing them—would be an example of both the soul of the sophist and of the
youth “moving itself defectively, but nevertheless moving itself.”9 Even if he is aware
that he is deceiving the audience by using rhetoric to pander to the masses, the sophist is
still deceiving himself that his life is the best one possible.
Socrates explains that to understand self-motion, “we must first understand the
nature of the soul, divine or human, by examining what it does and what is done to it.”10
Not coincidentally, it is by examining the soul that they both participate in the divine
madness of philosophical eros that passionately pursues self-knowledge. The purpose of
Socrates’ speech is caring for the immortal soul of Phaedrus. He indicates this after the
palinode when they discuss rhetoric, again with a focus on the soul. Socrates defines
rhetoric as “a way of directing the soul by means of speech” and likewise that “the nature
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of speech is to direct the soul.”11 Socrates as speechmaker is the psychagōgue who
creates a beautiful environment conducive to recollection. This makes self-knowledge
possible; it does not impart it. Directing the soul is not the same as moving the soul.
Directing the soul is preparing a place for the soul to think for itself, and pointing out
better (or worse) ways of evaluating beauty and goodness. The self-mover is
fundamentally active, i.e., actively seeking the object of its love. As the beloved of
Lysias, Phaedrus may not be in a place to understand this yet as it is so unfamiliar.
Always aware of his audience, Socrates takes note and changes the rhetorical means used
to elicit an understanding in his interlocutor. He does not, however, change the message.12
As Socrates explains the nature of a self-mover the intricacies of the definition
seem lost on Phaedrus. Perhaps during the explanation of the soul as self-mover, Socrates
noticed he was losing Phaedrus’s attention. As fascinating as the idea of the essence or
substance of soul itself is for a more mature mind, for a young man the technical nature
of the argument may have been too arcane. Perhaps it was the universal idea of the soul
moving itself. This seems like an isolated activity, and is in stark contrast to the
mythological description of the soul to come that is full of yearning, burning erotic
attraction to a beautiful body.
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Socrates shifts his strategy, as he often does.13 Instead of continuing in the same
way, he constructs a speech that will allow Phaedrus to be moved by the beauty and
accuracy of the chariot myth, thereby pairing eros and philosophy in the hope that this
beautiful environment can help Phaedrus move himself from a speech-lover to a wisdomlover. This is one benefit of Plato’s dialogue format, writes Gary Alan Scott:
Perhaps it was only by removing his dominant, authorial voice from the dramatic
conversations that present his philosophy that Plato could best ensure that any
disciples he engenders will fall in love with his vision of philosophy, and not with
Plato the man.14
Although we are sitting in the pleasant shade of the platon tree, we should not fixate on
the tree itself; rather we should embrace the learning process as we experience it in the
dialogue format. Socrates as mythmaker both expresses love for Phaedrus’s soul and
wisdom in his speechmaking while simultaneously loving wisdom himself. At one point
Socrates even exclaims, “If I don’t know my Phaedrus I must be forgetting who I am
myself—and neither is the case.”15 Socrates possesses self-knowledge as well as
knowledge of different souls—like Phaedrus the speech-lover—which makes him an
13
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effective instigator of philosophical eros. As a passionate lover of wisdom and
philosopher who is practiced in the art of love, Socrates also pursues Beauty itself with
erotic vigor. Socrates’ mind flies high in contemplation of Forms and as such is a selfmover. However, the soul cannot move itself until it has “wings,” and it cannot fly high
until it has a goal for ascent. Phaedrus’s soul has the requisite desire (the first bloom of
wings), but not the requisite aim (Forms) to fly high. Plato says that this person exhibits
the fourth type of madness
when he sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded of true Beauty; then he
takes wing and flutters in his eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so; and he
gazes aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below—and that is what
brings on him the charge that he has gone mad.16
Phaedrus is more chicken than eagle when he meets Socrates in the city, but in the
countryside his soul begins to soar up into the trees with the cicadas, the beings whose
discourse never ends. Phaedrus begins the transformation from a lover of speeches to a
lover of wisdom, and as such can begin to fly high contemplating the true nature of
things.17
When Socrates began his exposition on the soul he said it was a self-mover. The
soul as a whole is a self-mover, and each part within it also has the ability to move. The
difference is that the bad horse has the ability to diminish the authority that the charioteer
wields over the chariot as whole, and also diminish the capacity for the noble horse to
limit itself. The soul cannot be a self-mover if the three parts are in discord. The dark
16
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horse will move the chariot, but neither the dark horse in its wild trotting or the charioteer
as he pulls the reigns, will achieve their aim. If there are three aims, then it is improbable
that any of the three aims will be met. Only when the three parts work together as a
whole with a specific aim is it likely the chariot will move itself in order to reach the
intended goal, i.e., it is a self-mover when all parts work together as a unified whole.
This is the tragic state of the human soul. In its state of forgetfulness it does not know its
aim or purpose, the various parts of the soul, or how to harmonize the soul parts
correctly. The bad horse is goaded to act by external objects it desires, and in that sense,
it distracts the self. Only when the bad horse is well trained can the soul possess true
focus. So, the lover in his pursuit of the boy must learn to control himself. In doing so, he
also liberates himself from the wild chaos of the dark horse distractions and channels that
stream of appetitive desires to Beauty itself. Likewise, in order for the beloved to become
a self-mover, he must liberate himself from remaining the passive object of love to begin
loving Beauty itself actively.
Philosophers as teachers or “lovers” are able to reveal the best way “to turn the
right kinds of souls toward philosophy,” although they do not have the absolute power to
turn another person’s soul.18 Only one’s reason may lead one to pursue Beauty itself as
the ultimate goal of life. Socrates hopes that Phaedrus will ascend gradually up the
“ladder of love” from loving beautiful speeches to loving Beauty itself, but Phaedrus
must act from his own soul. Socrates reveals the path toward ascent, and Phaedrus must
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choose to embark on the journey by engaging in stimulating philosophical discussions.19
By doing this Phaedrus will begin to move his soul closer to Beauty itself, which is what
truly attracts Phaedrus when he is titillated by the logos of great Athenian
speechmakers.20 One could argue that it is Socrates pushing the soul toward the Forms,
and that this is inconsistent with the claim that the self-motion is the essence of the soul.
Socrates’ goal is “to encourage or provoke a receptive soul to move itself toward a
philosophical life.”21 Socrates makes new possibilities for Phaedrus. He cannot force him
to desire wisdom. “The myth attempts to achieve both,” Werner states, “by stirring the
individual to desire the philosophical life and by stirring him to engage in some
philosophical thinking.”22 As midwife, Socrates stands by the bedside, holding Phaedrus’
hand, reminding him of the beauty of wisdom by asking provocative questions and
constructing pointed pedagogical myths. All Phaedrus must do to pursue that beautiful
wisdom is to think.23
The ever-moving stream of eros makes self-motion possible; it courses through
the soul alongside reason as it schemes on how to capture the object of desire. The selfmover is the “spring of motion” (245c9) and the “spring that feeds the stream is desire
19
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(himeros)” (255c1). Lower desires motivate the soul to descend to the physical realm,
while higher desires motivate the soul to move itself towards the heights by learning
more about the self and the desires present in the soul. The self ascends via self-reflective
eros. Eros “waters the passages for the wings, starts the wings growing, and fills the soul
of the loved one [beloved] with love in return” (255d1–2). It is the knowledge of one’s
place on the ladder of love, the state of the wings of the soul, and the heightened vision
gained while contemplating true reality that makes ascent possible.
When you want something you go after it. Ultimately, the soul is attracted to
Beauty itself. The ultimate goal of self-motion is to move the soul away from bodily
matters to spiritual ones and from caring for the body and worldly matters to caring for
the soul. The idea of self-motion as a gradual understanding of the true object of eros is
articulated in the ladder of love. The individual is moved by love of beautiful bodies, and
as he moves up the ladder of love from the sensible realm to the intelligible realm, the
self-mover gradually contemplates the true nature of beauty as the form of Beauty itself.24
Diotima says that Eros is a daimōn, the offspring of Penia (lack) and Poros (resource). A
daimōn is a self-moving messenger between human and divine, between ignorance and
reason. A daimōn is always moving from one to another, desiring to fill the gap, and
Socrates is the erotic messenger who continually reminds those around him of the true
Beauty for which their souls long—the Beauty that always fills and never lacks.
The reading of self-motion as climbing the ladder of love is also substantiated by
the charioteer analogy and the allegory of the cave from Republic. Like the charioteer
soul that naturally desires to return to the source of all reality and partake of the divine
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banquet, so the soul is attracted to beauty. This erotic attraction allows movement to
occur, even when the soul is embodied. Attraction to bodily beauty is the first rung on the
ladder of love. To use the allegory of the cave, it is the first step out of the cave when the
eyes are blinded by the sun and only gradually begin to see shadowy shapes with dimmed
eyesight. The cave-dweller is the embodied soul, the soul that fell from the heavenly
realm and is now trapped in the body. When the cave-dweller finally begins to see, his
soul’s vision is awakened for the first time. The dimmed cloudiness fades with use; he
must learn to move from the shadows that he is used to perceiving to greater objects for
his budding vision.
In the ladder of love, the young boy is learning the art of love, and the first rung is
loving one beautiful body. This is the first step on a long climb upward. It reflects what
he is accustomed to (loving individuals such as his family and friends), but he is
experiencing a new kind of love for the first time. His soul is experiencing love for the
first time, and it is both exhilarating and terrifying as his soul begins the process of
adjusting to the attraction to Beauty itself.
To compare the journey of the cave-dweller from the Republic’s allegory of the
cave to the charioteer analogy, the soul that is newly embodied begins to experience
divine madness in the form of erotic attraction as it begins to regrow its wings in the
presence of the beloved. The soul must learn to harness his appetites with self-control.
The process of the soul’s transformation is related to the lover-beloved relationship
because the “initially confused lover” whose soul is not accustomed to eros, who
“gradually achieves greater degrees of self-awareness and self-mastery, uses the erotic
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relationship to become a philosopher.” 25 An individual can use the lover-beloved
relationship as a platform to becoming a philosopher. The person must eventually
overcome the normal roles of the relationship and harness the attraction expressed by the
lover towards his beloved, thereby transforming it into philosophical eros. The loverbeloved relationship is probably the youth’s first experience with eros, and represents the
soul’s first taste of beauty. Socrates describes how the beloved responds to the love his
lover expresses for him. The boy finds himself as the object of desire, and as such his
soul begins to feel the pains of eros:
Think how a breeze or echo bounces back from a smooth solid object to its
source; that’s how the stream of beauty goes back to the boy and sets him aflutter
[…] He is seeing himself in the lover as if in a mirror.26
The youth is “aflutter” with eros for the first time, and perhaps he begins to question what
this feeling is, why his lover is attracted to him, and what is so attractive about himself.
This is the beginning of self-knowledge as he places a mirror in front of his soul. The
stream of newfound erotic desire is properly channeled through self-reflective dialectical
discussions. Socrates says,
When someone’s appetites are strongly inclined in one direction, we surely know
that they become more weakly inclined in others, just like a stream that has been
partly diverted into another channel. […] Then when a person’s desires flow
toward learning and everything of that sort they will be concerned, I imagine,
with the pleasures that the soul experiences just by itself, and will be indifferent to
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those that come through the body.27
The newly transformed philosopher practices philosophical thinking through dialectical
exchanges that help grow the wings of his own soul as well of those of his interlocutor.
He understands that some youth may “happen to be swept that way [towards truth] by the
current—[that is] the greatest good,” but it is not worth risking the souls of the capricious
youth to let their desires be shaped by chance. A person who knows what she wants, why,
and how she can get it is much more likely to enjoy the pursuit and not become wracked
with frustration, disappointment, anger, and jealousy when the object of desire remains
outside of her grasp. Thus, Socrates becomes mythmaker for the love of wisdom of as
many souls as possible.28

3.2 The Charioteer Analogy and the Ascent to Beauty Itself
Psychic health is related to the soul’s ascent insofar as the soul desires the Good. Psychic
illness is the descent of the human soul away from the Good.29 The question thus arises,
what is the human good? What is the human function? What is the soul? Plato believes
that seeking answers to these questions is in itself an activity that leads to the best
possible life. Reflecting on the nature of the Good in dialectical exchange with others
who are pursuing wisdom is the most beautiful environment because it is the most
suitable to give birth to ideas. When the dialectic is erotically charged with a passion for
27
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Beauty, recollection is potent and the soul ascends; when the beloved is Beauty itself, the
lover is able to give birth to true virtue with the aid of dialectics as midwife.30 In
Phaedrus Plato regards eros as necessary for the tripartite soul to ascend towards truth
through participating in philosophical discussions. Ascent becomes possible when the
soul loves. However, rationality must moderate eros in order for love to attain its goal.
Applying the charioteer analogy, the chariot moves when the horses move, and the horses
only move toward the charioteer’s goal when they are properly trained. The soul consists
of a tripartite structure in which each part has a specific role to play in the harmonious,
healthy soul. Phaedrus provides an intricate mythology that explains the nature of the
soul in its relationship to the Forms, as well as an explanation of how visible beauty
sparks recollection of Beauty itself.31 The soul filled with eros directed toward the pursuit
of Beauty itself through philosophical discussions moves itself toward its ultimate goal.
The soul is not moved passively by an external object when it is attracted to Beauty itself;
rather, attraction to beauty is how the soul moves itself as it reflects on and responds to
the truth beyond discourse.
Because he cannot describe the soul as it actually is without providing a long and
detailed exposition, Socrates explains to Phaedrus what it is like instead.32 The soul is
likened to the “natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer.”33 What
moves the charioteer? His horse, of course! The pair of horses the gods have attached to
their chariot are both noble and of noble blood, while everyone else has a mixture of
30

Plato Symposium 209a1–d1.
Plato’s account of the tripartite soul in Republic clarifies the idea of soul in the charioteer myth of
Phaedrus. The Republic shows how the best soul is ruled by reason, where spirit functions as reason’s
auxiliary in order to control the more unruly appetites. Ultimately the appetites begin to crave those objects
deemed worthy by reason and in doing so discover an abundance of pleasure.
32
Plato Phaedrus 246a.
33
Plato Phaedrus 246a.
31

124

horses.34 The mixture includes one beautiful (καλός) and good (ἀγαθός) horse, and one
that is the opposite. Being fit with two opposite types of horse means that the act of
driving the chariot is quite a struggle.
The use of the chariot analogy is quite crafty. A young man would probably be
very interested in chariot races and would immediately feel a connection to this
analogy.35 Phaedrus made a reference to a legend earlier, so Socrates frames the analogy
in terms of a “legendary” chariot procession to a heavenly banquet. Socrates uses familiar
gods, as well:
Now Zeus, the great commander in heaven, drives his winged chariot first in the
procession, looking after everything and putting all things in order. Following him
is an army of gods and spirits arranged in eleven sections. […] When they go to
feast at the banquet they have a steep climb to the higher tier of the rim of
heaven.36
One can imagine how excited Phaedrus would be listening to Socrates’ speech—wideeyed and expectantly waiting for the next part of the “story.” Keep in mind that the myth
of the charioteer is a device that Socrates is using to explain what he means by selfmotion, i.e., how the soul ascends. Instead of continuing to explain the first part of his
speech, or explain the nature of the soul’s ascent in the same manner as the first part,
Socrates gives Phaedrus a myth that can help him put the pieces together for himself. The

When Socrates says that the gods have two horses of good stock, this can mean that the god’s chariot is
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trained spiritedness and the second horse perfectly trained appetite.
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myth is told to guide Phaedrus’s soul to ascend by passionately reflecting on itself. So,
what are the soul and its journey like?
The gods easily make the climb in their superior outfits, while the other chariots
are beset with adversity. The other souls climb to the highest peak of heaven while “the
heaviness of the bad horse drags its charioteer toward the earth. It weighs him down if he
has failed to train well, and this failure causes the most extreme toil and struggle that a
soul will face.”37 As Socrates gives his speech, Phaedrus’s mind is most likely filled with
vivid images of chariots soaring into the heavens—the gods easy gliding upwards while
the other charioteers are holding on for dear life. Phaedrus imagines the clattering of the
axles, the slapping of reigns on flesh, the tumult caused by the unruly horse as it neighs
and kicks in the air. If Phaedrus used a potion on Socrates to charm him to leave the walls
of Athens, then Socrates is repaying the favor with his discursive charms.38 Socrates is
not spouting pure rhetoric, however, nor is he providing all form with no content. He uses
the vivid narrative format to his advantage as he continues this new approach to describe
the nature of the soul.
Earlier in the palinode, Socrates defines the soul as the immortal self-mover.
Next, he defines living things as a combination of mortal body and immortal soul.39 This
is reminiscent of Diotima’s description of eros as daimōn, which is in between worlds
like the embodied soul. A daimōn is a messenger between mortal and immortal realms.
On the one hand, the mortal or physical realm represents ignorance. On the other hand,
the immortal realm represents perfect possession of the true knowledge, i.e., wisdom. The
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daimōn is the dialectical exchange between ignorance and wisdom that produces an
active desire to bridge the two.40 The daimōn is the self-mover who climbs the ladder of
love; the soul is the daimōn whose wings are nourished by the Forms and fly higher to
Beauty itself. Aporia is the daimōnic interlude that allows the soul to pause and gather its
resources in order to pursue the utmost object of desire: Beauty itself.
The soul becomes embodied when it loses its wings and falls from heaven and lands
in a body. Socrates is concerned about what causes the soul to shed its wings in the first
place. He explains that
by their nature wings have the power to lift heavy things and raise them aloft where
the gods all dwell, and so, more than anything that pertains to the body, they are
akin to the divine, which has beauty, wisdom, goodness, and everything of that sort.
These nourish the soul’s wings, which grow best in their presence; but foulness and
ugliness make the wings shrink and disappear.41
The words used to describe the opposite of beauty, wisdom, and goodness have physical
and psychic connotations of ugliness: deformed (αἰσχρῷ) and foulness. The wings
become deformed when the soul is surrounded by what is antithetical to its nature,
ugliness (κακῷ). The lack of beauty, wisdom, and goodness cause the soul’s wings to
disappear, or to “forget” the soul’s own nature, thereby destroying the wings that carry it
aloft. The soul cannot fly high without contemplating true reality. Also significant is that
the word for disappear (διόλλυται) means “to destroy utterly, bring to naught, blot out
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of one’s mind, to forget.”42 To forget is to mar the soul by diminishing its participation in
beauty, wisdom, and goodness. The soul’s forgetfulness diminishes and deforms it,
leading to descent and ultimate embodiment. Embodiment thwarts the chariot’s goal to
ascend to the rim of heaven to behold the Forms.
The description of the soul’s descent is similar to Diotima’s speech on the nature
of the soul’s procreative function. If the nature of eros is “wanting to possess the good
forever,” and lovers pursue this end with “eagerness and zeal,” then what is the precise
activity of pursuing the object of love?43 Diotima answers that it is “giving birth in
beauty, whether in body or in soul.”44 A person can give birth to another person, or give
birth to greet deeds or works of art, but most importantly a lover of wisdom is able to
give birth to true virtue. Each type of procreative act shares in the prerequisite of a
beautiful environment to give birth in; birth can never occur in ugliness.45 Exposure to
beauty provokes self-reflection concerning one’s attraction to beauty, while ugliness
repels the soul from the object and diminishes eros as the soul “frowns and draws back in
pain.”46
Because “beauty is in harmony with the divine,” Socrates explains that what eros
truly longs for is the release that comes with “reproduction and birth in beauty.”47 Beauty
leads to recollection, while ugliness leads to forgetting. The highest function of love is to
participate in immortality by giving birth to beautiful ideas that create beautiful
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environments for others that in turn inspire recollection, and so on forever.48
Reproduction is immortal because it is the act of “leaving behind a young new one in
place of the old,” much like the dialectical method recollects immortal ideas via
recollection and is able to replace old opinions with “newer” ideas.49 The ideas
themselves are not new per se, but the recollection of ideas places them in the foreground
of thought, which makes our dimmer images of the old idea into a newer, clearer, and
more rationally justified idea. Diotima says, “Reproduction always leaves behind a new
young one in place of the old.”50 The older, decrepit image is replaced by a vibrant and
new idea that is brimming with truth. This illuminates why Socrates says he “honors the
rites of Love and practices them with special diligence” based on the lessons he learned
from Diotima. His statement mirrors the prayer he and Phaedrus recite to devote their
lives to love through philosophical discussions.51 Socrates’ life is dedicated to
transforming the Athenians’ untamed eros into philosophical eros so that they too may
move themselves upwards towards Beauty itself by engaging in dialectics.
Returning to the mythology of Phaedrus, the soul at its peak performance “flies
high” and “patrols all of heaven.”52 The soul’s wings flourish in this divine realm
performing the highest activity because the wings are “akin” to the divine, that is, they
are comfortable in the presence of like things. This word “akin” refers back to the nature
of the horses. The noble horse is good and beautiful and originates from good and
beautiful stock. It is good because it received goodness from its source, the Good. The
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soul itself is related to the divine because Beauty Itself is the source of the soul, attracting
the soul above all else and allowing the wings to grow stronger in the presence of divinity.
The nature of the soul is that it is composed of three parts that must work together in
harmony if it is to perform its “highest” function of feasting on Forms by way of ascent.
Each part has a specific function—the charioteer leads and the horses obey. When each
part performs its function well, the whole chariot can move as one onward and upward
toward its goal. The more unified the soul, the more effective it will be in reaching its
ultimate aim.53 The chariot is composed of many parts, but only when the soul orders
himself can he achieve any meaningful goals. When the soul parts are each allowed to
follow their individual paths as they see fit, only chaos and disorder ensues as the chariot
is unable to follow a single path.54
The charioteer who trains her noble horse to obey her and act as her helper in
taming the wild horse, and succeeds in this endeavor, is “lifted up by justice to a place in
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heaven.”55 If the soul finds a wrench in its spoke and consequently forgets the Forms, she
will fall to earth and be incarnated as a philosopher. The charioteer who is unable to rule
over her horses will descend into chaos and never nourish herself on the feast of Forms,
falling to inferior incarnations, including king or commander, statesman, physical trainer
or doctor, prophet or priest, poet, farmer, sophist, and lastly tyrant.56 Socrates describes
the different types of first incarnations of the soul in descending order, starting with the
philosopher, whose soul has “seen the most.”57 Those who live just lives will “change to
a better fate” in the next round of reincarnation, and those “who have led theirs with
injustice, to a worse one.”58
The goal of the chariot’s ascent in the procession is to feast on the banquet that
lies beyond heaven; the feast is for the soul and is explained in terms of sight. The souls
that make it to the top sit on the ridge of heaven and “gaze upon what is outside
heaven.”59 Socrates dares to describe what no one else has attempted: the truth (ἀληθές).
That which is beyond heaven is “without color and without shape and without solidity, a
being that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to
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intelligence, the soul’s steersman.”60 These Forms are the source of all reality and true
knowledge:
Now a god’s mind is nourished by intelligence and pure knowledge, as is the mind
of any soul that is concerned to take in what is appropriate to it, and so it is
delighted at last to be seeing what is real and watching what is true, feeding on all
this and feeling wonderful, until the circular motion brings it around to where it
started. On the way around it has a view of Justice as it is; it has a view of Selfcontrol; it has a view of Knowledge—not the knowledge that is close to change,
that becomes different as it knows different things which we consider real down
here. No, it is the knowledge of what really is what it is. And when the soul has
seen all the things that are as they are and feasted upon them, it sinks back inside
heaven and goes home.61
The gods float around the ridge of heaven for the entire circuit. Their souls triumphantly
feast on the Forms until sated. The other souls, however, have only a fleeting glimpse of
reality—at best. The souls that have trained their horses the best, who have the most
control over their chariot, and are able to work as one harmonious whole during the steep
climb are able to peep at the Forms for a short time until either the bad horse pulls away
or another chariot crashes into it. The scene is chaotic: horses are being trampled and
trampling others, wings are broken, feathers are flying everywhere, and the whole scene
is “noisy, very sweaty, and disorderly.”62 Most poor souls, after facing the steep climb
and clamor, go away without feasting on the Forms and “when they have gone they will
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depend on what they think is nourishment—their own opinions.”63 This is the beginning
of the end; descent is imminent when the soul’s wings lack the proper nourishment
necessary to survive. The soul fed on opinion will inevitably fall to earth.
Each human consists of a body paired with a fallen soul, and each person is born
with a certain type of soul that determines his or her predispositions, desires, and station
in life. The hierarchy of reincarnation is determined by the soul’s “past life” in heaven.
Did the well-trained soul gaze at the Forms and see the most, sating itself on true
knowledge, but in a moment of weakness deformed itself with forgetfulness? This soul
would fall to earth by necessity, and the man who would inherit this soul would become a
philosopher. Socrates explains three scenarios for the souls that are not divine. He says,
as for the [mortal] souls, one that follows a god most closely, making itself most
like that god, raises the head of its charioteer up to the place outside and is carried
around in the circular motion with the others. Although distracted by the horses,
this soul does have a view of Reality, just barely.64
This is the soul with the most exposure to the Forms, becoming a philosopher once
embodied. The second scenario is that, “another soul rises at one time and falls at
another, and because its horses pull it violently in different directions, it sees some real
things and misses others.”65 The third and worst scenario for the remaining mortal souls
is that they are all “eagerly straining to keep up, but are unable to rise; they are carried
around below the surface, trampling and striking one another as each tries to get ahead of
the others.” Later on, Socrates explains that only souls that had a view of the Forms
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become humans.66 The third scenario seems to explain animal souls only, while the first
two designate different types of human souls. Those mortal charioteers who follow
closely their god—one of eleven—leading the processional can avoid the chaos lurking
under the surface, which damages the charioteers as they struggle to peep at the Forms
above:
The result is terribly noisy, very sweaty, and disorderly. Many souls are crippled
by the incompetence of the drivers, and many wings break much of their plumage.
After so much trouble, they all leave without having seen reality, uninitiated, and
when they have gone they will depend on what they think is nourishment—their
own opinions.67
As far as the philosopher, Socrates confirms that the “soul that has seen the most will be
planted in the seed of a man who will become a lover of wisdom or of beauty, or who
will be cultivated in the arts and prone to erotic love.”68 Here Socrates foreshadows the
connection between erotic love and philosophy. Nussbaum explains that lovers, “whether
consciously or not,” respond the most powerfully to a “body illuminated by a soul of a
certain type, containing the divine. Love’s initial shiver is a shiver of awe (251a).”69 A
philosopher is a lover of wisdom, beauty, justice and goodness. As such, the philosopher
is passionately attracted to people who share these pursuits. But even the speech-lovers
are attracted to the body that contains a soul with strengthening wings. What else could
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Alcibiades have meant by the god within Socrates?70 Alcibiades was attracted to the
immortal truth within Socrates, who was closer to reaching immortality through
“reproduction and birth in beauty” as his soul became akin to the divine Forms.71
Just like the embodied soul that only caught a glimpse of the Forms in heaven and
who will now struggle in life to remember it, the teacher or lover who does not love
wisdom will struggle to teach a pupil or beloved how to ascend properly. This teacher,
similar to a sophist, is unable instill a passion for the correct goal of ascent: the Forms.
The sophist is an inferior teacher because his soul is filled with images of truth and a
desire for lower pleasures such as money and fame. The first step of the lover-beloved
relationship is to prepare one’s own soul for ascent, while a subsequent step is trying to
inspire it in another soul. The lover of wisdom is a passionate soul—indeed, so passionate
that she often inspires like passion in others. Therefore, a philosopher is both a better
lover and a better teacher than a sophist.
Was the soul’s chariot always filled with strife and disorder, only with great toil
reaching the rim of heaven? If so, then the embodied soul would be an inferior
reincarnation and live as a poet, sophist, or, at worst, a tyrant.72 These types of people
have souls that did not have a sustained vision of true Beauty but only a glimpse;
therefore, they have little chance of finding it in the embodied state. Their souls continue
to feed on opinion and have little chance of finding their place in the heavenly procession
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after ten millennia.73 Overall, just souls will be rewarded, and those who did not live in
justice will be punished by a worse incarnation.
The soul flourishes when eros is paired with dialectical reasoning. The soul is
infused with recollected Forms through an activity that produces and gives birth to more
beauty. This is why education through dialectic is crucial. Without dialectical training,
the soul flounders with its multifaceted desires. The bodily desires crowd out desire for
honor and intellectual desires; there is a noisy rabble in the soul. How is one to quiet the
crowd? A good education leading to recollection will reinforce the soul’s spirit to reward
intellectual rule and discourage appetitive usurpation. However, this is the “crowd” of the
soul. How does one quiet the external crowd tempting one with similarly multifaceted
pleasures?
Plato understood the soul as a complex structure composed of different desires
compelling it to different goals. Amongst the noisy rabble, the soul’s reason has the
ability to make sense of the chaotic desires within itself, and to move the soul toward the
unified goal of pursuing Beauty itself. To help with this idea, Socrates provides Phaedrus
with the vivid image of the charioteer with his well-trained horses ascending toward the
divine banquet. Just as the mortal soul must compete with other charioteers during the
steep ascent, the self-mover does not exist in a vacuum; she exists in a world filled with
other living, breathing, struggling self-movers. The role of the lover is to help his
beloved’s soul prepare for the journey of the soul after death. If the lover and beloved
pursue Beauty itself together, they both have a better chance at reaching their mutual goal

Plato Phaedrus 248e5–249a2: “No soul returns to the place from which it came for ten thousand years,
since its wings will not grow before then, except for the soul of a man who practices philosophy without
guile or who loves boys philosophically.”
73

136

at the divine banquet. The lover and beloved bask in philosophical eros in order to help
each other pursue Beauty itself, thus leading them to live the best life possible.
Philosophical eros transforms conventional longing into an even more frenzied passion
for knowledge of the Forms, which climaxes during contemplation of Beauty itself,
allowing the soul to give birth to true virtue. Post-climax, the soul is transformed; it is
now a wise soul with an altruistic bent. Just as the philosopher returns to the cave, so the
educator returns to the students. And the liberated student turns educator to all she meets
and the role is reversed: student becomes educator.

3.3 Why Dine Alone? The Lover and Beloved are Turned On
The way Socrates plays with the roles of lover and beloved by reversing and confusing
the boundaries between the two is important in his interpretation of self-motion. How
similar are the roles of mythmaker and matchmaker? Both the ladder of love and
charioteer analogies describe ascent provoked by eros. The erastēs-erōmenos (loverbeloved) relationship draws a distinction between the subject who actively participates in
eros and the one who serves as the object of erotic attraction. The beloved, the source of
attraction, moves the individual lover to act, sometimes impulsively, to satisfy the
overwhelming experience of erotic attraction. Kenneth Dover explains that
the Greeks did not think of a homosexual love-affair as involving mutual desire on
the part of two males of the same age-group. The more mature male, motivated by
eros, ‘pursues’, and the younger, if he ‘yields’, as motivated by affection, gratitude
and admiration. The older male is the ἐραστής (‘lover’), the younger is his
ἐρώμενος (passive participle of ἐρᾰν) or his παιδικά (a neutral plural, ‘things tο
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do with boys’, designating a person.)74
Upon erotic awakening (physical eros) one understands the beloved as one beautiful
body, while upon spiritual awakening (philosophical eros) one understands the beloved as
merely an image of Beauty itself, a particular participating in a universal form. The
gradual move from bodily attachment to contemplation of beauty is not an easy one, as
Socrates vividly describes the ordeal of the charioteer attempting to restrain the dark
appetitive horse. Much like the distinction between philosophical and intuitive
recollection, the difference between the traditional role of lover and beloved is in terms of
active and passive. The beloved as passive may intuitively recollect the Forms, but the
knowledge remains latent or unverified. The active lover self-consciously recollects the
Forms. Socrates must convince Phaedrus that to love as a philosopher is divine, and then
Phaedrus must choose to “devote his life to love through philosophical discussions” or
continue to stay at the level of speech-lover.75
Beauty is one of the most compelling ways to describe our fascination, attraction,
and obsession with the object of desire. Socrates plays on the universal experience of
sexual attraction to a beautiful body in order to point to the much greater erotic attraction
to an object that does not grow old and decay, let alone express fickle emotions. Socrates
uses the interplay between lover and beloved to promote self-reflection in Phaedrus. An
active lover is someone who is overcome with divine madness for the beautiful beloved.
The beauty of the beloved draws him into a frenzied love. The beloved passively
experiences the advances of the lover as he also passively learns the virtues of his lover-
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educator.76
Does the soul move itself to climb the ladder of love, or is the soul moved by
love? In the latter case, the lover seems passively controlled by his attraction to beauty.
However, we do not normally think of attraction in the same way as compulsion. I am
attracted to the smell of brisket in a smoker; I enjoy eating barbecue and it reminds me of
my childhood. Although I enjoy the smell and the taste of brisket, I have rationally
chosen not to partake in the consumption of flesh.77 The smell moves my appetite and I
begin to salivate; perhaps my stomach emits a growl; but I choose whether or not to eat
the brisket—to move from smell to hand to mouth. In the presence of beauty, the
individual may experience a physical response similar to the salivating and stomach
growls in the above example—Plato refers to it as “aches and tingles.”78 Then, she can
choose to act on her attraction or not. No matter what the response to beauty is, it does
not force her to move from loving the beautiful body to loving Beauty itself.79 The move
from loving particular beauties to loving universal beauty takes far greater time and effort
than any meal, but the nourishment the divine banquet provides the soul is also greater.
The move from sensible to intelligible beauty comes from the soul recollecting the form
of Beauty itself.
An individual’s transformation, indebted to the erotic experience, explains why
some people are able to continue to climb the ladder of love to Beauty itself, whereas
some remain at the first rung of the ladder. The philosopher as the lover of wisdom is the
continual climber, while the sophist, as the lover of the appearance of wisdom, remains
See Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen for a detailed description of love as passive.
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on the level of experiencing the image of beauty. Philosophical eros uncovers the
spiritual nature of the experience we call love. Socrates points to the Forms as true
knowledge that never changes, and is therefore universal. The universal experience of
erotic attraction points to a universal object of desire: Beauty itself. Of course, the
philosopher aids the novice’s transformation by constructing a beautiful environment that
helps the youth ask questions and seek the answers through dialectical exchange. Without
some direction, though, it seems likely that the transformation would occur only in a few
by chance.
The transition from being “turned on” to beauty through erotic attraction and
associating the attraction to a greater beauty is the crux. Love is necessary, but not
sufficient to propel our soul towards the Forms. If the mind cannot recollect true Beauty
or at least feel the attraction to particular beauties other than those of the physical realm,
the soul will not ascend. In order for the soul to partake in other divine feasts, such as
Justice, Moderation, and the Good, the soul must first be attracted to them (intuitive
recollection), then next recognize the object of attraction and desire in order to make the
journey to them (philosophical recollection). The transition from intuitive to
philosophical reflection occurs in the palinode when
the initially confused lover gradually achieves greater degrees of self-awareness
and self-mastery, and uses the erotic relationship to become a philosopher. But the
lover becomes a philosopher through his own activity […] For Plato it is through
dialectic—and not simply by reading myth or receiving images of beauty—that
one ultimately takes the leap.80
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Attraction to beauty is the first step on the ladder of love; turning from beautiful objects
to Beauty itself promotes the soul’s ascent. By its nature, the soul desires to ascend
because of its latent familiarity with true reality. The wings of the soul by nature desire to
fly up to return to its source. Socrates uses his discursive charms to spur self-knowledge
through self-awareness.
The goal of ascent is not solely to attain Beauty itself for the sake of your own soul;
rather, it is to improve the souls of others as well. If only the lover is benefited from
divine madness, then is this madness truly divine? Is the lover using the love for the boy
as a means to an end, stepping on him as if he were a rung on the ladder of love? Is the
philosopher selflessly abandoning his own pursuit of the Forms to inspire the honorlovers and money-lovers of his community? Philosophical eros rests on the relationship
between lover and beloved, teacher and student, philosopher and sophist. Socrates is a
mythmaker because he is a philosopher—a lover of wisdom. Loving wisdom passionately
often inspires a desire for others to share in the divine banquet of Forms. To dine alone is
not as rewarding as to dine with enthusiastic friends.81 Although the tumult of divine
procession, forcing some charioteers off the path to the Forms, could prove otherwise,
Plato believes that the soul is more likely to ascend with a correct training and in the
company of those seeking ascent for themselves. Imagine what the chariot procession
would look like if each charioteer participating had trained his horses well. No longer are
the stragglers on their own in pursuit of the divine banquet—a do or die quest if you
understand that the wings of the soul must be nourished, otherwise they whither and the
soul descends to earth. If the soul never peeps at the Forms, then the soul cannot descend
81
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into human form, rather that of an animal.82 This example shows the practical side of
educating others in that it eases one’s ascent, but Plato also reveals that Socrates was not
content to remain in solitary contemplation of the Forms, but sought the company of
others in order to aid their ascent.
Another example where Plato shows that dining on the Forms is better with others
is in Symposium. To set the stage for the series of speeches on eros in Symposium,
Apollodorus relays Aristodemus’s account of Socrates’ behavior on the journey to
Agathon’s symposium. Socrates was freshly bathed and donned his “fancy sandals.” He
tarried the whole way, urging Aristodemus to continue on without him.83 When
Aristodemus arrives at Agathon’s party uninvited, he explains that he came with Socrates,
who is lost in thought outside. When Agathon’s slaves attempt to retrieve him, Socrates
does not respond to their calls or even seem to hear their voices. When Agathon insists
that the slave bring him in, Aristodemus says,
No, no, leave him alone. It is one of his habits. Every now and then he just goes off
like that and stands motionless, wherever he happens to be. I’m sure he’ll come in
soon, so don’t disturb him; let him be.84
Presumably engaging in an internal dialectic, Socrates “ascends that ascent” and reaches
enlightenment under Agathon’s neighbor’s porch.85 Perhaps he was contemplating
Beauty itself as preparation for his speech. When he enters, Agathon requests that
Socrates sit next to him so that he can soak up the newly attained wisdom because “it is
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clear that you’ve seen the light. If you hadn’t, you’d still be standing there.”86 If Socrates
was truly communing with the Forms, why stop to attend a party? 87 The people present at
Agathon’s party were not necessarily “enthusiastic” philosophers, but they all had
something to say about love. While I am not claiming that the symposiasts ascend to the
Forms through sharing their inferior speeches, there is a sense that they are pursuing
knowledge of Beauty itself, albeit unaware, through praising eros. Socrates understands
that the symposiasts are not “feasting on Forms” in the same way that he does
immediately before entering the party, as he stares off into space on the porch unaware of
the sensible world around him. The speeches are a start, and the way that Socrates
implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) refutes the other speeches shows that Socrates is
providing the learning environment necessary to ascend out of opinions on love to
wisdom on the nature of eros. He elicits a desire to learn about love by recollecting
Beauty. Socrates cares not only for his soul, but all other souls that perhaps will serve as
dialectical sparring partners that aid in ascent.
The crux of Plato’s position on the appetitive dark horse, no matter what the object
of desire, is self-mastery. Nussbaum argues that eros is wrapped up in virtues that
improve one’s life, but just as importantly the lives of others, because “what one does
inevitably has a very profound effect on the being of the other.”88 I will use the charioteer
analogy to illuminate this claim. The charioteer must maintain control of the dark horse
of appetite and the white horse of spiritedness in order to work as a harmonious whole
and move toward the goal. The mortal chariots that follow the procession of Zeus move
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more harmoniously than the other mortal chariots that follow different gods in the
procession to the heavenly banquet.89 In the charioteer myth the procession to the Forms
is fraught with chaos and violence because all charioteers cannot ascend harmoniously. 90
If the chariot does not reach the divine banquet of the Forms, it will eventually fall to
earth and be trapped in a body as its soul. Socrates continues to explain the ascent of the
lovers of wisdom together within the charioteer myth:
Now if the victory goes to the better elements in both their minds [the noble horse
and charioteer contra the bad horse], which lead them to follow the assigned
regimen of philosophy, their life here below is one of bliss and shared
understanding. They are modest and fully in control of themselves now that they
have enslaved the part that brought trouble into the soul [the bad horse] and set
free the part that gave it virtue. After death, when they have grown wings and
become weightless, they have won the first three rounds in these, the true
Olympic Contests. There is no greater good than this that either human selfcontrol or divine madness can offer a man.91
Applying the myth to city life, to have not just one philosopher to share a life with, but a
city ruled by lovers of wisdom, would provide the best environment to remember the
Forms devoured at the soul’s divine banquet.92 To pursue wisdom with other wisdomlovers is beneficial because their lives “are bright and happy as they travel together, and
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thanks to their love they will grow wings together when the time comes.”93 Socrates also
contrasts the ascent of the soul for the lovers of wisdom and the lovers of speeches. The
former have developed wings through philosophical discussions throughout a lifetime.
Although the sophists have loved passionately, they fail to develop the wings necessary
to fly towards the divine banquet.
Plato couches Phaedrus and Symposium within the context of the lover-beloved
relationship because discussing love draws an audience and illuminates the desires that
transform the soul. The “method in the madness” of these dialogues is in part to illustrate
the power love has in shaping the soul. First, Phaedrus provides an example of the
traditional lover-beloved relationship as expressed by Phaedrus and Lysias. In
Symposium, each of the symposiasts couches their eulogies on eros within the context of
the lover-beloved relationship, albeit from their own various positions.94 Second,
Phaedrus is set in the midst of the playful and flirtatious relationship between the young
Phaedrus and an older Socrates, who inverts the cultural expectations of the loverbeloved relationship: Phaedrus demands speeches from Socrates, and Socrates cannot
resist his charms. In Symposium, Phaedrus is at it again. He initiates the turn from
drinking to telling speeches, and the mood is celebratory with a heavy dose of sarcasm
and banter. Third, both Phaedrus and Symposium are concerned with the nature of erotic
love and the quality of the education a sophist provides his beloved through rhetoric. This
is in stark contrast to the quality of education a philosopher provides through the
dialectical method.
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Plato Phaedrus 256d–e.
Aristophanes’ speech is the only one that does not explicitly reference the erotic and educational
relationship between an older, established Athenian and a young, aristocratic boy. What he does provide is
an aetiological interpretation of love for the same sex (Symposium 189d5–192c1).
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As a lover of wisdom, Socrates is able to see the benefits of pursuing Beauty itself
and wants to share this pursuit with others—a benefit to himself and others, although not
everyone in Athens sees it this way. The “method” is mythmaking for the purpose of
conjuring philosophical eros from traditional eros.95 One could interpret the “madness” as
the myths that Socrates creates, or the divine madness that ensues. Christopher Long
describes the divine madness of the Phaedrus as “eros that playfully awakens human
souls to the life of philosophy and touches on something of the truth.”96 Socrates loves
Phaedrus because Socrates is in love with Beauty itself. At the end of the palinode
Socrates concludes that
these are the rewards you will have from a lover’s friendship, my boy, and they are
as great as divine gifts should be. A non-lover’s companionship, on the other hand,
is diluted with human self-control; all it pays are cheap, human dividends, and
though the slavish attitude it engenders in a friend’s soul is widely praised as virtue,
it tosses the soul around for nine thousand years on the earth and leads it, mindless,
beneath it.97
Not straying from the charioteer myth, Socrates conveys it in terms Phaedrus will
understand: a lover (philosopher) will aid your soul’s ascent, while a non-lover (sophist)
will lead you to material success but spiritual decline. Socrates is attempting to transform
the traditional concept of education within the context of the lover-beloved relationship.

The distinction I make between philosophical eros and traditional eros is similar to Pausanias’ speech in
Symposium. In his speech, he says there are two types of love: Heavenly Aphrodite and Common
Aphrodite, and they have different lineages (180d). Common Aphrodite is “vulgar” because she is
descended form both male and female gods. This love is attached to the “body more than the soul” and all
the lovers care about is sex (181b). Heavenly Aphrodite is descended from only males, is attracted to
males only, as well as intelligence and strength, preferring adults (181c).
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He claims that instead of lovers focusing on the selfish gain of their elite class, they
should focus on the selfless good of as many as possible.
Philosophical eros is an altruistic endeavor to try to win over the novice in order
that she can win over herself. Nussbaum argues that Socrates captures the beauty of eros
as it opens the soul “with its sting of madness and his liquids flowing in as though an
irrigation trench—connecting the surrender, plausibly and powerfully, with the goods of
generosity and altruism.”98 The process is dangerous, both for the altruistic philosopher
who finds himself on trial for corrupting the youth, as Socrates was, and for the novice
who can potentially misconstrue the object of the “sting of madness” for either an
individual or a cultural norm, as Alcibiades did for Socrates and political power. The
dialectical method itself parallels the way eros is best expressed. A person in love should
not center his entire existence on his beloved. Neither the lover nor the beloved should
serve as the sun that generates a gravitational force that pulls our being into orbit. Rather,
Socrates’ ladder of love serves as a better model of loving relationships: they should
point to Beauty itself and not rest content with one of its images.
The allegory of the cave also contains an altruistic message.99 The liberated and
enlightened cave dweller returns to the dark recesses in order to free those ignorant of
their own prison. If what moves the self is the erotic attraction toward divine truths, then
Socrates can play with those erotic impulses to start the process of recollection of what
ultimately attracts him. With all his mythmaking skills, Socrates still does not have the
magical power to deposit eros into the soul. He cannot penetrate his beloved’s soul and
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inject it with a pure stream of wisdom.100 The lover-beloved relationship rests on the
assumption that wisdom is stamped onto the soul of the passive youth, that virtue is
attained when the young man mimics his lover. All the beloved has to do, according to
this model, is passively await his lover’s penetration. Socrates directly combats this in
Republic when he states, “education is not what some people boastfully profess it to be.
They say they can pretty much put knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight
into blind eyes.”101
Eros is formative in shaping the life of an individual because the object of one’s
desires changes the trajectory of his soul’s motion. What do you desire more than
anything? Your soul will unite in order to chase after that goal more resourcefully.102
Depending somewhat on the environment that someone is raised in and accustomed to,
her desires may or may not have a natural inclination to investigate the nature of beauty.
Although people express erotic attraction in some form or fashion, not all rise above the
bodily realm to the intelligible. Not even the most powerful of Socrates’ discursive
charms can force the disinclined soul to move itself to think philosophically. That does
not mean Socrates will not try.

100

It seems that this is what Alcibiades wants when he tricks Socrates into spending the night with him
(Plato Symposium 217c–217e).
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Plato Republic 518b–c. Italics mine.
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Penia (lack) unites or “copulates” with Poros (resource) in order to transform lack into possession. The
offspring of the union is Eros, the daimōn that constantly moves between lack and resource. Eros fuels the
dialectic in passionate pursuit of truth (Plato Symposium 203b–c).
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CHAPTER 4

LEARNING TO LOVE BY LOVING TO LEARN:
ROLE REVERSAL AS PHARMAKON PROMOTING
SELF-MOTION
Phaedrus, my friend! Where have you been?
Where are you going?
— Plato Phaedrus 227a1–2
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The first line of Plato’s Phaedrus is an amiable question Socrates poses to a young man
he meets on a country path outside the walls of Athens.1 The question indicates that
Phaedrus should reflect on his past and the future in order to aim at the best life. It also
implies a bi-directionality that permeates the dialogue. Will Phaedrus choose to continue
on the past path as a speech-lover, never ascending to higher desires? Or will he choose
to transform himself into a philosopher? By reflecting on the past, one may shape the
future more clearly. In the following sections, I apply my interpretation of the soul’s selfmotion to the mythological ascent narratives with their respective role reversals within
Phaedrus’s palinode and Symposium’s speeches by Alcibiades and Socrates (via
Diotima). In both dialogues, Socrates uses role reversals in the lover-beloved relationship
to highlight the nature of the soul’s ascent through dramatic irony created by the speeches.
For example, I will explain why Socrates reinterprets the myth of Zeus and Ganymede,
where Zeus represents the traditional role of lover and Ganymede the beloved. Another
example I will use includes the daimōnic power of philosophy as personified by Eros,
mythologized as Pan, and embodied as Socrates.
Like Socrates’ philosophical myths, role reversals are a charming part of Platonic
discourse that aid the newcomer to philosophy by cultivating philosophical eros.
Reversing a traditional role highlights the nature of the role and continues to ask the
audience to look within and ask, “What is my role? What will be my role in the future?”
or, more specifically, “What did I love? And what will I love in the future?” I focus on the
mythological passages that invite the interlocutor to reflect on the relationship between
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In Greek tragedy, entrances and exits hold significant meaning. For a thorough investigation on this claim,
see Oliver Taplin’s The Stagecraft of Aeschylus: The Dramatic Use of Exits and Entrances in Greek
Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.)
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lover and beloved in a deeper way. Upon reflection, one begins to understand how the
interplay of these two roles relates to attraction to Beauty itself. Socrates plays on the
active and passive roles of mythological characters as well as his interlocutors to spark
reflection and self-knowledge. Much like the myths, the role reversals aim to spur selfawareness and philosophical thinking in Socrates’ interlocutors. Alcibiades’s speech
reveals the consequences of not ascending from the lower reaches of eros. The myth of
the charioteer procession vividly portrays an erotic tale of ascent through actively
participating in dialectics and self-reflection, which strengthens the soul’s capacity to
move toward Beauty itself.

4.1 Opening the Sluice-Gates: Socrates as Pan
In the palinode, Socrates (representing an erastēs) is compared to Pan and Zeus, while
Phaedrus (representing the erōmenos) is compared to Ganymede.2 Each analogy has
multiple layers of interpretation, all pointing to the choice each individual must make: to
stay on the superficial level of the speech as a passive erōmenos, or ascend the ladder of
love toward Beauty itself as an erastēs, or active lover of wisdom. The further one
reaches beyond the literal interpretation of Socrates’ speeches, the more pleasure each
new layer may bring as the reader observes the transformation of the beloved into Beauty
itself and the lover into a philosopher.
The role reversal in Phaedrus and Symposium acts as a pharmakon or love potion.
Socrates uses his discursive charms to inspire a transformation from physical eros to

2

The whole dialogue, like the Symposium, is set within the context of the lover-beloved relationship. The
interplay between active lover (erastēs) and passive beloved (erōmenos) highlights the nature of love and
education.
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philosophical eros, guiding souls through speeches and ultimately dialogue toward
ultimate reality. Sophists use rhetoric as pharmakon to deceive the audience concerning
the truth of a matter, or even trick one into doing something against his will, while
Socrates uses rhetoric and myth not to deceive but to open up the possibility for selfawareness. Werner says that “for Plato it is through dialectic—and not simply reading a
myth or receiving images of beauty—that one ultimately makes the leap” to transforming
oneself into a philosopher.3 Again, this is why Phaedrus does not end with the palinode.
Socrates engages Phaedrus to discuss the speeches in order to evoke philosophical
thinking in the passive speech-lover. By the end of their time in the countryside together,
Phaedrus agrees to challenge Lysias’s rhetorical skills. Not only does Phaedrus pray to
devote his life to philosophical discussion, but he promises to relay what he learned under
the platon tree to his (former) idol Lysias. This role reversal challenges the traditional
lover-beloved relationship as well as the benefits of rhetoric.
While discussing rhetoric, Socrates says, “How much more artful with speeches
the Nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are, according to what you
say, than Lysias, son of Cephalus!”4 Pan is mentioned twice in Phaedrus. Ancient
Athenians attribute Pan’s father as Hermes, who relays messages from the gods.5 Hermes
is also one of the principal Olympian gods and as such is present in the divine
processional from the palinode. This means that Hermes is one of the eleven gods that the
charioteers follow as a guide to the feast of the Forms. Pan, as his son, is related to the
messenger god who connects the sensible realm of embodied souls to the intelligible
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realm of the divine Forms.6 Griswold reminds the reader that according to Plato’s
Cratylus, Pan is the “double-natured son of Hermes (the inventor of logos).”7 Words, like
Pan, have the ability to reveal Beauty or images of Beauty in the same way that Pan is
both humanlike in his musical abilities and goat-like in his lascivious preoccupations.8
This ambiguity resembles that of Eros, from Diotima’s speech in Symposium, which
recounts his birth from Poros and Penia. These parents also instill a double nature—one
of both resource and lack.9
The second mention is in the concluding prayer when Socrates says, “O Dear Pan
and all the other gods of this place, grant that I may be beautiful (καλῷ) inside. Let all
my external possessions be in friendly harmony (φίλια) with what is within.”10 This is
not the god one would think you would pray to for beauty. Pan is notoriously ugly in his
goat-like features. Reflecting on this connection one could argue that the beauty Pan
provides is from his ecstatic pipe playing. The Homeric Hymn describes how Pan,
as he returns from the chase, sounds his note, playing sweet and low on his pipes
of reed: not even she could excel him in melody—that bird who in flower-laden
spring pouring forth her lament utters honey-voiced song amid the leaves.11
There is beauty in Pan. In the same way that sensible objects participate in the form of
Beauty itself, so Pan participates in beauty via musical harmonies. However, Socrates
does not hope to guide souls to the external beauty of objects alone, but to embrace them
as reflections, albeit murky ones, of the greater Beauty itself. For this reason, Socrates
Hermes’s symbol is the crane—another reference, among many, of birds in Phaedrus.
Plato Cratylus 408d1.
8
Griswold 1986, 228. Cratylus 408b–d.
9
Plato Symposium 203b.
10
Plato Phaedrus 279b8–9.
11
Homer Homeric Hymns 19: 14–20.
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prays to Pan to help us uncover the hidden or “internal” beauty in order to understand
how the internal form of Beauty itself “makes it external” by participation. The soul has
access to this knowledge by contemplating how internal and external beauty relate to one
another through participation. This relationship is also expressed in Symposium’s ladder
of love and Phaedrus’s charioteer analogy. Another example is provided by Alcibiades’
speech in Symposium when he says Socrates’ external body looks satyr-like whereas his
internal soul is filled with “tiny statues of the gods.”12 Socrates’ prayer brings to the
foreground Pan’s external ugliness while pairing it with his internal gift for music in
order to allow the reader to think about how internal and external beauty are related in the
self. The body and soul each participate in Beauty itself. The body expresses lower
beauty whereas the soul is able to express higher beauty more akin to Beauty itself.
In both references to Pan in Phaedrus, he is revered beyond his usual status as the
merry, lascivious prankster and sometimes rapist.13 Pan is upheld as the fertility god who
romps outside the city walls in fields, forests, and next to streams, much like the setting
for the dialogue. Pan “embodies the uncivilized power of procreation which nevertheless
remains indispensable and fascinating for civilized life.”14 Socrates does not pray to
Athena, goddess of wisdom and protector of his city. He prays to the pastoral fertility god
who frolics in the fields and rests besides streams, just as Socrates is doing in the
company of this beautiful boy.
To be fertile in an all-encompassing sense involves more than physical
12

Plato Symposium 215a5–b5.
In Homeric Hymn 19 to Pan, he is referred to as “the dear son of Hermes, with his goat’s feet and two
horns—a lover of merry noise [...] they called the boy Pan because he delighted all their hearts.” Plato’s
Phaedrus reads much like a Homeric hymn as Socrates invokes the Muses and infuses his speeches with
rhetorical flourishes.
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reproduction. Pan is often depicted with his erōmenos, Daphnis, whom Pan taught to play
the pipes. Daphnis was later purported to have invented pastoral poetry. Will Socrates
teach Phaedrus to play the pipes? Pan is also fertile, in the context of Phaedrus, because
he inspires speechmaking and possibly philosophical reflection. It becomes clear why
Socrates invoked Pan, the erastēs par excellence, on this extraordinary day in the country.
Socrates hopes that his day with Phaedrus is a fertile one—transitioning from seduction
through speeches to consummation of philosophical eros through dialogue, and perhaps
even a little soul ascent with fortified wings. Socrates’ goal, as articulated in his prayer to
Eros, is for Phaedrus to rise above his love for speeches and “devote his life to [Eros]
through philosophical discussions.”15 Phaedrus is fertile ground for speeches, so now let
his soul open up to the possibilities of fertility in accessing the Forms through dialectical
exchanges.
Plato’s description of mind-bending love in Phaedrus illuminates the organic role
of eros in the individual’s search for the good life. Keep in mind that the following
description is told from the perspective of the lover (erastēs) who already has a welltrained soul upon embodiment, presumably the soul of a philosopher. The “ladder of
love” as erotic ascent depicts the intense and challenging process of the soul recollecting
Beauty itself starting from physical attraction to a beautiful boy:
A recent initiate, however, who has seen much in heaven—when he sees a
godlike face or bodily form that has captured Beauty well, first he shudders and a
fear comes over him [...] once he has looked at him his chill gives way to
sweating and high fever, because the stream of beauty that pours through his eyes
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warms him up and waters the growth of his wings.16
The idea that this process, the development of philosophical eros, occurs in a “recent
initiate” of the divine mysteries points to Socrates’ assumption that the role of erastēs is
exclusive. Not everyone can educate the youth.17 The group of people who should serve
as educators of the youth are the few and the rare that have the deepest connection to
Forms. Socrates already stated that the most well trained souls, once embodied, usually
become philosophers. Of significance is the idea that beauty “nourishes” the soul.
Meanwhile, the heat warms him and melts the places where the wings once grew,
places that were long ago closed off with hard scabs to keep the sprouts from
coming back; but as nourishment flows in, the feather shafts swell and rush to
grow from their roots beneath every part of the soul (long ago, you see, the entire
soul had wings).18
The soul is not depicted in its tripartite structure here. Rather, Socrates mentions that the
wings are not limited to one pair. Each of the three parts will grow a pair of wings.
Socrates alludes to a time when the “entire soul” had wings. The whole surface area of
the soul, each of the three parts included, had several pairs of wings. Much like
Aristophanes’ tragic-comic speech in Symposium, the image of the primordial soul is
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Plato Phaedrus 251a–b2.
Cf. Plato’s Apology 25b. Socrates argues against Meletus by using the horse-trainer analogy. All
Athenians are not competent horse trainers, and can possibly do harm to a horse if they try to train it. The
person competent to train a horse is a horse trainer. In the same vein, not every Athenian is a model citizen
that should perform the function of cultivating virtue in the youth. Socrates implies that the person
competent to educate the youth is a person who exhibits virtue and loves wisdom, i.e., a philosopher.
18
Plato Phaedrus 251b2–b6.
17

156

both humorous and horrifying.19 Trying to picture the outline of a charioteer with his
horses covered in a vast array of wings is ridiculous; imagining the logistics of ascent in
such a creature is depressing. Flight would be nearly impossible; it would require perfect
harmony of not only all three parts, but of the many pairs of wings on each part to
synchronize flying to a specific goal. Except for the divine soul, ascent to the divine
banquet would be virtually impossible.20
Returning to the description of the soul where each of the three parts has one set
of wings, Socrates continues to describe how the embodied soul gets its wings back.
Now the whole soul seethes and throbs in this condition. Like a child whose teeth
are just starting to grow in, and its gums are all aching and itching—that is exactly
how the soul feels when it begins to grow wings. It swells up and aches and
tingles as it grows them.21
Our “philosopher” sees the beauty of the boy, which stirs the memory of Beauty itself
that is locked in the dark recesses of the soul. Each feather follicle begins to enflame and
seethe with pain. And because at one time the soul was entirely covered in wings, the
entire soul throbs. Unlocking this divine memory causes the soul’s wings to burst forth
from their scabby prisons, in the same way that the heart reels encountering her first love
and the mind is blown when a young pupil encounters her first exposure to the “real”
19
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world. In both cases, the heart and mind experience pain because they are using a part of
themselves that has never been exercised. The young woman’s heart, when experiencing
her first love, will fill with joy in one moment and be thrown into the pits of despair the
next. She does not know better because she has never loved before. The student who has
never exercised critical thinking and independent thought will initially struggle in a
setting where she is asked to do so.22 Like using an atrophied muscle, both heart and
mind will experience struggle and pain before joy and balance:
But when it looks upon the beauty of the boy and takes in the stream of particles
flowing from this beauty (that is what this is called “desire”), when it is watered
and warmed by this, then all the pain subsides and is replaced with joy. When,
however, it is separated from the boy and runs dry, then the opening of the
passages in which the feathers grow are dried shut and keep the wings from
sprouting. Then the stump of each feather is blocked in its desire and it throbs like
a pulsing artery while the feather pricks at its passageway, with the result that the
whole soul is stung all around, and the pain simply drives it wild—but then, when
it remembers the boy in his beauty, it recovers its joy.23
Socrates is describing both the mental and physical reaction of the erastēs to a beautiful
body. The focus is, of course, how divine madness infects our mind and causes an
obsessive attachment to the object of beauty. Yet the physical parallels are noteworthy.
As I mentioned earlier, Socrates is describing erotic attraction in a way that Phaedrus, as
a young man, can easily grasp. The “pulsing artery [...] driving him wild” alludes to a

This is common in “Introduction to Philosophy” where rote memorization and regurgitation will not lead
to success in the course, although this is the educational model to which many students are accustomed.
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phallus, which would have been an image associated with Pan or a libidinous satyr. It is
an account of love that reflects Phaedrus’s own budding sexuality. Socrates as Pan
concocts a myth that has the potential to give the onset of lust a metaphysical twist. Eros
is more than an uncontrollable urge that overpowers a young man—it is the blossoming
of his soul. Now the soul needs the proper training in order to properly channel all of its
blossoming.
The visual image of the phallus-soul does not end with Pan. One ancient talisman
took the form of a “phallus-bird-quadruped” that depicted the “Greek association of the
male organ with a bird.”24 Eva C. Keuls writes that the phallus serves as a charm
representing “the essence of man’s being [used] in the rites of black magic, which the
Athenians, even those of the higher classes, were not above practicing.”25 The phallus
bird could be used as a fertility charm, a humorous embellishment, or a reminder of one’s
manliness. Much like Socrates’ use of the charioteer analogy as pharmakon appealing to
Phaedrus’s youth and interests, I believe Socrates is playing on this association of the
phallus with a bird to appeal to Phaedrus. If the image of a phallus with wings is already
a familiar one, then Phaedrus will more likely connect to it and even reflect on why
Socrates is using it in this specific context.
The image is not used solely to appeal to Phaedrus as something he is already
familiar with, but it points to a deeper meaning. Another example of Socrates playing on
bird analogies is from Plato’s Theaetetus where “memory is like an aviary [...] and
Stefano de Caro, The Secret Cabinet in the National Archeological Museum of Naples (Naples: Electa
Napoli, 2000), 36.
25
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recollection is akin to seeking and finding within it a particular bird.”26 The description of
the aviary as “stocked with birds of every sort, some in flocks apart from the rest, some in
small groups, and some solitary, flying in any direction amongst them all” is like the
description of the chariots with varying aptitudes attempting to ascend to the divine
banquet.27 The birds of the mind’s aviary represent ideas, and the question is how do we
learn, recollect, and have access to true ideas. We have to learn to recognize each bord
for what it is. The birds of the mind’s aviary represent knowledge of the Forms, much
like the wings of the soul represent the process of recollection and forgetting—when the
chariot peeps at the Forms the wings grow stronger, while when the chariot fails to rise
above to the Forms, the wings shrivel.
The image of the phallus bird is similar to the description of the soul in Phaedrus.
The comic and flirtatious description of the soul re-growing its wings is offset by the
description of the agony of the process. If this winged creature is to rise up to its final
destination, it must strengthen the stamina of the wings. Otherwise the individual will be
doomed to a frustrated and impotent existence. A winged creature living a flightless life
is a sad thought. A being filled with a divine soul unable to express its nature—ascent—is
even sadder.
From the outlandish mix of these two feelings—pain and joy—comes anguish and
helpless raving: in its madness the lover’s soul cannot sleep at night or stay put by
day; it rushes, yearning, wherever it expects to see the person who has the beauty
(κάλλος). When it does see him, it opens the sluice-gates of desire and sets free
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the parts that were blocked up before. And now that the pain and the goading have
stopped, it can catch its breath and once more suck in, for the moment, this
sweetest of all pleasures. This is not at all willing to give up, and no one is more
important to it than the beautiful boy.28
The onset of love is fraught with pain and confusion. If the attraction were not so strong,
no one would continue down this stressful path. It is only because the individual is
possessed by divine madness that he can persist. Love is not for the faint of heart. But
after suffering, this poor tormented soul finally glimpses the beloved and experiences
ecstasy. The beloved is the source of all sorrow, but more the source of joy. Part of divine
madness is an obsession on the part of the lover to always be near the beloved because
“in addition to its reverence for one who has such beauty, the soul has discovered that the
boy is the only doctor for all that terrible pain,” which is the “experience we humans call
love, you beautiful boy.”29 Divine madness is the intersection of pleasure and pain as the
soul becomes reoriented to what truly matters. Martha Nussbaum asserts:
Unlike the friendship of the nonlover, it is really a kind of madness and
distraction—full of the gadfly’s sting of painful longing, which cannot permit the
lover rest or satisfaction in the absence of the young man’s beauty.30
In other words, divine madness fuels self-motion. Without this form of erotic madness
the soul would not have the possibility to re-orient itself to the divine. Under all other
pretenses, the lover is actually attracted to Beauty itself. Physical attraction is the first
step among many to understand the source of all beautiful appearances.
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After his vivid description of the soul’s response to beauty, Socrates turns the
conversation to education. In the traditional lover-beloved relationship, the goal is for the
erastēs to educate the erōmenos in civic virtues. Because the erastēs already possesses
these virtues, and is a model citizen, all the boy needs to do, presumably, is to follow in
his mentor’s footsteps. The erōmenos mimics the virtues of the erastēs. In this sense, the
beloved is the legacy of the lover’s virtue, much as Daphnis and his pipe playing and
invention of poetry is the legacy of Pan. In the charioteer analogy, Plato includes the idea
of legacy in the description of eros within the context of the lover-beloved relationship.
The nature of each soul is determined by which of the eleven gods it followed in
the heavenly procession to the feast of Forms.31 A follower of Zeus’s chariot is Zeus-like
“in the nobility of his soul.”32 Each lover “takes their god’s path and seeks for their own a
boy whose nature is like the god’s.” Like is attracted to like, so Zeus-souls are attracted to
other Zeus-souls. When the Zeus-lover finds his Zeus-beloved “they emulate the god,
convincing the boy they love and training him to follow their god’s pattern and way of
life, so far as it is possible in each case.”33 Education, in this model, is a form of worship
of one’s “mentor” god. Just as the soul followed one of the gods in the procession to the
divine banquet, so too does the lover continue to follow in the legacy of his god while
also teaching his beloved to do the same. Socrates highlights the benefits of this type of
divine processional education by explaining that lovers “show no envy, no mean-spirited
lack of generosity, toward the boy, but make every possible effort to draw him into being
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totally like themselves and the god to whom they are devoted.”34 Socrates interprets
education as a spiritual exercise. It is simultaneously an act of worship of the divine, and
an emulation of the divine in order to strengthen the soul. We are both divine and human.
Socrates returns to the charioteer analogy to explain what makes our “mixed” soul
different from the divine soul.
One of the horses, we said, is good, the other not [...] The horse that is on the right,
or nobler, side is upright in frame and well jointed, with a high neck and a regal
nose; his coat is white, his eyes are black, and he is a lover of honor with modesty
and self-control; companion to true glory, he needs no whip, and is guided by
verbal commands alone.”35
The gods have two of these horses attached to their chariot, which makes controlling the
direction of their chariots easy. Humans have only one. The qualities of the noble horse
correspond to the spirited part of the soul as explained in Plato’s Republic. Just as the
efficient charioteer will train his horses to obey him, and the noble horse acts as a model
example of obedience for the wild horse, so spiritedness in the harmonious soul will obey
the rule of reason and keep the appetites in check according to reason’s prescriptions. The
good horse exhibits self-control and also control over the bad horse, or appetitive
element. Socrates explains,
The other horse is a crooked great jumble of limbs with a short bull-neck, a pug
nose, black skin, and bloodshot white eyes; companion to wild boast and
indecency, he is shaggy around the ears—deaf as a post—and just barely yields to
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horsewhip and goad combined.36
The bad horse represents the appetitive element of the soul. It is difficult to train because
above all else it seeks the satisfaction of its multifarious desires. In contrast to the good
horse, it cares little for honor gained by obedience to the charioteer, or any form of
modesty. It cares only for its own desires or whims, whatever they may be. The bad horse
has no limits; no transgression is out of bounds. It seeks only instant gratification, and is
not concerned with the means to this end. It would destroy the entire soul for a moment
of pleasure.
The lover acts like the noble horse in the sense that he is obedient to his god and
his godlike nature as he trains the boy in the same virtues. The charioteer of the unmixed
horses is divine because he is able to reflect the wisdom he possesses in his virtuous
actions by way of the two noble horses. It is easy for a god to be perfectly virtuous
because there are no lower desires holding back his potential to ascend. I do not think
Plato is bemoaning our state as lowly humans. Rather, he is trying to understand the
human condition as straddling both animalistic and divine, like a daimōn. Although
humans will never be gods in the strictest sense, we can ascend to the heights of wisdom
with the help of what is available to us mere mortals.
In the same way that our souls are part divine and part animal, so is Pan. Griswold
draws parallels between the dual natures of Pan and logos by saying “their upper part is
true, smooth, and godlike.” 37 The higher nature of Pan is human and the higher nature of
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logos is wisdom.38 As for the lower part, it is “false and goatlike; it shares in myths and
tragedy, dwells among men, and is dangerous to sophrosyne.”39 Pan and logos can inspire
great speeches and spiritual ascent, but his goat song can also lead the naïve or careless
astray.40 In Cratylus, Socrates likens Pan to logos. Socrates says, “You know that speech
makes all things (πᾶν) known and always makes them circulate and move about, and is
twofold, true and false” which means that speeches can distract from recollection or
inspire a desire to pursue the Beauty; logos can provide images of beauty or Beauty.41
Socrates continues,
Well, the true part is smooth and divine and dwells aloft among the gods, but
falsehood dwells below among common men, is rough and like the tragic goat; for
tales and falsehoods are most at home there, in the tragic life.
There is a common or lower Pan and a higher or heavenly Pan in the same way that
Paisanias claims that there are two versions of Aphrodite: Pandemos and Urania.42
Then Pan, who declares and always moves (ἀεὶ πολῶν) all, is rightly called
goat-herd (αἰπόλος), being the double-natured son of Hermes, smooth in his
upper parts, rough and goat-like in his lower parts. And Pan, if he is the son of
Hermes, is either speech or the brother of speech, and that brother resembles
38

In Symposium, Pausanias differentiates common and heavenly Aphrodite (180d–181c). It is noteworthy
that Pan and Eros have a connection through Aphrodite. Borgeaud states that “in the fourth century, Pan is
clearly connected with Aphrodite in secular iconography.” He describes one example of a scene carved into
a bronze mirror where “Pan rides the goat of Aphrodite Pandemos” and another where Aphrodite is gently
pushing a flirtatious Pan away with her sandal as Eros floats overhead. In the fifth century there are a
number of depictions that connect Pan with the birth of Aphrodite from the ground. Borgeaud observes the
“sudden appearance of the goddess from the soil, whether an epiphany or her actual birth, is joined by the
goat-god’s dance; his hooves strike the earth to call her forth.” (Borgeaud 1988, 138).
39
Griswold 1986, 228.
40
Etymologically, tragedy (tragōidia) means goat (tragos) song (oide).
41
Plato Cratylus 408d.
42
Plato Symposium 180d–e.

165

brother is not at all surprising.43
Pan has the power to say everything, whether true or false, pharmakon as poison or cure.
He is either true speech or the brother of speech, and most people cannot tell the
difference because they so closely resemble each other.
In the charioteer analogy, the gods do not love. Gods do not need to re-orient
themselves to Beauty itself. They possess the perfect memory, and the return trip to the
divine banquet is one of ease. In contrast, the lover struggles to express the spirited
element as he overpowers his erotic attraction to the boy and directs that passion into
philosophical erotics, or passion directed to stimulating the boy’s capacity to ascend.
Humans attempt to become as divine as possible through eros. Love makes the
transformation from erotic attraction to philosophical erotics possible by re-orienting the
soul through strengthening the noble horse and taming the wild horse.
The lover is concerned with teaching the boy how to train his bad horse before it
has a chance to develop and grow strong. Another incentive that attracts the lover to
youth is that he must get to them while they are still able to train the bad horse. The later
the training begins, the more difficult it will be to suppress the bad horse, as in the
following case of the lover’s soul reacting to the beautiful boy:
Now when the charioteer looks love in the eye, his entire soul is suffused with a
sense of warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the goading of desire. As for the
horses, the one who is obedient to the charioteer is still controlled, then as always,
by its sense of shame, and so prevents itself from jumping on the boy. The other
one, however, no longer responds to the whip or the goad of the charioteer; it
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leaps violently forward and does everything to aggravate its yokemate and its
charioteer, trying to make them go up to the boy and suggest the pleasure of sex.
At first the other two resist, angry in their belief that they are being made to do
things that are dreadfully wrong.44
The above passage represents an accurate portrayal of physical yearning with its “tingles”
and “goading.” The crux is that the bad horse alone does not experience this yearning. All
three parts of the soul—the charioteer as he gazes, the noble horse as he is shamed and
controlled, and the bad horse as he lurches for the boy—all express the same desire
ignited by the beauty of the boy. The desires of all three parts of the soul are aligned in
attraction to beauty. In other areas, the three parts may express a mutiny of desires. How
can a soul ascend when all three parts with its disparate wings do not have the same
desired goal? In the case of erotic attraction, the soul desires the same object, but each in
a different manner. The difference is that the charioteer and noble horse share in the
divine nature of restraint, while the bad horse, as the animalistic part of the soul, cannot
control itself.
Pan is also distinguished as being one of the gods known for erotic chase.45 I
argue that this is comparable to Socrates’ erotic pursuit of wisdom; Socrates pursues
Beauty itself as Pan chases lovers. In fact, Borgeaud notes that “when a god or a
huntsman or lover of races about, he looks very much like a messenger.”46 Pan gained his
status of messenger from this father, Hermes, and from his overabundance of eros.
Socrates is compared to a daimōn because he is always on the erotic hunt for Forms and
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as such he straddles the realm between ignorance and knowledge.47 Phaedrus lured
Socrates out of the city with his “enticing” speech, while Socrates is intellectually
chasing after Phaedrus, trying to construct speeches that both appeal to him and spur selfreflection and philosophical thinking.48 Socrates’ pursuit of Phaedrus mirrors his pursuit
of Beauty itself, as well as his desire to cultivate philosophical eros in the people of
Athens—young and old alike.49 The more Zeus-like charioteer souls there are ascending
to the divine banquet, the less of a struggle it will be for all parties involved.
The madness brought on by eros has a dark side—unlimited, untrained, and
unfocused eros is what we commonly understand as lust, obsession, and jealousy.50 The
chase of Pan, much like the chase of eros, can remain on the lower levels of the ladder of
love. Socrates’ first speech gives an example of the erotic chase that leads to descent of
the soul. He explains that when reason replaces love in the erastēs, he wants nothing to
do with his former erōmenos. The lover has “switched roles and must flee” from the
beloved, who “must chase after him, angry and cursing” as he attempts to hold the lover
to his promises.51 The soul as chariot also has an interesting parallel to Pan as the pursuer
of beauty. The chariot’s horses enable the charioteer to move, and the wildest force is the
dark horse, appetite. Left to its own devices, the dark horse will chase after the beautiful
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boy until he has taken his fill of his body and soul.
Pan and satyrs represent the animalistic forces within human nature in their half
animal and half human form. Pan is a lesser god and half goat, whereas satyrs are
daimōns with horse characteristics. Elizabeth Belfiore describes satyrs as “big, misshapen
creatures, with snub noses, high foreheads, shaggy hair, thick, short legs, large eyes, and
large, erect penises,” which sounds like the description of the charioteer’s dark horse as
well as Socrates.52 In this dialogue, Pan represents the satyr-like dark horse of the soul.
Our unrestrained animal nature leads the soul astray and on a path of descent. Why are
Pan, satyrs, and Socrates associated together? Because the same erotically driven animal
nature aids the soul’s ascent when it is properly reinforced with self-control and the
knowledge of its true pleasure and aim—Beauty itself. The charioteer cannot move
without the dark horse; the harmony of the tripartite soul is impossible without the
appetitive part.
In order to overcome the bad horse’s impulse to rape the boy, Socrates provides a
violent description of training the lover’s soul. In response to desire, the charioteer and
noble horse “resist, angry in their belief that they are being made to do things that are
dreadfully wrong.”53 Anger at the self is the response of the spirited element to vice. In
Plato’s Republic, Socrates proves the existence of this third part of the soul, the spirited
part, which is distinct from reason and appetite. He illustrates it with a story of Leontius,
who had a strong sexual attraction to pale boys, which led him to enjoy peering at dead
boys—an act he found repulsive. He understood the perversity of taking sexual pleasure

Elizabeth Belfiore, Socrates’ Daimonic Art: Love for Wisdom in Four Dialogues (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 259.
53
Plato Phaedrus 254a.
52

169

from a corpse.54 As he was walking outside the North Wall toward Athens, he passes
some fresh corpses. Leontius simultaneously has an “appetitive desire to look at them”
and a feeling of disgust that makes him turn away and put his hands over his eyes.55
When the inner struggle to control his desire is too grueling, he gives up, opens his eyes
as wide as he can, and exclaims, “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches; take your fill
of the beautiful sight.”56 Leontius’s anger at himself shows his “spirit becoming the ally
of his reason” against his vile appetite.57 If appetite and reason were the only two parts of
the soul, there would not be a part that could “take sides” with what is known to be right
versus what is desired.
Likewise in the charioteer myth, the lover knows taking advantage of the boy’s
body is wrong because reason tells him, and he feels that it is wrong because of the noble
horse’s anger. Socrates cautions that the lover’s willpower is not yet at its peak and
ultimately “when they see no end to their trouble, they are led forward, reluctantly
agreeing to do as they have been told.”58 The lover approaches the boy, and in doing so is
“struck by the boy’s face as if by a bolt of lightning.” There is an instant chemistry that
begins the alchemical process of love as “his memory is carried back to the real nature of
Beauty, and he sees it again where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to Self-control.”59
Beauty comes first, then self-control. In order for the soul to practice training itself with
self-control, it must first be driven mad by beauty.
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4.2 Taming the Dark Horse of the Soul: Alcibiades and Self-Control
Self-control is necessary for the soul to ascend, motivated by philosophical eros and
informed by reason. Applying the charioteer analogy, if the bad horse never struggled
against the will of the charioteer, then neither the charioteer nor the noble horse would
have the chance to grow strong. And the one day that the bad horse finally reared its ugly
head, the chariot as a whole would flounder under the duress. Gods do not have to grow
strong or struggle or learn or love because they are already perfect. For the lover who is
unable to pair beauty and self-control, as they are meant to stand with each other as in the
divine banquet, then the lover will potentially succumb to vice and rape his beloved. It is
the responsibility of the active lover as a self-mover to practice self-control as part of the
“art of love.” Recovering his memories of the divine banquet, the lover begins to
understand the broader reach of eros.
Another example of the importance of self-control in response to eros is in
Charmides. Socrates responds with similar enthusiasm to the physical beauty of the
resting place Phaedrus chose as he does to Charmides’ physical beauty when Critias and
Chaerephon point it out. In Phaedrus, Socrates exclaims, “By Hera, it really is a beautiful
resting place” and goes on to describe the platon tree in detail.60 In Charmides, Socrates
narrates to the reader, “But at that moment, when I saw him, I confess that I was quite
astonished at his beauty and stature.”61 Later, Socrates says that he “caught sight of the
inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I could no longer contain myself.”62 On
the literal level, it seems that peeping at Charmides’ naked body has turned Socrates on.
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However, as a consummate psychagōgue and not a pederast, one can argue that Socrates
caught sight of Charmides’ budding soul, which made him very excited indeed. Either
way, Socrates exhibits self-control:
I thought how well Cydias understood the nature of love, when in speaking of a
fair youth, he warns someone “not to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be
devoured by him,” for I felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild-beast
appetite.63
Socrates is not really referring to himself, but of all the men that surround Charmides.
Upon his return to Athens after a long expedition, all the men want to talk about is how
lovely Charmides is and that Socrates simply must meet him immediately. By the end of
their time together, it does not seem that they have reflected on or are able to practice
self-control. Socrates implores Charmides to “examine yourself” without the use of
charms because “the more wise and temperate you are, the happier you will be.”64
Charmides misses the point and responds, “I shall be willing to be charmed by you daily,
until you say that I have had enough,” an attitude that Critias fully endorses.65 Socrates
implicitly questions whether or not Charmides’ pool of lover-educators, Critias for the
time being, can teach the virtue of self-control to the youth when Critias’s aim is “to
command” the youth.66 Critias commands Charmides to be charmed by Socrates, and
when Socrates asks what the two are conspiring about and if he should be worried that
they “are about to use violence, without giving [him] a hearing in court,” Charmides
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responds that he will because Critias orders him to.67 The dialogue ends with Charmides
slyly telling Socrates that he should not resist him, and Socrates says that he will not. The
flaws of the lover-beloved relationship are expressed in the struggle between the dark
horse, on one hand, and, on the other, the charioteer with his noble steed. Critias has lost
to the beastly appetitive part of the soul, and his beloved, Charmides will likely succumb
to the same fate. Critias the lion has devoured Charmides the fawn.
Socrates describes the struggle of the soul with a vivid description of the horses.
in response to the beloved’s beauty, both horses fall back in awe and then struggle in
different directions. The noble horse “drenches the whole soul with sweat out of shame
and awe” while the bad horse “bursts into a torrent of insults [...] accusing the charioteer
and yokemate of all sorts of cowardice and unmanliness for abandoning their position
and their agreement.”68 The soul continues to feel the intermingling of pleasure and pain
as it struggles to make sense of this erotic attraction to the beautiful boy. The feather
shafts have opened. At this point, how does the soul grow its wings? Certainly the wings
do not develop by taking advantage of the boy’s body. The charioteer continues to pull
violently on the reins until the bad horse submits to his will.
When the bad horse has suffered this same thing time after time, it stops being so
insolent; now it is humble enough to follow the charioteer’s warnings, and when it
sees the beautiful boy it dies of fright, with the result now at last the lover’s soul
follows its boy in reverence and awe.69
It is only after the bad horse has been tamed that the lover can enter into a relationship
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with the beloved: “This, then, is the true lover’s heart’s desire: if he follows that desire in
the manner I described, this friend who has been driven mad by love will secure a
consummation for the one he has befriended that is as beautiful and blissful as I said—if,
of course, he captures him.”70 The captive is caught via self-control, not seduction or
rape. The chase is intense, but only through taming the animalistic “Pan” within can one
reach the goal of the chase. To grow wings the lover must learn how to love in the divine
sense, going beyond the physical chase; his appetites must fall in line with the noble
horse’s self-control to allow the charioteer to ascend to the heights of friends in pursuit of
Beauty itself.
The description of love as the beginning of ascent occurs in the older established
man as he is attracted to the beauty of the younger man. However, Socrates is telling this
myth to a young man. In one sense this part of the myth seems to act as a cautionary tale.
Phaedrus should look for a lover who exhibits the qualities of a person who has an
advanced soul, a soul actively ascending to Beauty itself rather than descending into lust.
If he is attracted to a good soul, the boy is much more likely to engage in philosophical
erotics instead of stagnating at the first rung of physical eros. In another sense, the
examination of the soul’s structural response to eros is one-sided. Socrates explains the
benefits the lover receives from divine madness, but not the benefits for the beloved other
than friendship.
It seems as though divine madness puts the young boy at a considerable amount
of risk. If the lover is unable to control himself, he will make sexual advances on the
impressionable young boy. How then will the young boy learn self-control if it is lacking
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in his teacher, the man he is supposed to mimic in order to become a good citizen? Why
do some souls follow their teacher (and disposition) and ascend to the virtuous life, while
others when exposed to beauty either remain unchanged or worse, descend into vice?71
Why does Alcibiades fail when Phaedrus seems on the path of success? Whereas
Phaedrus’s appetites are infatuated with the beauty of speeches, Alcibiades’s appetites are
more varied. Griswold observes that it is precisely Alcibiades “remarkable eros” that
“prevents him from turning to philosophy.” 72 Alcibiades’ speech in Symposium
illustrates how Socrates was unable to inspire Alcibiades to reflect on his eros and then to
learn how to channel it properly. Griswold notes that “for all his mediocrity, Phaedrus is
closer to philosophy than Alcibiades, and at the end of the dialogue Phaedrus agrees to
represent the claims of philosophy to his former beloved (Lysias). Socrates has, to that
extent, succeeded with Phaedrus.”73 The potential-sophist experiences beauty in the same
way the potential-philosopher does on the lower rungs of the ladder of love; it is the
movement from image to Forms that matters. Erotic ascent is contingent upon the
individual soul transforming “physical” eros (appetites) and “reputation” eros
(spiritedness) to philosophical eros. It is possible for Alcibiades to remain on the lower
reaches of the ladder of love and never ascend from body to mind if he never learns to
tame erotic passion with wisdom. Alcibiades replaces wisdom with Socrates himself, i.e.,
Beauty itself with Socrates’ golden god within: his virtuous life and beautiful mind.74
Phaedrus’s advantage is that he is attracted to the beauty of logos and not simply
71
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beautiful bodies. Even though humans have souls that participated in the divine
procession to the Forms, not every soul was trained sufficiently to successfully complete
the cycle. The well-trained chariots were able to ascend and peep at the Forms for an
extended time; the less skilled ones could not get a sustained view, but rose and fell
catching only glimpses. Socrates gives a few explanations of why some embodied souls
struggle to remember true Beauty and why a lover of wisdom should help others ascend.
According to the myth of the palinode, a soul’s past life during the divine procession
provided some deficiency of training. Another is that “bad company”—which could refer
to the child’s parents, teachers, cultural and societal norms, pantheon of gods and heroes,
and most of all friends and lovers—deformed the soul:
But not every soul is easily reminded of the reality there by what it finds here—not
souls that got only a brief glance at the reality there, not souls who had such bad
luck when they fell down here that they were twisted by bad company into lives of
injustice so that they forgot the sacred objects they had seen before. Only a few
remain whose memory is good enough; and they are startled when they see an
image of what they saw up there. Then they are beside themselves, and their
experience is beyond comprehension because they cannot fully grasp what it is that
they are seeing.75
Even the soul of the strongest constitution would find it nearly impossible to go against
the grain of parents, friends, and a society filled with distractions and vice. Socrates’
description of the descent into vice, i.e., the deformity of love, hearkens back to how the
lover-beloved practice twisted the focus from virtue to sexual satisfaction: “he surrenders
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to pleasure and sets out on the manner of a four-footed beast, eager to make babies; and
wallowing in vice, he goes after unnatural pleasure too, without a trace of fear or
shame.”76 The deformed soul with its deformed love descends into vice unaware that his
form of love is wrong. Dover reminds Plato’s readers that
Wherever and whenever the homosexual ethos of the Greek world originated, the
simple answer to the question, “Why were the Athenians of Plato’s time so fond of
homosexual relations?” is “Because their fathers and grandfathers were.” The
structure of Athenian society, and in particular the segregation of the sexes,
reinforced and maintained this ethos.77
There is no rational reason for the sexual component of an “educational” relationship.
Similarly, Phaedrus is in love with Lysias’s empty words regarding love for no good
reason. Socrates understands that Phaedrus would be better off if he pursued the truth
about love and not beautiful sounding speeches about love. On the positive side,
Phaedrus is not wallowing in the muck of sweaty brothels, but his attraction is still
deformed because what he finds beautiful does not aim at the universal knowledge of
Beauty itself. The fact that Phaedrus is seduced by words and not sex is nevertheless a
good start for Socrates, who sees the potential for Phaedrus to continue to pursue the best
life.
The lover and beloved bask in eros. The love the man and boy share is the same
love that is attracted to Beauty itself, but how will the two together begin to recollect the
true nature of beauty when they are surrounded by the temptation of flesh?
When they are in bed, the lover’s undisciplined horse has a word to say to the
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charioteer—that after all its sufferings it is entitled to a little fun. Meanwhile, the
boy’s bad horse has nothing to say at all, but swelling with desire, confused, hugs
the lover and kisses him in delight at his great good will.78
The dark horse whispers to the lover’s soul; he wants to run free, now that the object of
desire is so close. The dark horse of the beloved reflects the sentiment of his lover, but in
a more confused manner. The beloved’s “desire is nearly the same as the lover’s, though
weaker: he wants to see, touch, kiss, lie down with him; and of course, as you might
expect, he acts on these desires soon after they occur.”79 The beloved has not developed
the awareness and consequent restraint of his appetites. He does not understand that his
appetitive horse needs restraint.
Luckily, the soul is not a slave to such passions. Socrates reminds Phaedrus that,
“whenever they are lying together [the dark horse] is completely unable, for its own part,
to deny the lover any favor he might beg to have. Its yokemate, however, along with its
charioteer, resists such requests with modesty and reason.”80 The noble horse is the seat
of virtue. Reason understands what the right thing to do is, but only with the aid of the
spirited part of the soul is it able to put it into practice. The more erotic passion or divine
madness a lover has, the more self-control he will need to restrain his physical desires.
Erotic passion is not inherently evil, but it must be subdued with the virtue of self-control
in order for the soul to ascend to the heights of human existence:
Now if the victory goes to the better elements in both their minds, which lead
them to follow the assigned regimen of philosophy, their life here below is one of
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bliss and shared understanding. They are modest and fully in control of
themselves now that they have enslaved the part that brought trouble into the soul
and set free the part that gave it virtue. [...] After death, when they have grown
wings and become weightless, they have won the first of three rounds in these, the
true Olympic contests. There is no greater good than this that either human selfcontrol or divine madness can offer a man.81
A lover is most happy when his beloved also begins to take part in the activity of
passionate love; both the boy’s and the man’s wings grow stronger. Socrates notes that,
“their lives are bright and happy as they travel together, and thanks to their lives they will
grow wings together when the time comes.”82 Life is good because together they are free
to ascend with their loving partners, accountable to each other for virtue and knowledge,
harnessing divine madness with self-control. The advantage for the beloved is not just in
the mortal realm, but the immortal one as well. A life well-lived means the soul is strong
enough to join the divine procession once it has been released from the body. The
released soul easily rises to the heavens and returns to his heavenly father, Zeus, whose
procession leads the soul as chariot to the heavenly heights so it may partake of the
nourishing and enlightening Forms.
Limiting the power of the appetites through moderation is key to ascent. Through
the prayer to Pan, Socrates reminds Phaedrus how crucial is self-control in order to
master the self and pursue wisdom: “Grant that I may be beautiful (καλῷ) inside. [...]
May I consider the wise man rich. As for gold, let me have as much as a moderate man
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could bear and carry with him.”83 The gold mentioned in the prayer is the “spiritual
riches” at stake, and Socrates hopes that Phaedrus now begins to see how valuable
wisdom is compared to speeches. 84 If “friends have everything in common,” then
perhaps Phaedrus will share in Socrates’ philosophical eros, which fueled their day
together and strengthened the wings of their souls through recollection.85 On the role of
beauty in the prayer to Pan, T.G. Rosenmeyer argues that:
The use of the adjective καλός—where one might expect σοφός or at least
φιλόσοφος—serves notice that the prayer, like the dialogue of which it is the
conclusion, emphasizes the aesthetic aspect of the λόγος, and that means, among
other things, its communicability and persuasiveness. If they had no beauty, the
products of the philosophic mind would remain hoards, buried in the house of
learning, instead of being converted into the living currency of significant
thought.86
Rosenmeyer’s understanding of “beauty” coincides with Socrates’ speeches as pharmaka
or “love potions.” Beauty for Rosenmeyer means rhetorical charm, i.e., the dialogue’s
psychagōgic appeal. The speeches charm the listener because they play on myths and
ideas familiar to the audience while simultaneously adding a philosophical twist that
hopefully inspires self-reflection. The speeches are beautiful because they guide the
listeners toward philosophical thinking, and, as such, toward recognizing the form of
Beauty itself as the source of all beauty in the sensible world. The speeches are beautiful
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on many levels—appealing to those on each rung of the ladder of love. Engaging in
philosophical thinking and self-reflection, each person ascends at his or her own pace
based on disposition, current state of the soul, and perhaps even the quality of his or her
dialectical partners. With all this individual variation, however, the goal remains the
same.
Plato provides many examples of the individual variation of possible ascent
towards the goal of wisdom in his dialogues, including Phaedrus, Alcibiades, and
Socrates. For example, in Plato’s Symposium, Alcibiades refers to the golden god of
Socrates’ soul that is hidden underneath his rough exterior. Socrates’ soul is golden—
beautiful, rich in wisdom, and precious to Athens.87 Socrates tells Alcibiades that “you
seem to want more than your proper share: you offer me the merest appearance of beauty,
and in return you want the thing itself, ‘gold in exchange for bronze.’”88 Socrates cannot
give Alcibiades a beautiful soul, rather he provides a beautiful environment for
Alcibiades and Phaedrus to manifest the virtues they lack. As Sheffield says, “intellectual
intercourse with Socrates is productive of, or at least conducive to, the attainment of
wisdom.”89 For Alcibiades, Socrates is only a crafty magician, and he wants the tricks for
his own.90 He cannot see beyond Socrates’ erotic charm to the ultimate purpose of loving
wisdom, so he is unable to climb higher on the ladder of love. Socrates does not provide
the instant gratification that comes with a sophist’s power of persuasion. The sophist is
certain that an image of beauty is Beauty itself. By contrast, Socrates is never so certain.
He is instead the daimōnic messenger between potential philosophers and wisdom. He is
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the spirit of eros that cultivates a beautiful environment to open one’s soul and peep
within.
With Socrates’ speech in the Symposium, Plato inverts the common meaning of
eros, as well as the consequences of the socially accepted lover-beloved relationship.
When does love turn from physical eros to philosophical eros? What is the role of reason
in turning away from lower desires to higher desires, with their corresponding higher
pleasures? Moral education trains the soul to rely on reason to govern; virtue is pursuing
excellence; love is the ascent toward the Good. But ultimately, educators cannot force
someone to love learning. They can inspire and create a beautiful environment, but they
cannot change the object of desire for the students. Education is an active ascent on the
part of the student. The role of the philosopher as midwife is to nurture lovers who
actively choose to give birth in beauty, to create and produce (pro-create) thoughtful
reflections of themselves and the world around them.91
Socrates criticizes the conventional erastēs-erōmenos (lover-beloved) relationship
of his fellow symposiasts because it creates a duality between education and eroticism; it
affirms images of virtue and not true virtue. The educational-erotic relationship should
not reflect the duality of perceived reality: corporeal and incorporeal, sensible and
intelligible, image and Forms. Rather, the educational-erotic should reflect the ladder of
love: one ultimate aim that undergoes a gradual process of transformation that grows
closer and closer to Beauty itself. Socrates tells Alcibiades that with age comes the ability
91
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to control physical eros, or at least it should. Is this not the assumption that fuels the
notion that the lover provides the best education to his beloved? Socrates says, “The
mind’s sight becomes sharp only when the body’s eyes go past their prime—and you are
still a good long time away from that.”92 Socrates asks Alcibiades why he (Socrates)
should love him when he (Alcibiades) had nothing to offer him as far as the state of his
soul is concerned. Philosophy is a high stakes activity because what is at stake is the soul.
So, it is important for us to understand the role of the body versus the role of the mind,
especially in the realm of philosophical erotics.
Alcibiades—in his unrestrained eros—seems more like Pan than Socrates. Pan
takes what he wants, sometimes through deception, sometimes through violent aggression,
and then is happy to sit and play his pipes when the chase is over, not regretting the harm
he caused others (and his own soul). Alcibiades was not able to reflect on his own “Pan”
nature in such a way that would transform his eros into one that was philosophically
attuned. But, is Pan only base and vulgar? Socrates is often depicted as a randy and
flirtatious figure, but his eros is focused on wisdom, whereas Alcibiades never expands
his lower nature into a higher one. Again, the role reversal of Socrates depicted as the
animalistic and vulgar satyr only highlights Alcibiades’ failure to recognize how lower
desire attracts him to a life filled with images of virtue and not true virtue. He is attracted
to Socrates’ soul, but tries to seduce him physically. Alcibiades is the empty satyr; there
are no gods within his hollow frame.
So, how does Socrates as satyr open up the sluice-gates of the soul? Belfiore
concludes that Plato depicts Socrates as Eros, Pan, and satyr in Phaedrus and Symposium
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because “Socrates, like them, has daimonic qualities,” 93 which are present in all human
souls. The daimōnic is necessary to produce “psychic harmony” that allows humans to
ascend to the heavenly realm.94 Recognizing the goat-like within unlocks the possibility
to reflect on the divine within by practicing the daimōnic skill of dialectical reasoning.
Self-motion is made possible through examining the self and choosing to rule it with
reason. We must recognize the Pan in us in order to see the Zeus-like within. We are
satyrs before we are gods; we are lovers before we are lovers of wisdom. Without
recognizing the dark horse of our soul, we will not take the proper steps to tame it. The
Homeric Hymn to Pan continues:
At that hour the clear-voiced nymphs are with him and move with nimble feet,
singing by some spring of dark water, while Echo wails about the mountaintop,
and the god on this side or on that of the choirs, or at times sidling into the midst,
plies it nimbly with his feet.95
Socrates as Pan plays the pipes of charming speeches to entice the youth to get their souls
moving in time to the harmony of Beauty itself. Plato echoes the song of Socrates in his
dialogues, which is really the chorus of the Forms, as both dance nimbly to the beat and
invite the reader to dance along daimōnically.

4.3 Erōmenos and the “Spring that Feeds the Stream:” Phaedrus as Ganymede
Winding down his palinode under the platon tree and next to the stream, Socrates
emphasizes the benefits of divine madness for the beloved within the context of the lover-
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beloved relationship. The play on the lover-beloved relationship illuminates how
Socrates’ description of the nature of the tripartite soul corresponds to the necessary
function of eros for the soul to ascend to the divine banquet, recollecting Beauty through
participating in philosophical discussions all along the way. Plato uses the intersection of
myth and philosophical eros to lead the soul toward the Form of Beauty itself.
The dialogue shifts in focus to the boy’s reaction to the lover’s divine madness.
The lover’s desire is likened to a cup that overflows: “the spring that feeds the stream
Zeus named ‘Desire’ (ἵμερον) when he was in love with Ganymede begins to flow
mightily in the lover and is partly absorbed by him, and when he is filled it overflows and
runs away outside him.”96 Socrates alludes to the “project of dialectic in the metaphor of
masculine insemination of a partner’s soul.”97 The mythological figures of Zeus and
Ganymede reflect both the lover-beloved relationship and the individual’s introduction to
philosophical erotics. Zeus and the young mortal Ganymede together are the “gods”
presiding over the lover-beloved relationship. Zeus spies a boy tending his flock, which,
like the mention of Pan, reminds one of the pastoral themes in the dialogue. The boy
surpasses all others in his youthful beauty. Zeus transforms into a winged creature, which
parallels the reference to the soul as a phallus-bird. Zeus takes wings in order to descend
to earth and scoop up the beautiful youth, ascending with him again into the heavens.
After Zeus—in the form of an eagle—carries off Ganymede, he becomes Zeus’s
cupbearer and sexual companion.98 Zeus preserved the youth’s beauty by making
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Ganymede the immortal wine-bearer of the stars as the constellation Aquarius, with
Aquila the eagle and Crater the serving bowl not far from his side. Ganymede’s beauty
will never fade.
The story of Zeus and Ganymede illuminates both the virtue and vice of the loverbeloved relationship. The interpretation of the Ganymede passage is twofold. The first
interpretation is the more literal sense of the “spring” that erupts from desire as an
allusion to the sexual fluids during the lover’s climax. This reflects the physical
relationship between and the erotic component of the lover-beloved relationship. The
second interpretation is in the more abstract sense of the “spring that feeds” sexual desire
represents divine madness. This reflects the educational component of the lover-beloved
relationship. Zeus becomes obsessed with the boy, kidnaps him, and presumably rapes
him. Zeus desires that the boy’s beauty never fade, so he grants him immortality. Both
parts of the story reflect different aspects of the lover-beloved relationship: one is overtly
sexual and selfish, the other concerned with the soul, i.e., educational. One seeks sexual
gratification from the boy’s body; the other seeks the well being of the boy’s soul through
dialectical education.
Socrates inverts the cultural norm: the erotic-educational relationship should not
practice physical eroticism, but philosophical erotics. The imagery from the above
“spring” passage emphasizes Zeus’s imperfection in his obsession with the beautiful
young boy.99 In this case, the topic of “sexual desire” or himeros arises. Socrates
graphically describes the pain the soul undergoes as its wings grow, likening it to a
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child’s first teeth bursting through the gums.100 The only thing that eases the pain is the
sight of the beloved in all his beauty. Socrates explains that the soul
swells up and aches and tingles as it grows [wings]. But when it looks upon the
beauty of the boy and takes in the stream of particles flowing into it from his
beauty (that is why it is called “desire [ἵμερος]”), when it is watered and warmed
by this, then all the pain subsides and is replaced with joy.101
According to Liddell and Scott, love as himeros is “longing, yearning after; a
yearning after tears, i.e. a desire of the soul to disburden itself in grief; desire, love.”102
The connotation of this type of desire is a mix of pleasure and pain—a release from pain.
The god Himeros is in contrast to the gods Eros and Anteros. According to Hesiod, both
Himeros and Eros were present at Aphrodite’s birth.103 Sometimes Eros is depicted with a
twin, Anteros, or requited love.104 Each of these Erotes is mentioned in Phaedrus as
Socrates and Phaedrus examine the experience of love for the beloved, the erōmenos.
Thus himeros is understood as the painful desire the beloved’s beauty causes the lover as
the sexual tension mounts; it is unrequited or unconsummated lust. Reeve describes the
etymology of the word to explain Socrates’ description of visual beauty as it actively
works upon the passive eyes of the lover. Reeve notes that merē means “particles,” ienai
means “go,” and rhein means “flow.”105 In Cratylus, Socrates explains the etymology of
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himeros differently:
The name ἵμερος (longing) was given to the stream (ῥοῦς) which most draws the
soul; for because it flows with a rush (ἱέμενος) and with a desire for things and
thus draws the soul on through the impulse of its flowing, all this power gives it
the name of ἵμερος. And the word πόθος (yearning) signifies that it pertains not
to that which is present, but to that which is elsewhere (ἄλλοθί που) or absent,
and therefore the same feeling which is called ἵμερος when its object is present,
is called πόθος when it is absent. And ἔρως (love) is so called because it flows
in (ἐσρεῖ) from without, and this flowing is not inherent in him who has it, but is
introduced through the eyes.106
Whereas Reeve points to the literal interpretation of ἱέμενος as the particles of the
beloved’s beauty flowing into the eyes of the lover causing a painful desire, Socrates in
Cratylus points to the lover’s desire as a powerful stream that rushes over him, reflecting
the “spring that feeds” in the above passage.
The etymology of Ganymede is significant because it points to the double
meaning of the myth. “The boy’s name Γανυμήδης is derived from the word ganumai,
meaning “to brighten up, to make bright, be glad or happy,” is used in Plato’s Phaedrus at
234d3 when Socrates notes that reading Lysias’s “speech made [Phaedrus] radiant with
delight (γάνυσθαι ὑπò τοῦ λόγου).”107 The source of Phaedrus’s joy is speeches. He
is in love with speeches, feels an attraction to speeches more than to anything else, and in
106
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the presence of speeches is in all his radiant glory. Phaedrus’s love of speeches is
comparable to the lover’s love of the beloved. A speech is passive, however; it cannot, in
itself and by itself, provide love. It can quickly satisfy the lover’s craving, though.
Griswold notes that “Phaedrus shines (ganusthai; 234d3) while reading, perhaps putting
quite a bit of expression into his voice […] Phaedrus’ delight is an egocentric revelry in
the repetition of ‘truths’ he unreflectively holds dear.”108 For Phaedrus, hearing a speech
brightens his day in the same way as seeing one’s beloved. Plato uses the analogy of eros
and brightness when referring to both Phaedrus and the lover-beloved relationship and
the potential to move from darkness to light.109 Once the lover and beloved have learned
to control their physical desires and hone their mutual love of wisdom in friendship,
“their lives are bright and happy as they travel together, and thanks to their love they will
grow wings together when the time comes.”110 Could the cause of Phaedrus’s radiance be
compared to himeros? Phaedrus is made radiant by passively listening to speeches in the
same way that the lovesick erastēs is relieved of pain, his mood “lightened,” by beauty
particles entering his eyes.
Who is made happy by the lover-beloved relationship? Whom does the star-bright
Ganymede brighten—Zeus or Ganymede? Zeus, of course, is gladdened by the presence
of his beloved.111 Ganymede’s name “becoming catamitus in Latin, has given English the
word catamite, meaning the passive object of male homosexual lust.”112 Ganymede’s
beautiful body provides sexual stimulation and satisfaction for Zeus. Ganymede also
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brightens those in his presence as a beautiful wine-bearer brightens any festive occasion.
In contrast, Ganymede himself is brightened by being immortalized in the constellation
Aquarius, as well as brightening the night sky with his beauty.
Many later thinkers, including the poet Goethe, interpret the myth as an uplifting
tale of spiritual ascent to the divine.113 One could corroborate the spiritual interpretation
of Zeus in Phaedrus through Plato’s charioteer myth. The gods have two noble horses,
and thus do not experience the struggle toward the divine banquet, nor do they fear losing
control of the chariot and falling from heaven. Zeus, as the leader of the procession,
represents the ultimate guide to Forms. Yet, the spiritual meaning of the Homeric
Ganymede myth is often superseded by the much more shocking interpretation of the
rape of a boy by the greatest of all gods. In this case, Zeus represents the human erastēs
as possessed by divine madness. He descends due to his erotic attraction to the boy.
Ganymede, his beloved, is taken unawares as he tends his flock in the pasture; he is as
innocent as a lamb, as unaware of the danger as one taken to the slaughter. Zeus rapes the
young boy, and keeps him as his cupbearer.
As we have seen, rape is a recurring theme in Phaedrus. Gellrich notes that the
myth in the palinode is “haunted by the overtones of a sexual assault described in the first
exchange of the dialogue” near their resting place on the banks of the river Ilissus. 114
Oreithuia, who was playing with her friend Pharmaceia, was chased and abducted by
Boreas, winged god of the North Wind. Oreithuia was the daughter of Erechtheus, the
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king of Athens, and unlike most rape myths, she becomes Boreas’s immortal wife, nymph
of mountain winds, and mother of Thracian twins who grew their father’s wings upon
puberty.115 Ovid relays that, “as their cheeks grew yellow down, so, like a bird, wings
lapped them on each side.”116 Phaedrus led Socrates to the platon tree and asked Socrates
if this was the place of the rape. Athenians were attracted to this specific assault because,
as Keuls notes, “the myth’s patriotic flavor made it the most popular rape story in the
pictorial arts,” especially since Athena and Erechtheus are usually depicted as watching
over approvingly as the events unfold.117
Zeus is usually depicted as the “master rapist.”118 Although Phaedrus begins with
an infamous local rape not by the master rapist himself, the Boreas-Oreithuia myth
foreshadows the Zeus-Ganymede myth. Oreithuia’s friend was Pharmaceia, a nymph of a
poisonous well, also resided near Illisus. She is a reference to the pharmakon of logos,
i.e., speeches as love potions, which are Phaedrus’s “best friends.” Phaedrus as
Ganymede-Oreithuia is continually placed in the passive role as a beloved, i.e.,
dominated by the pursuing lover represented by Zeus or Boreas, respectively. Boreas and
Zeus as eagle both have wings, and Boreas’s sons grow wings much as Ganymede is
transformed into a celestial constellation. The significance of these mythological parallels
is that Phaedrus is playing a specific role in the Athenian lover-beloved scene, and the
results can be just as dark as these violent myths. Even if Phaedrus eludes sexual assault,
the state of his soul is at risk. Sophistic pharmakon degrades the soul as a means of
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domination in the Athenian social hierarchy.
Much like Charmides’ threat to Socrates, Phaedrus hints that if Socrates does not
give a speech he will assault him. Socrates refers to Lysias as Phaedrus’s “beloved,”
which points to the role reversal by which Phaedrus is already bound. Phaedrus exclaims,
“Get it into your head that we shall not leave here until you recite what you claimed to
have ‘in your breast.’ We are alone, in a deserted place, and I am younger and stronger.
From all this ‘take my meaning’ and don’t make me force you to speak when you can do
so willingly.”119 Phaedrus is not able to control his love of speeches. It is as if he is
forcing Socrates to do something with which he is uncomfortable, and yet it gives
Phaedrus pleasure. The dark undertones of rape are present here as they are in all
discussion of the lover-beloved relationship. Also, in the way Socrates mimics Lysias’s
speech, he is taking on the role of non-lover in terms of speechmaking because it is as if
Socrates, like Lysias, was not “very interested in it.”120
Zeus, aware that the kidnapping and rape were wrong, sends Ganymede’s father,
Tros, a pair of divine horses as reparation.121 Like the phallus-bird, horses also have a
lustful connotation with which Socrates plays. Belfiore explains that “the horse is an
erotic symbol in Greek literature, representing both lover and beloved.”122 The pair of
horses given by Zeus parallels the pair of horses the gods possess in the charioteer
analogy. In the Homeric myth of Ganymede, Zeus gives a mortal this precious gift of
horses to ease a father’s suffering, and immortality to Ganymede in exchange for his duty
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to beauty. In the Platonic myth, the horses represent, on one side of the scale, the dark
part of the soul that has an unseemly himeros, a lust that resists control, and on the other
side of the scale, the noble part of the soul that is obedient to reason as anteros. Himeros
and anteros represent the traditional roles of the tripartite soul: himeros is the appetitive
part of the soul. Himeros represents the appetitive part of the erastēs as he takes sexual
pleasure in the body of the obedient beloved.
To treat a child as a commodity in such a way by exchanging goods and services
for sexual companionship is more than disdainful, it is disgusting. In fact, in Plato’s
Laws, the Athenians accuse the Cretans of inventing the story of Zeus and Ganymede in
order to “plead his example for their indulgence in this pleasure too.”123 Socrates is
working against the same cultural norm—present in the Athens of history, even if absent
from the Athens of Plato’s last dialogue—in order to shape the best educational model
that is most advantageous for the soul and city. To do this he rewrites mythology to
express the idea of philosophical eros. The Zeus in the Homeric Ganymede myth has
little to do with Socrates’ charioteer myth. In Socrates’ myth, Zeus is the leader of the
procession to the divine banquet. Why does Socrates use this myth to refer to the
experience of love for the beloved?
The lover-beloved relationship reeks of rape. It is pederasty, the erotic love of
children. It is also where pedagogy (παιδαγωγέω) originates: pais, paidos (παῖς,
παιδός) means “boy” or “youth” and agogos means to “lead” or “guide.” Pedagogy is
leading a child’s soul or shaping the mind of a child. The lover-beloved relationship is
both erotic and educational. In theory it is supposed to cultivate the soul of the boy, who
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will be a virtuous and happy citizen, but somehow it became tainted with sex. The
imagery Socrates uses in his speeches is erotic, but the erotic attraction to the body is
redirected to an erotic attraction to Beauty (and the Good) during the philosophical
discussions on love (and various topics). Most youth feel the burning, yearning attraction
to beautiful bodies. What Socrates does is construct speeches that play on the likes and
dislikes of his audience in order to instigate critical reflection on why they feel those
sensations, whether their attraction has a greater purpose, and how they want to live their
lives. Socrates takes the sex out of education because this only trains the youths to care
about physical matters and lower pleasures; what truly counts is cultivating a virtuous,
contemplative soul. Philosophical erotics cares for the soul through passionate dialectics.
In Phaedrus, Socrates is attempting to seduce Phaedrus’s mind to fall in love with his
second speech, so that by the end Socrates can instill a radically different value from the
cultural norm: the love of wisdom that improves the soul. After the speech, Socrates and
Phaedrus have a lengthy discussion, which is the most important part of the educational
process because it strengthens the soul and inspires more philosophical questions as more
puzzles arise.
There is a link between Ganymede and Phaedrus. Like Ganymede’s name,
Phaedrus’s name (φαῖδρος) means bright and beaming. Phaedrus is brightened by
exposure to logos, as well as brightening Athens with his speeches.124 Socrates takes
Phaedrus’s “brightening” as a step in the right direction, but not the end of the
philosophical journey of the soul. Much like the allegory of the cave in Plato’s Republic,
Phaedrus is no longer chained by ignorance. His eyes are drawn to a brightness he has
124
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never encountered in his life, and they are gradually filling with that brightness.
Phaedrus’s love of logos points to the progress of his soul. He is not in love with a
specific body or with any physical object for that matter. He has potential, but in order for
him to progress to the next level of learning, he must see the drawback of beautiful
speeches: they do not necessarily provide a rational account or truth of their subject.
Werner affirms this when he explains that Socrates’ use of myth in the palinode gives
Phaedrus the potential to think philosophically because the “images of myth, like the
images of beauty, have their direct impact on us,” even if that impact is on an
“unconscious level, without our taking an active role in the process.” 125 Although our
passions are ignited by the images, Werner sates that “such stirrings—even though
accompanied by metaphysical reminiscences—do not yet amount to philosophical
activity.” 126 The stirrings are the preparation of the beautiful environment that is
necessary to give birth to true virtue.127 To love speeches for speeches’ sake is a good
start, but ultimately it misses the mark. It does not matter how excellent a teacher
Socrates is; if Phaedrus cannot actively engage the ideas through discursive reasoning,
then he will not ascend any further towards Forms.
Another connection exists between the importance of vision and the analogy of
ascent like a bird, reinforcing the lesson of the cave analogy. When a bird learns to use
his wings, his visual perspective changes drastically. The grounded bird uses his vision to
see the world and peer up into the faraway sky. The bird in flight possesses a breadth of
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vision unknown to groundlings.128 Much like the bird, Ganymede transforms from
shepherd to constellation as Zeus guides him. “Combining sight and reason, astronomy
becomes a means of elevation,” Miller writes, “a process that purifies both.”129 From
above, Ganymede can see much more and understand the world below in a more
complete way, as well as have access to the heavens. Socrates desires Phaedrus to grow
his wings through philosophical activity. Phaedrus as a lover of wisdom (versus
speeches) is in a “purer” state and as such can understand the world from a grander
perspective, like Ganymede in his incorporeal, purer constellation form.
A philosophical erotic harnesses passion for learning, but the process of ascent
must continue with the aim of Beauty itself for the love of wisdom, not getting stuck
along the way. Phaedrus has the potential to ascend, but he also might get stuck in his
love of speeches. Socrates’ goal in this dialogue is to help Phaedrus ascend towards
Beauty itself. That is one reason the dialogue does not end after the three speeches are
given, but continues with a dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus about the nature and
aim of speeches and speech making. Logos benefits both of them, but Phaedrus has the
most to gain from further analysis because he is at a pivotal point in the awakening of his
soul. It is thinking about speeches, not the speeches themselves, which he needs in order
to begin loving properly. If one did not love speeches, though, there would not be the
possibility for discussing speeches in an intellectually stimulating manner.
The passage on the overflow of eros in the lover explains that when the lover’s
capacity to hold divine madness has reached its limit, the overflow “runs outside him”
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and presumably into the erōmenos. Unlike the lover, the boy is not overcome with erotic
passion at first sight; however, the abundance of desire reaches the boy, who now shares
in divine madness to a lesser extent. The overflow passage mirrors the description of the
setting at the beginning of the dialogue: “From under the plane tree the loveliest spring
runs with very cool water—our feet can attest to that.”130 Both Socrates and Phaedrus are
testing the waters of desire through charming speeches. Socrates’ second speech is the
most satisfying because it points to a greater truth rather than confirming conventional
understanding of love.
In the same way that Socrates has honed his thinking skills, so he understands
how to appeal to Phaedrus’s interest to get him thinking about speeches instead of just
listening and giving them. The lover begins the process of erotic ascent, but the beloved
has most to gain. The beloved is necessary as the beauty that inspires love, but he is not
the source of the love, properly speaking. The interplay of active and passive forces
confirms the traditional roles within the lover-beloved relationship. The boy is the
passive recipient of the man’s active love in the same way the lover’s desire becomes the
beloved’s desire. It is seen as unbecoming if a boy makes sexual advances on a man.131
Where a lover experiences eros, the beloved experiences philia.132 Therefore, the source
of erotic passion is the lover, not the beloved.
Without seeing the potential in Phaedrus—the beauty of a young mind filled with
130
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passionate stirring—Socrates would never have given the two speeches nor discussed
them afterwards. How then does this help the reader understand how the beloved begins
to experience love? Socrates explains that the beginning of love in the beloved is like
when a “breeze or an echo bounces back from a smooth solid object to its source.”133 The
beauty of the boy flows from the beloved to the eyes of the lover and “the stream of
beauty goes back to the beautiful boy and sets him aflutter.”134 Beauty “enters through his
eyes, which are its natural route to the soul.”135 The significance of vision is examined
within the context of the physical realm. Socrates then explains that when beauty enters
the soul from the physical realm “it waters the passages for the wings, starts the wings
growing, and fills the soul of the loved one with love in return.”136 Here we see the
twofold interpretation of both the physical response to beauty as well as the soul’s
response to beauty. They are both the slow, gradual, and painful process of recollecting
Beauty itself. The beloved is first the passive recipient of his own beauty. The beloved’s
attraction to beauty begins with the erotic response of the lover to the beloved’s own
beauty.
In the physical sense, the self is eroticized. The beloved—uncomprehending of
what is happening to him or why he seems to have caught this love-sickness—sees
himself as an erotic object for the lover and is turned on by his beauty’s power of
attraction. The boy does not understand that he “is seeing himself in the lover as in a
mirror.”137 In the metaphysical sense, the boy is seeing the beauty that participates in

133

Plato Phaedrus 255c4.
Plato Phaedrus 255c6.
135
Plato Phaedrus 255c7.
136
Plato Phaedrus 255d1–2.
137
Plato Phaedrus 255d6.
134

198

Beauty itself for the first time; most significantly, he is seeing that what participates is
within himself. The reflection of the beauty of his soul nourishes that same soul as it
begins to grow its wings in order to ascend. When the lover is able to control himself
properly, he is able to shape how the beloved understands love.
When the beloved is in the company of the lover
the boy’s pain is relieved just as the lover’s is, and when they are apart he yearns
as much as he is yearned for, because he is the mirror image of love in him—
backlove [ἀντέρως]—though he neither speaks nor thinks of it as love [ἔρωτα],
but as friendship [φιλίαν].138
It is actually from experiencing the lover’s goodness that the boy realizes that love is not
vile, rather divine. The beloved “is amazed by it as he realizes that all the friendship he
has from his other friends and relatives put together is nothing compared to that of this
friend who is inspired by a god.”139 The love between lover and beloved is mutual, not
asymmetrical as is interpreted by some scholars.140 “As the relationship develops,”
Nussbaum remarks, “he recognizes that the loved one is the vehicle of divinity through
whom and in whom he follows up traces of the god he himself reveres.141 After
uncovering the true nature of the soul that is cloaked under the body, love really begins to
deepen into the frenzy of divine madness. Philosophical eros is divine madness because it
seeks the divine within without taking anything in return, such as sexual favors. In
Socrates’ explanation of the four types of divine madness, he refers to a character that is
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similar to Diotima when he talks about the “prophetess of Delphi” as participating in
prophetic madness.142 In Symposium, Socrates throws off the rhythm of the previous
speeches by interjecting a female voice into the all male lover-beloved mix. Diotima acts
as Socrates’ teacher, replacing the aristocratic tradition of the lover-beloved relationship.
Diotima is Socrates’ priest-teacher as she reveals the mysteries of the rites of love
through a speech, and not a physical seduction as in the lover-beloved relationship about
which the other symposiasts speak in their speeches praising eros. A priestess to a boy
explains the mysteries of love as it pertains to young boys in the context of the loverbeloved relationship. As a priestess, she is not teaching Socrates how to love her, or even
women for that matter. Diotima is a more objective educator as she teaches the young
Socrates “the art of love” practiced by “loving boys correctly.”143
The role reversal is a measure to lure Socrates’ audience into self-reflection,
specifically on the topic of the nature of the erotic-educational relationship as it is
practiced among the Athenian elite. As such, the role reversal is similar to Socrates’ first
speech in Phaedrus, which mimicked Lysias’s poor speech in order to allow Phaedrus to
take a more critical look at the speech he loved so much he memorized it. David Halperin
explains that this role-reversal reveals what “correct pederasty” aims for— improving the
relationship between aristocratic men and boys. 144 “Diotima thereby founds, or refounds, an important institution in classical Athens,” writes Halperin, “providing at the
same time an ideological (philosophical) justification for it.”145 Why would Socrates
choose a woman to instruct men on the proper conduct of the pederastic relationship?
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One plausible reason is that Socrates distances himself from the educational cycle of the
lover-beloved relationship in order to show that the “wisest man of Athens” did not
become so as a passive recipient of knowledge. Nor is Socrates shaping a new
educational model with any sexual ulterior motives, which was prone to happen.146 The
combination of Lysias’s speech recited by Phaedrus, and Socrates’ second speech
indicates that the lover-beloved relationship is motivated by eros, but should be dictated
by a philosophical eros leading to divine madness. Sexual frenzy should be understood
not as a sexual need to be sated, but as an indication that one’s soul is drawing closer to
its source.
The lover is content to love his beloved in a mutual respect and thanks for the
beloved’s aid in the dialectic, the pursuit of Beauty. For the philosopher, instead of love
characterized by himeros, asymmetrical lust, it transforms into anteros, mutual love.
Mutual love involves recognition of the other person as a soul in flux. Plato’s use of
himeros and anteros supports a definition of love as mutual and dialectical in nature.
Socrates as teacher provides his student with a philosophical fertile speech and myth.
The student either rejects or accepts the efficacy of its ideas, as is the case for Phaedrus.
In the end, Phaedrus rejects the self-image of the passive Ganymede of the traditional
myth in favor of Socrates’ myth of the celestial Ganymede immortalized in the heavens.
The passive beloved of speechmakers memorizes speeches and does not reflect on the
ideas contained within, or even why he is attracted to speeches in the first place. The
passive beloved takes what is given to him, not discerning whether the gifts bestowed are
beneficial to him or not. The active lover of wisdom discusses the ideas contained within
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charming speeches, and does so while passionately seeking wisdom as well as selfknowledge.
The pharmakon of Socrates’ mythmaking transforms myths so as to direct souls to
the true object of desire: Beauty itself. The best souls are lovers who take the Forms as
their beloved. An active lover of wisdom regains the reins of the soul, while the beloved
is beholden to the whims of the horses. Zeus lifts Ganymede to the heavens through
enlightening dialectical exchanges, not by carrying a terrified boy away with deadly
talons. The Pans and satyrs of Athens can teach the youth the song of Beauty itself as the
lovers of wisdom ascend together to the heights—wings grow strong, cicadas hum in
harmony, and the horses fall in line with the charioteer through a mutual passion and
daimōnic pursuit of wisdom.
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CONCLUSION

Happy race of birds, that wear
No fleece to fend the winter’s air;
Nor can summer’s beaming ray
Scorch us through the sultry day.
Bosomed deep in leafy green
Us the flowery meadows screen,
While the shrill cicada cries
Rapt in noontide ecstasies.
― Aristophanes, Birds1

Aristophanes refers to cicadas as “the chirpers” or ἀχέτας (1095).
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Even on the laziest of summer days when the sun is directly overhead scorching our
skulls and the droning of insects fills our ears, the erotic attraction towards Beauty rests
latently in the soul, ready to be woken up by a bit of prodding, poking, or stinging by the
infamous gadfly of Athens. Socrates understands that cultivating philosophical eros
requires a gradual awakening of the hazy mind to open up the novice to willingly engage
in sophisticated discussions that elevate self-knowledge. Instead of plopping down an
encyclopedic volume on our laps, Socrates starts us off with a glossy magazine that
contains vivid images and true articles.2 The charming speeches are just the beginning of
dialectical ascent reflecting Beauty itself motivated by eros. The image-lover is hooked
by the dazzling exterior, and then once intrigued has the potential to begin to transform
his love of images into love of wisdom by reading and discussing the articles enfolded
within, thus allowing reason to reign.
Humans have the potential to ascend the rungs of the ladder of love toward
Beauty itself. The crux to motivating self-ascent is becoming aware of the rung we are
presently perched on, and determining what will best prompt us to open our droopy eyes
and notice the higher rungs above motivating us to climb to the very top. This dissertation
is a climb of sorts, and it is important to recollect where we started from and where we
ended up. Chapter 1 focused on the lower rungs of the ladder of love. The setting
represents the lowest rungs on the ladder of love as it sets up the soul to see past the
physical and into the intelligible—the flirtation between two individuals in its erotic

The magazine “Vanity Fair” comes to mind. This publication is swathed in celebrity photo shoots by
renown portrait photographers, but hidden underneath the shiny pop-culture exterior are excellent models
of journalism, perhaps some even life-changing. Socrates plays both roles—the Annie Leibovitz of Athens
constructing rhetorically appealing speeches, and the James Wolcott of the agora with his hard hitting
philosophical method that seeks to transform the soul.
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playfulness promotes the ascent. Socrates listens attentively to Phaedrus’ speech as a
means of determining his place on the ladder of love. When he understands that Phaedrus
has not made it out of the middle rungs of loving customs and traditions by way of
speeches, Socrates advances his own charming speech as a kind of lure. Socrates sings a
cicada song to inspire divine madness in Phaedrus. Playing with Phaedrus’s interest in
speeches on love enables Socrates to spark an erotic awakening toward Beauty itself.
Unlike the sophists, Socrates’ version of persuasion does not entail that Phaedrus
concedes that Socrates’ speech is correct. The goal of Socrates’ pharmakon is that
Phaedrus cares about the subject and desires to pursue the truth of the matter by using
reason. As a psychagōgue instilling philosophical eros, Socrates leads Phaedrus’s soul in
order that Phaedrus will desire to learn how to lead his own soul on the upward journey
armed with the love of wisdom aimed at the Forms.
Chapter 2 picked up with Socrates leading Phaedrus’s soul to higher rungs on the
ladder of love through the palinode, a medicinal speech. Socrates’ pharmaka are speeches
imbued with myths that open up the possibility for a focused discussion on the role of
rhetoric and speeches in caring for the soul. When Phaedrus said, “let’s talk,” he showed
that he was at least willing to try to climb from speech-loving to a higher rung.3 The rung
above loving customs and speeches is that of loving knowledge, in this case knowledge
concerning rhetoric, speeches, writing, and the soul; if he recollects correctly, the
attraction to the beauty of speeches will transform to an attraction to the beauty of all
knowledge and continue to drive his ascent. Chapter 3 discussed how Socrates’
interlocutors must move themselves up the ladder of love from their own philosophical
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eros; wisdom is not attained by being pushed all the way up the ladder of love. Chapter 4
examined the interplay of the roles of lover and beloved, contrasting the traditional roles
with the way the lover and beloved are presented in Socrates’ speeches. The fact that
traditionally the lover is the active and the beloved acts in the passive role illuminates the
misdirected educational model that Socrates criticizes. Socrates employs role-reversals to
highlight the pedagogical difference between his own charming speeches evoking
philosophical eros and those of the sophists evoking persuasion and mimicry. Socrates
plays on Phaedrus’ desires not to instigate a lover-beloved relationship where Socrates is
the active member and Phaedrus the passive, rather to inspire the philosophical eros
within Phaedrus so that he is able to “turn on” his own soul toward intellectual pursuits.
This is the only way Phaedrus will move himself from the middle rungs to the highest
rung on the ladder of love, recollecting Beauty itself.

Say Your Prayers: The Theuth and Thamus Myth
The prayers scattered throughout Phaedrus represent a final reminder of Socrates’
charming psychagōgia. The mention of a potion at the beginning of Phaedrus
foreshadows the end of the dialogue, when Socrates criticizes writing using the myth of
Theuth and Thamus. The gift of writing is a “potion for memory and wisdom” provided
by Theuth.4 Thamus understands that writing itself is not a magical cure for ignorance,
rather “it will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: they will not
practice using their memory because they will put their trust in writing.”5 The potion is
actually an elixir for forgetfulness; writing is the “appearance of wisdom” and not
4
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wisdom itself.6 Socrates likens a written work to paintings, which will “stand there as if
alive, but if anyone asks them anything, they remain most solemnly silent.”7 Similarly, a
book may have the appearance of wisdom in between the lines, but it is not wise itself. A
written discourse is not wise because it cannot “defend itself” or provide more reasons to
support its claims.8 In this sense, writing is another dead image that is likened to Lysias’s
speech hidden under Phaedrus’s cloak: ultimately impotent. A philosopher can defend her
writing when challenged, but she does not place utmost value on the writings themselves.
Instead, this honor goes to the pursuit of knowledge that serves as a recollection (means)
to her true motivation (end), Beauty itself.9 The person who values writing above all else
and “spends long hours twisting it around, pasting parts together and taking them apart”
is a poet, speech writer, or legislator, not a lover of wisdom. To confuse the means
(writing as a substitute for recollection) as the end (recollection of the Forms) is a
confused and ultimately impotent task because the nature of the goal that one is working
towards is unclear.10
In yet another instance of mythmaking for the sake of inspiring self-reflection,
here Socrates is likening Phaedrus to Theuth, and Socrates to Thamus. Theuth believes he
has found the solution to the world’s problems, which are really Phaedrus’s problem of
wanting access to all speeches all the time. Thamus instructs Theuth that he has not found
a salvific potion, rather a poison for the mind. Instead of writing acting as a saving
potion, it poisons the youth like Phaedrus into believing they know something when
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actually they do not. Socrates says, in the voice of Thamus, that Theuth’s invention will
“enable [students] to hear many things without being properly taught, and they will
imagine they know they have come to know much while for the most part they will know
nothing.”11 The purpose of writing is to remind the person who already knows and
understands the topic, not for someone who is new to it.12
Socrates’ critique of writing makes the reader of Plato’s dialogues uneasy, as it
should.13 Plato is reminding us that we are reading about the benefits of dialectical
reasoning, and are not actually participating in it. It is as if he is cautioning us not to fall
prey to the comforting notion that all answers lie in books. The speeches of Phaedrus are
the potion that induces the labor of dialogue, with Socratic elenchus as the midwife of
self-movers, coaching the birth of dialogue.14 “Myth is but a step toward understanding,”
Asmis asserts, because “it needs to be complemented by rational, dialectical examination
if it is to be part of a genuine philosophical search.”15 The myths Socrates creates in his
speeches are the beginning of philosophy because they inspire self-reflection and
philosophical eros. Reading is not enough; thinking and discussing ideas is ascent to
Beauty itself.
Rhetoric’s “big brother” is dialectical reasoning. Socrates asks Phaedrus if he can
think of “another kind of discourse, a legitimate brother to this one” that is “by nature
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better and more capable.”16 Phaedrus is confused and asks Socrates for clarification, to
which Socrates responds that it is the discourse that is written “in the soul of the
listener.”17 Phaedrus now understands and excitedly responds that the speech that is
written in the soul is the “living, breathing discourse of the man who knows, of which the
written one can be fairly called an image.”18 Phaedrus is beginning to understand the
superiority of dialectic over rhetoric, discourse over speeches. Socrates succeeds in
helping him ascend as he gradually changes his perspective on speechmaking, realizing
that one who “knows what is just, noble, and good” would not “sow [knowledge] through
a pen, with words that are incapable of speaking in their own defense as they are of
teaching the truth adequately,” but would sow his seeds wisely to yield the fruit of the
dialectic.19 Dialectic is superior to written speeches because it aids in teaching knowledge
effectively, as well as leading souls to eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονεῖν).20 Socrates is
reaching the pinnacle of his argument, confirming for a receptive Phaedrus the beneficial
fruit of dialectical reasoning:
The dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse
accompanied by knowledge—discourse capable of helping itself as well as the
man who planted it, which is not barren but produces a seed from which more
discourse grows in the character of others. Such discourses make the seed forever
immortal and render the man who has it as happy as any human being can be.21
Logos is not meant to merely amuse. There is much more at stake here than the instant
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gratification of entertaining speeches. Both the eternal soul and happiness of both the
teacher and student are on the line. The seed of philosophy, i.e, informed dialectic,
flourishes when it is planted in the proper environment of the student’s soul. Phaedrus’s
soul, as discussed, is rife with philosophical potential because he already loves something
higher than the body. However, the seed of philosophy will not germinate in his soul
without being cultivated by dialectical reasoning over sophistic rhetoric. The danger of a
sophistic education, as Gary Alan Scott explains, is that the teacher and student are not
able to ascend out of the murkiness of rhetoric. Whereas the sophists were known to
lecture at their audience, the dialectical method espoused by philosophers accounted for
the psychological phenomenon that “only if something the teacher says resonates with the
student is the student likely to learn or remember it.” 22 The philosopher is also not merely
honing his skill, but learning alongside the student. To begin, the teacher should have
knowledge about the subject, otherwise he will not be able to guide the student towards
the Forms accurately.23 “In a sense then, it is true that, at bottom, all learning ultimately
requires a kind of self-teaching too, because,” as Scott continues, “for learning to take
place, the pupil must appropriate or incorporate the teacher’s lessons.”24 As Socrates said
about the rhetoricians—teachers and philosophers must understand souls and what type
of learning environment suit different students.25 Also, Scott says that teaching is such a
“shared activity” that “the teacher cannot be really said to teach if the student does not
learn.” 26 If anything, a teacher should be able to open up the intellectual space for a
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student to recognize their ignorance in certain areas of knowledge, which also allows the
teacher to reflect on where he lacks knowledge. Scott interprets Socrates’ dialectics as
“discourse capable of helping itself [in the student] as well as the man who planted it [the
teacher]” because discussing ideas aids the soul’s ascent toward divine Forms in both
teacher and student. The teacher’s job is twofold: seeking knowledge of the topic, but
also knowledge of the student’s soul (and one’s own) in order to cultivate the best
philosophical discussions.
It is clear in Socrates’ discussion of writing that he believes knowledge should not
be hoarded, but shared with as many people as possible. The seed of informed dialectic
“is not barren but produces a seed from which more discourse grows in the character of
others” so that all benefit from philosophy. If one writes a record of his knowledge, it is
“likely that he will sow gardens of letters for the sake of amusing himself, storing up
reminders for himself when he reaches forgetful old age and for everyone who wants to
follow in his footsteps.”27 Amusing yourself and your followers does not constitute
caring for the souls of the youth, which evidently concerns Socrates when he states that it
is “much nobler to be serious about these matters, and use the art of dialectic.”28 The fruit
of the dialectic is immortal and leads to enduring happiness, in contrast to the “vulgar
amusement” of sophistic rhetoric.29 The ultimate meaning of speechmaking is not to
amuse, but to teach or persuade “for the sake of understanding and learning what is truly
written in the soul concerning what is just, noble, and good.” 30 In order to teach a
student, he must be receptive, but that should not dissuade an educator from persuading
27
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the student that what she truly desires is to learn. Once the youth’s love for lower
objects—speeches, in the case of Phaedrus—is transformed into a love for wisdom, the
young philosopher may reap the crop of Forms.
Socrates uses another analogy that is prominent in Symposium when he compares
philosophical arguments to children. Diotima says in that dialogue that one becomes
immortal by “giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul.”31 Giving birth to ideas
is possible in the beautiful environment of the dialectic between souls. In Phaedrus,
likewise, Socrates says “such discourses should be called his own legitimate children,
first the discourses he may have discovered already within himself and then its sons and
brothers who may have grown naturally in other souls insofar as these are worthy.” 32
These speech-children are created from a twofold method: collection and division of
knowledge on the topic, and then collection and division of knowledge about the soul of
the audience:
First, you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing
about; you must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, you
must know how to divide it into kinds until you reach something indivisible.
Second, you must understand the nature of the soul, along the same lines; you must
determine which kind of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul, prepare and
arrange your speech accordingly, and offer a complex and elaborate speech to a
complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one. Then, and only then, will you be
able use speech artfully.33
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This emphasis on knowing the audience confirms that to know the truth is not enough;
one must share this knowledge in the most effective way. Sophistry confuses this process
because it fails to attain knowledge of the topic, but only promotes opinions that seem
true, the conventional belief that appear to be wisdom, as Lysias’s speech illustrates. His
speech failed the first step of the art of speechmaking, that is, to pursue the truth about
love’s nature as well as the nature of the soul. Lysias did succeed in appealing to
Phaedrus’s soul, but only superficially; his speech did not care for it. As Socrates notes,
the “whole point of the argument we have been making” is to highlight where Lysias’s
speech fails, while also showing a better way of speaking, the art of speechmaking that
succeeds.34
The myth of Theuth and Thamus clarifies Phaedrus’s relationship to speeches.
Again, Socrates becomes a mythmaker in order to lead Phaedrus to self-knowledge. It is
difficult for him to listen to constructive criticism, so Socrates gently channels his
critique of Phaedrus’s speech-loving into a “healing” myth. This myth, as with the others
mentioned, is a psychagōgic pharmakon. Phaedrus must learn how to “administer” or
apply the healing ideas of it to himself in order for it to work properly. “More than any
other dialogue,” writes Gellrich, “Phaedrus allows us to understand how magic and
persuasion are embedded in the philosophical logos, which is an art of rhetoric even
though some works declare it to be opposed to such an art.”35 Socrates concocts
enchanting speeches in order to help the audience ascend, but the potion Socrates serves
cannot force another to pursue wisdom. It serves as a gentle nudge, or a not so gentle one,
depending on the interlocutor.
34
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Socrates’ aim is for Phaedrus to begin the process of recollection, also known as
ascent, via self-reflection. Simply listening to or reciting speeches does not help
Phaedrus’s soul. Griswold states, “But in the sense of ‘remembering’ that is at play in
Thamus’ critique, Phaedrus’ mnemonic efforts illustrate the danger of the written word,
for they deprive him of true recollection as well as of dialectic.”36 Memorizing for the
sake of repeating verbatim does not spur ascent; it is a passive relationship to the world of
ideas, awaiting discussion within the pages of the settled text. It is possible to memorize
something without understanding it. As is clear from the structure and content of the
dialogue, Phaedrus is adept at listening to speeches, and maybe memorizing them, but he
gives little thought to the ideas within the speech. Without actively thinking about the
ideas within the speeches, Phaedrus will not be able to recollect Beauty itself.
In Plato’s Symposium, Socrates also constructs a speech with a mythological
framework for understanding the role of ascent. The essence of Diotima’s ladder of love
is pedagogy as pushing the student to advance from ignorance toward wisdom starting
with one thing that everyone knows something about—physical attraction to beautiful
bodies:
This is what it is to go aright, or be led by another, into the art of Love: one goes
always upwards for the sake of this beauty, starting out from beautiful things and
using them like rising stairs: from one body to two and from two to all beautiful
bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautiful customs to learning beautiful things,
and from these lessons he arrives in the end at this lesson, which is learning of this
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very Beauty, so that in the end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful.37
The gradual redirection of love toward Beauty itself is ascent via recollection. The soul is
naturally attracted to beautiful objects, and by pursuing beautiful objects the soul is
unconsciously seeking the source of that beauty, the form of Beauty. By truly
understanding beauty via Beauty itself, the soul will be able to “see” with clear eyes
which objects are really beautiful and which are mere shadows of beauty. Socrates
constructs myths like the ladder of love, or Theuth and Thamus in order to lead the soul
in the right direction. He cannot force Phaedrus to know Beauty itself, but he can
cultivate a beautiful environment that is conducive to turning the soul towards higher
goods.
If someone got to see the Beautiful itself [...] do you think it would be a poor life
for a human being to look there and to behold it by which he ought, and to be with
it? Or haven’t you remembered,’ she said, ‘that in that life alone, when he looks at
Beauty in the only way that Beauty can be seen—only then will it become possible
for him to give birth not to images of virtue (because he is in touch with no images),
but to true virtue (because he is in touch with the true Beauty).38
Plato argues that eros is the foundation for one's identity and morality. Without reflection,
the object of one's desire is usually unknown, or vague at best. Plato believes that
isolating one's desires, and reflecting upon the object of this passionate force within the
self is a crucial component to living the best life. Once the individual understands his or
her desires, it becomes possible to direct those desires. The process is gradual, and in
most instances involves great effort of the will, usually accompanied by a friend, teacher,
37
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or loved one who helps fuel the dialectical force of ascent. In Plato’s dialogues, the loverbeloved relationship is a significant component revealing the power of elenchus and
aporia.39 Socrates instills a passion for knowledge through elenchus. The process of
revealing is also the process of accessing knowledge: dialectical reasoning.
The ability to redirect one’s desires relies on the assumption that our desires were
previously shaped by some outside influence, namely our culture and education. In order
to break free of the chains of a bad education that misdirected knowledge away from the
truth, one must cultivate a love a beauty that is counter-cultural. What was once the
paragon of beauty, truth, justice, and the divine is turned on its head—not for the purpose
of a kind of rebellion, but from a greater understanding of what is truly beautiful.
To aid memory, and to serve as signposts along the way, Socrates uses another
strategy that features myth as psychagōgic pharmakon: prayer. In the Platonic dialogues,
Socrates recites twelve prayers, four of which are located in Phaedrus: to the Muses
(237a-b), to Eros (257a-b), to Pan (279b-c), and the fourth a wish that he and Phaedrus
should become philosophers, to which Phaedrus agrees (278b).40 These examples are “the
richest prayers of the dialogues” Jackson adds, “on the lips of Socrates as a man of
seasoned maturity” and are philosophical in nature because the content refers to loving
wisdom.41
Labeling the fourth example as a prayer is problematic because there is no
recipient of the prayer, and no prayer that is recited by Socrates or Phaedrus. The fourth
“prayer” seems to serve as a reminder of the day’s insights to become the philosopher as
Aporia as etymologically related to Poros (and Penia) as the parents of Eros in Plato’s Symposium
(203b–204a).
40
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described by Socrates, rather than a prayer to some higher power. A prayer is not
provided here because the discussion on rhetoric and writing was the prayer to become
philosophers. What better way to show one’s commitment to loving wisdom than by
trying to achieve it? The discussion allowed Phaedrus to practice loving wisdom so that
he could become a philosopher. After Socrates’ instruction that a philosopher “would be
just what you and I would pray to become,” Phaedrus responds that, “I wish and pray for
things to be just as you say.”42 Socrates has aided Phaedrus’ soul to open up and begin to
grow wings, but now it is up to Phaedrus to strengthen them with reason.
Asking how prayer is philosophical is like asking how rhetoric is philosophical—
both act as a pharmakon that may lead the soul to philosophy. Moss points out that “the
main substance of the rhetorical art is dialectic (266d, 269b), and the main point of
acquiring the art is to put it to its divine use, which turns out to be nothing other than the
practice of philosophy.”43 By invoking the divine in prayer, Socrates is leading Phaedrus
out of his mundane world and into the philosophical one that had access to divine Forms.
It is as if Socrates helps Phaedrus to develop from underground nymph to winged cicada.
Socrates’ charming incantation leads the buried nymph to the surface, where they shed
rough covering and stretch diaphanous wings for the first time; climbing the platon tree
they sing an enchanting song amongst themselves until they breach the sun-dappled
canopy and fly into the sunset.
In spite of his careful analysis, Jackson fails to include an additional prayer from
Phaedrus, one to philosophical arguments. After the palinode, at the beginning of their
discussion about rhetoric, Socrates invokes philosophical argumentation itself. Phaedrus
42
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is open to the merits of discussing speeches for the sake of uncovering the truth about
their topics, but he is reluctant to participate. He reverts to demanding that Socrates
perform for him, saying, “We need to hear these arguments [against rhetoric], Socrates.
Come produce them, and examine them: What is their point? How do they make it?”44
Socrates does not outright ask Phaedrus to stop mimicking his sophist mentors and think
for himself, but he does say,
Come to us, then, noble creatures; convince Phaedrus, him of the beautiful
offspring, that unless he pursues philosophy properly he will never be able to
make a proper speech on any subject either. And let Phaedrus be the one to
answer.45
Ultimately, only Phaedrus can heal his own soul by listening and responding to the ideas
in his beautiful offspring, speeches. Griswold notes that Socrates “attempted to induce
Phaedrus’ soul to move itself toward philosophy” instead of relying on either him or
Lysias to deliver the pharmakon that leads his soul to the divine.46 Phaedrus must make a
choice: to continue down the path of paved by sophists such as Lysias, or to imitate
Socrates and discuss ideas as dialectical equals. Socrates sweetens the prospect by using
beautiful speeches as “people lead hungry animals forward by shaking branches of fruit
before them.”47 The difference between Socrates’ rhetoric, which takes into consideration
“the kind of speech that is appropriate to each kind of soul,” and sophistry, which either
does not or does so without true knowledge of the different types of souls, is that Socrates
seduces people like Phaedrus in order to inspire dialogue. In dialogue, both participants
44
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think actively in order to achieve their goal and neither performs for the other; instead,
they both engage each other for the sake of wisdom. Socrates is leading the soul from
lower realities to a unified higher reality of Beauty itself.
Of the twenty-one prayers mentioned in Plato’s dialogues, there is only one
dedicated to Eros.48 This prayer is unique also because it is the only one where Socrates
prays for other people, viz., Phaedrus and Lysias. He asks forgiveness for Lysias’s speech
and his first speech because they have blamed love rather than praising it. He also hopes,
as Griswold explains, that the palinode “fulfills the two main conditions for noble
rhetoric outlined later in Phaedrus—namely, that one should both speak the truth and suit
one’s words to the soul of one’s auditor.”49 Socrates ends his second speech with a prayer:
So now, dear Love (φίλε ἔρος), this is the best and most beautiful palinode we
could offer as payment for our debt, especially in view of the rather poetical
choice of words Phaedrus made me use. Forgive us our earlier speeches in return
for this one; be kind and gracious toward my expertise at love, which is your own
gift to me: do not, out of anger, take it away or disable it; and grant that I may be
held in higher esteem than ever by those who are beautiful. If Phaedrus and I said
anything that shocked you in our earlier speech, blame it on Lysias, who was his
father, and put a stop to his making speeches of this sort; convert him to
philosophy like his brother Polemarchus so that his lover (ἐραστής) here may no
longer play both sides as he does now, but simply devote his life to Love through
philosophical discussions (ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς πρὸς ἔρωτα μετὰ φιλοσόφων
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λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῆται.).50
The soul’s ascent is made possible only by a “lover’s friendship” (ἐραστοῦ φιλία).51
The most important logos in Phaedrus comes during the discussions on the topic of love
among passionate friends. When Socrates calls on the god of love, he pairs two words for
love together: philia, as in love of wisdom (or philosophy), and eros, as in the loverbeloved (or erastēs-erōmenos) relationship. The pairing of the two is philosophical
erotics. Moss agrees that Plato believes “a wise leader can use her disciple’s erotic desire
for beauty as a tool by which to lead him to philosophy.”52 Symposium harnesses the
attraction to various images of beauty while Phaedrus plays on the love of a specific
image—speeches. “True rhetoric will focus people’s love for the fine and beautiful onto
fine and beautiful logoi,” says Moss, “which have been designed to lead the hearers' souls
towards the love of wisdom.”53 In each dialogue the lover-beloved plays a role in how
love and rhetoric relate to one another. The lover is supposed to lead the beloved’s soul to
becoming a virtuous Athenian citizen by exposing him to speeches and ideas that
cultivate civic pride and other virtues. The philosopher is the best-suited lover, i.e., leader
of the souls of the youth. The beloved is Beauty; to reach it, one must actively pursue it
with the divine madness of erotic vigor.
The last line of the prayer to Eros is arguably the most powerful in its simplicity.
The purpose of the dialogue is to lead the reader to commit his life to eros through
philosophical discussions. The word translated as “devote” is ποιῆται, derived from
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ποιέω. According to Liddell and Scott, poieō means primarily to “make, produce, first of
something material, as manufactures, works of art, etc.”54 In this sense, Phaedrus’s life is
in his own hands; he has the ability to construct it like a painter makes a work of art.
Poieō can also mean “create, bring into existence, beget, conceive” as it is used in the
genealogy of eros in Plato’s Symposium.55 Penia conceived a scheme to conceive a child
with Poros. The true nature of eros, as Diotima describes, is to actively love
what is beautiful, and wisdom is extremely beautiful. It follows that love must be a
lover of wisdom, and, as such, is in between being wise and being ignorant. This,
too, comes from his parentage, from a father who is wise and resourceful and a
mother who is not wise and lacks resource.56
Both conceptions (dialectic relationship) and children (sexual relationship) are created as
a response to beauty. Phaedrus should harness his love of speeches inspired by beautiful
words, and direct that eros singularly towards its true object, Beauty itself. Ascent is
mutually beneficial just as descent is mutually destructive.
The dialogue concludes with an appropriate bookend: Socrates reminds Phaedrus
that their “playful amusement regarding discourse is complete” and that he should return
to Lysias and give him a full report on the events that occurred next to the stream so that
he, too, can benefit from it.57 Socrates repeats the difference between a philosopher and a
sophist, calling Lysias a “speech writer” (278e1) and not someone who “seriously
pursues” (278d1) wisdom. Socrates is providing Phaedrus with a gentle reminder of the
lessons gathered from their day spent together under the platon tree. The older man
54
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pushes the younger one—a lover of speeches—to love wisdom, as a philosopher, instead
of what appears wise, as a sophist. As if speaking to Phaedrus, Socrates conjectures the
future of his “friend” Isocrates.58 Socrates says, “It seems to me that by his nature he can
outdo anything Lysias has accomplished in his speeches; and he also has a nobler
character.”59 Phaedrus is a step ahead of his lover, Lysias, in that his intentions are pure.
He loves speeches and does not seek any personal gain from them other than the joy of
beautiful words.
Socrates continues to foresee that the speeches his friend writes will improve as he
ages, but that there will probably come a time when speech-writing does not satisfy, for
“a higher, divine impulse leads (ἄγοι) him to more important things. For nature, my
friend, has placed a love of wisdom in his mind.”60 As a speech-lover, Phaedrus has
potential to become a philosopher. Socrates becomes mythmaker to lead Phaedrus’s soul
out of the realm of the body-sophistic and ascending toward the intellectual-philosophic
life. Phaedrus is awed by the speech, and is captivated enough to discuss what makes a
good speech afterwards, as he should do concerning all the speeches he hears within the
city walls.
As a final reminder, Socrates offers a prayer to Pan that expresses his passionate
desire for beauty, harmony, wisdom, and moderation of the soul:
O dear Pan, and all the other gods of this place, grant that I may be beautiful inside.
Earlier in the palinode, referring to divine madness, Socrates mentions prophecy as “the clear-headed
study of the future, which uses birds and other signs, was originally called oionoïstic, since it uses
reasoning to bring intelligence (nous) and learning (historia) into human thought” (Plato Phaedrus 244c5–
7). Bird analogies are used throughout the palinode in connection to the charioteer analogy and the process
of ascent. They are also an allusion to the cicadas, as they both have wings for the purpose of ascent
(flight).
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Let all my external possessions be in friendly (φίλια) harmony with what is within.
May I consider the wise man rich. As for gold, let me have as much as a moderate
man could bear and carry with him.61
This last prayer of Phaedrus sums up the virtues a true lover will instill in his beloved. It
also evokes Alcibiades’ description of Socrates in Symposium. When he catches a
glimpse of what is within Socrates’ rough exterior, he says it was “godlike—so bright
and beautiful, so utterly amazing.”62 Socrates’ virtue overwhelms Alcibiades, but he
ultimately misses the transition from lower goods to higher goods; he covets Socrates’
wisdom, but wants to possess it in the same way a rich man can possess a material
object—by throwing some money at it. Alcibiades seems to believe that when he
associates with Socrates and “throws some time” at him, he will come to possess the
same intellectual beauty. At the beginning of the dialogue Agathon mirrors this sentiment
when he flirtatiously requests that Socrates sit next to him because “if I touch you, I may
catch a bit of wisdom […] It’s clear you’ve seen the light.”63 Socrates flirts in return as
he responds that he wishes it were true that “wisdom were like water, which always flows
from a full cup into an empty one” because he could sit next to Agathon and “soon
overflow with your wonderful wisdom” and be the true winner of the evening.64
Associating with a philosopher may make you appear wiser, but it does not make you
truly wise, just as attending the celebration for Agathon’s poetry prize does not make
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everyone at the symposium “winners.”65
Alcibiades ends his speech in Symposium by comparing Socrates’ internal and
external qualities with his arguments:
If you were to listen to his arguments, at first they’d strike you as totally
ridiculous; they’re clothed in words as coarse as the hides worn by the most
vulgar satyrs […] he’s always making the same tired old points in the same tired
old words […] But if you see [the arguments] when they open up like the statues,
if you go behind the surface, you’ll realize that no other arguments make any
sense. They’re truly worthy of a god, bursting with figures of virtue inside.
They’re of great—no, of the greatest—importance for anyone who wants to
become a truly great man.66
If Alcibiades’ speech highlights the stark difference between the amount of beauty
contained by external and internal qualities of Socrates, then why does Phaedrus end
with a prayer to make the external and internal harmonious? Socrates prays to be
beautiful inside, but he also prays that his external possessions will “be in friendly
harmony with what is within.”67 He wants the external and internal to be friends. He
seems to be saying that it is sometimes appropriate to use beautiful language to attract
those who are persuaded by rhetoric. “One assumes the philosopher is outside the
configuration as the grand manipulator of the transformations,” Gellrich argues, “but the

65

Many in attendance were accused of desecrating statues of Hermes and profaning the Eleusinian
mysteries, therefore seen as traitorous or of inferior moral characters. Cf. Nails 2002 for a full account of
the events in question.
66
Plato Symposium 221e1–222a5.
67
Plato Phaedrus 279c.

224

dialogue […] reveals the embeddedness of dialectic in the terms it strives to transcend.”68
Socrates induces transformation through the pharmakon of the palinode. First through
becoming mythmaker, second by initiating discussion through questions that spark
Phaedrus’s interest, and third by pointing to that beyond the dialectic through prayer that
“writes words in their souls” and not on impotent scrolls.69 In Philebus, Socrates asks
Protarchus, “What is the object which catches my eye there beside the rock under a tree?”
and responds that “It is a man.”70 Perhaps it is Phaedrus he sees, writing these prayers on
his soul to remind himself of what transcends speeches and dialectical exchange.
Plato constructed Phaedrus with three speeches that gradually improve both
rhetorically and philosophically. Socrates acts as magician because he manipulates
language in order to lead Phaedrus to recollect Beauty itself. Rhetoric, as a way to lead
souls, is not outside the purview of the philosopher. It is a pedagogical tool aiming at
ascent. The series of divinities invoked in the prayers of Phaedrus point to the ascent that
takes place during the afternoon. The prayers in Phaedrus invoke the Muses, Eros, and
philosophical arguments. Then, Socrates utters a prayer to no god in particular,
expressing a desire for him and Phaedrus to become philosophers. Lastly, he recites a
prayer to Pan and all the gods of the place where they resided for the afternoon. I argue
that the progression of prayers suggests that the soul open to divine inspiration will
experience the passion of eros. If a person has “god-sent madness” like that provided by
the Muses (first prayer), his soul will be opened to the possibility of experiencing love.
Experiencing the madness of love (second prayer) is the start of the soul’s recollection.
68
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This in turn leads the soul to the yearning for Beauty itself via philosophical eros (third
and fourth prayers). The consequence is that the soul becomes virtuous by reflecting
Beauty itself, as the prayer to Pan (fifth prayer) seeks. 71
Phaedrus responds that Socrates’ final prayer works for him as well because
“friends [φίλων] have everything in common.”72 There is no pantomime of affection as
in the beginning of their time together. Socrates has earned Phaedrus’s friendship.
Although Socrates usually does not venture from the city that has so many opportunities
for dialectic, he found a potential dialectical sparring partner under the silent platon tree.
Together they ascend another rung on the ladder leading to wisdom and eudaimonia. The
last words of the dialogue are Socrates’ declaration, “Let’s be off” (ἴωμεν).73 When
using the word ἴωμεν in reference to birds, it means to fly.74 Socrates and Phaedrus
strengthened their soul’s wings and ascended while discussing speeches together “with
great pleasure.”75 Now they are ready to join in the larger discussion within the city
walls. It is up to Phaedrus to decide who will help lead his soul (a philosopher or a
sophist), and to what end (Beauty or an image of beauty). The two “sang playfully, but
also appropriately and respectfully, a storylike hymn to [their] master […] Love, who
watches over beautiful boys,” and now it is time to head off to the city to mingle their
voices with all of Athens in its frenzied procession, like the cicadas who sung above them
all afternoon.76
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